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MASS SHOOTINGS, MENTAL “ILLNESS,” AND 
TARASOFF 
J. Thomas Sullivan* 
ABSTRACT 
The continuing public attention focused on acts of mass violence, including 
mass shootings, has understandably created significant concerns over the ability to 
protect individuals from death and injury attributable to these acts. At least two 
generalized explanations for this kind of violence have been put forward, based on 
the nature of the acts and apparent motivation of the perpetrators, who are often 
killed in the process by themselves or law enforcement officers. Many acts of mass 
violence are committed by individuals confirmed to be terrorists, acting with 
political or religious-political motivations. Others are assumed to be committed by 
individuals acting out of mental instability. For at least the latter, evidence of prior 
mental health problems or treatment affords support for the notion that mental health 
professionals may offer the potential for prevention in some cases or instances. 
While looking to the mental health professions for solutions to some cases of mass 
violence may seem logical and has resulted in legislative responses that recognize 
or create a duty for mental health professionals to warn or take other protective 
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action to prevent injury to third persons, it is far from clear that this approach can 
be counted on to yield favorable results, and certainly not with respect to all, or even 
a majority of episodes of mass violence. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE LAS VEGAS MASSACRE, AND AFTER 
The Las Vegas mass shooting committed by Stephen Paddock, who killed 
himself after fatally wounding fifty-eight outdoor concert-goers and injuring 
approximately 500 more during a relatively short but extremely intense shooting 
spree using numerous assault rifles,1 now ranks as the single most violent mass 
shooting episode in United States history.2 Paddock unleashed his assault on 
October 1, 2017, firing from a room at the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino into a 
crowd attending a music concert on the street below. In the aftermath of the dramatic 
assault, questions about the shooter’s motivation remain unanswered.3 Apparently, 
however, there has been no evidence of neurocognitive disorders or mental illness 
uncovered, reflecting a common question posed in the wake of such events as to what 
would cause an individual to engage in this kind of horrible act. 
President Donald Trump offered his view of Paddock’s motivation to reporters 
at a Cabinet meeting: 
                                                          
 
1 Las Vegas Shooting: What We Know, CNN (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/02/us/las-
vegas-shooting-what-we-know. The number of dead and injured victims fluctuated with early news 
reports, but an Associated Press story published on October 5 and quoted in the USA Today article 
reported: “Clark County Coroner John Fudenberg said all 58 victims in the shooting at a Las Vegas concert 
have been identified and families notified. Fudenberg declined to answer questions about how the victims 
died.” Coroner Says All Vegas Victims Now Identified, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www 
.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2017/10/06/coroner-says-all-vegas-victims-now-
identified/106342976/. 
2 Leila Fadel, ‘You Can Get Through It’: Las Vegas Shooting Survivors Rebuild Their Lives, NPR 
(Sept. 23, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/23/649264345/one-year-after-the-las-vegas-
shooting-2-survivors-remember. The Las Vegas shooting is only one of several most lethal attacks in U.S. 
history, with the deadliest assault being the terrorist attack on World Trade Center Towers on 
September 11, 2001. Pamela Engel & Ellen Ioanes, What Happened on 9/11, 19 Years Ago, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 10, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-on-911-why-2016-9. 
3 See, e.g., Melissa Healy, What Drove Las Vegas Shooter to Kill? We Don’t Know, and It Drives Us 
Crazy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-shooting-
mental-health-20171012-story.html (“Police detectives and criminal profilers are working overtime in 
their efforts to dissect Paddock’s behavior, circumstances and psychological state in the lead-up to the 
shootings. Mental health professionals and experts on human behavior, meanwhile, are bearing witness 
to a more common and less mysterious response on the part of Americans: a sense that without an 
explanation for Paddock’s actions, we cannot psychologically close the chapter on this shooting.”). 
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I guess a lot of people think they understand what happened, but he was a 
demented, sick individual. . . .The wires were crossed pretty badly in his brain. 
Extremely badly in his brain. And it’s a very sad event.4 
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: MASS SHOOTINGS AND THE 
SHOOTER’S STATE OF MIND 
The sheer magnitude of the massacre committed by deceased suspect Stephen 
Paddock, apparently acting solo or without accomplice assistance, necessarily raised 
the question of why any individual would commit such a crime. What motivation 
could explain such a random act of mass violence?5 President Trump’s 
characterization of Paddock as “a demented, sick individual” hardly seems 
unreasonable in light of the circumstances of the Las Vegas mass shooting. 
Within a few months, other mass shootings had occurred, including one at a 
church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on November 5, 2017.6 There, shooter Devin 
Patrick Kelley, dressed in tactical/military gear, shot forty-six people with an 
“assault-style” rifle, killing twenty-six churchgoers while they were attending 
Sunday morning services at the First Baptist Church. He had “escaped” from an 
inpatient facility in 2012 and had a history of domestic violence, suicidal behavior, 
and cruelty to animals.7 
Then, on February 14, 2018, seventeen students were killed and seventeen 
others were wounded during the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School 
in Parkland, Florida. The mass murder was committed by Nicholas Cruz, a former 
student at the school armed with an assault rifle. Cruz had a long history of school 
and social service interventions due to behavior that was “moody, impulsive, angry, 
                                                          
 
4 Dana Dovey, Trump Says Las Vegas Shooter’s Brain Was Wired up Extremely Badly: Autopsy Literally 
Just Showed This Wasn’t True, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017, 4:36 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-
says-las-vegas-shooters-brain-was-wired-extremely-badly-autopsy-686312. 
5 Healy, supra note 3. 
6 David Fernandez, Christopher Mele & Manny Fernandez, Gunman Kills at Least 26 in Attack on Rural 
Texas Church, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/us/church-shooting-
texas.html. 
7 See Eli Rosenberg, Derek Hawkins & Julie Tate, Who Is Devin Patrick Kelley, the Gunman Officials 
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attention seeking, annoy[ing] others on purpose and threaten[ing] to hurt others.”8 In 
the aftermath of this shooting, which garnered national attention based on the 
students’ demonstrations supporting gun regulation, President Trump commented on 
the need to provide additional security in schools and to “tackle the difficult issue of 
mental health.”9 
The Florida high school shooting continued the pattern of mass shootings 
dominating the news in the United States in recent years,10 all generating renewed 
public debate over the availability of firearms, specifically assault rifles, and the 
mental stability of the individuals perpetrating the violence. President Trump 
focused on the mental health of the offenders perhaps to deflect attention from the 
gun control debate and to avoid possible legislation. However, he also relied on a 
common perception that perpetrators of these mass murders must be mentally 
compromised—that rational individuals could not be responsible for these episodes 
of violence. 
In the aftermath of the Parkland, Florida high school shooting, the New York 
Times related President Trump’s responses to other recent mass shootings and his 
focus on mental impairment as the cause of these acts: 
“So many signs that the Florida shooter was mentally disturbed, even 
expelled from school for bad and erratic behavior,” Mr. Trump said in a tweet 
hours before he addressed the public. “Neighbors and classmates knew he was a 
big problem. Must always report such instances to authorities, again and again!” 
He delivered similar remarks in November, after a gunman with a military-
style rifle mowed down more than two dozen parishioners in a church in 
Sutherland Springs, Tex. Mr. Trump told reporters that the problem “isn’t a guns 
situation” and that the shooting signified “a mental health problem at the highest 
level.” 
                                                          
 
8 Rafael Olmeda, School Officials Worried About Nikolas Cruz and Guns 18 Months Before Mass 
Shooting, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/ 
florida-school-shooting/fl-reg-florida-school-shooting-mental-health-20180316-story.html. 
9 Katie Rogers, After Florida Shooting, Trump Focuses on Mental Health Over Guns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/politics/trump-florida-shooting-guns.html. 
10 The New York Times reported on April 10, 2019, in a follow-up article on the Parkland shooting: “The 
F.B.I. identified 27 active-shooter incidents in the United States last year, according to a report the bureau 
published on Wednesday. The episodes, which spanned 16 states, killed 85 people. None was deadlier 
than the Parkland shooting.” Patricia Mazzei, Parkland Victims’ Families Sue, Claiming Negligence in 
Mass Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/parkland-lawsuits-
safety.html. 
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In October, after a gunman in Las Vegas killed 58 people and wounded 
hundreds in the deadliest mass shooting in United States history, Mr. Trump called 
the assailant “a very sick man” and a “demented person.”11 
The evidence that mental illness was responsible for the acts perpetrated by 
individuals who committed these mass shootings is not clear. But, over time, the 
motivations of individuals responsible for these episodes will become clearer in at 
least some cases. For instance, there is evidence developed in news reporting and in 
litigation arising from the Parkland shooting12 that the perpetrator had a lengthy 
history of involvement with mental health providers and had been prescribed 
psychoactive medication.13 
There is little evidence, however, that mental illness actually caused the 
individuals responsible for these mass shootings to engage in shootings or other acts 
of mass violence. Evidence shows that some perpetrators suffered from mental 
illness or emotional problems at some point prior to their homicidal rampages, but it 
is more difficult to establish a direct link that would permit the inference that 
intervention by mental health professionals would have prevented the mass 
shootings. Nevertheless, the suggestion has been continually advanced that the 
underlying problem reflected in these episodes is that mental health issues, rather 
than other explanations—such as ideological terrorism—should be the focus of the 
nation’s response to these shootings. The response is itself unfocused, while the 
suggestions by President Trump and others of mental impairment as the cause for 
mass shootings implies that the mental health community can provide the solution. 
The issue of the shooter’s intent is complicated by evidence at least suggesting 
alternative theories that may reflect sociopathic personalities. For example, the 
shooting at a Jewish synagogue, The Tree of Life Congregation, in which eleven 
worshipers were killed and six injured, was perpetrated by Robert Gregory Bowers, 
                                                          
 
11 Rogers, supra note 9. 
12 Megan O’Matz, Mental Health Provider Had Long History with Parkland Shooter: Was Agency 
Negligent?, SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/ 
parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-ne-henderson-cruz-civil-suit-20190116-story.html. The author was 
the member of the Sun Sentinel reporting team that was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the 
shooting. Id. Numerous civil actions have been filed against school officials, mental health providers and 
individuals, including the school’s public safety officer who reportedly failed to respond appropriately to 
the shooting inside the school. See Mazzei, supra note 10. 
13 See, e.g., Olmeda, supra note 8. Sherman Douglass High School Shooting, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Stoneman_Douglas_High_School_shooting (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  6 9 3   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
whose social media posts indicate white supremacist, anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi 
beliefs.14 Similarly, social media posts linked to Patrick Crusius, arrested after the 
fatal shooting of twenty-two people at a Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, on 
August 3, 2019, with at least twenty-four others known injured at the time, included 
the shooting suspect’s white supremacist manifesto. His post discloses that the attack 
was a “response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.”15 
The El Paso shooting followed on the heels of a shooting that killed four and 
injured thirteen, including the shooter, at the Gilroy Garlic Festival in Gilroy, 
California, on July 28, 2019. The Gilroy shooter, a nineteen-year-old white male, 
had no known history of mental illness and had posted a message on social media 
immediately before the shooting directing people to read Might Is Right, a book 
commonly used to “justify racism, slavery and colonialism.”16 
Following the El Paso attack and another mass shooting at the Ned Peppers Bar 
in Dayton, Ohio the following day in which ten people were killed, including the 
shooter, and twenty-seven others were wounded,17 President Trump again blamed 
                                                          
 
14 See Campbell Robertson, Christopher Mele & Sabrina Tavernise, 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; 
Suspect Charged with 29 Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/ 
us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html. The shooting occurred on October 27, 2018. Id. 
15 Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, ‘I’m the Shooter’: El Paso Suspect Confessed to Targeting Mexicans, 
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/us/el-paso-suspect-
confession.html. He drove ten to eleven hours from Allen, Texas, to the store location in El Paso, on the 
Texas border with Mexico, and used a semi-automatic assault rifle in the attack. Id. 
16 Ruben Vives, Richard Winton, Hannah Fry, Matthew Ormseth, Laura J. Nelson, Colleen Shalby & 
Hailey Branson-Potts, What We Know About the Gilroy Garlic Festival Shooting Suspect, L.A. TIMES 
(July 29, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-07-29/what-we-know-about-gilroy-
garlic-festival-shooting-suspect-santino-william-legan. 
17 Madeline Mitchell, Kevin Grasha, Keith Biery Golick, Cameron Knight, Rachel Berry & Anne Saker, 
Connor Betts: Dayton Gunman Played in ‘Pornogrind’ Metal Band, Had a ‘Kill List,’ Choked Women, 
CIN. ENQUIRER (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2019/08/04/dayton-shooting-
what-we-know-gunman/1916121001 (showing that the killer, Connor Betts, composed a “kill list” and 
“rape list” in high school, had a history of depression and domestic violence, and has an expunged juvenile 
record). He shot and killed his sister before shooting others at the bar, using an AR-15 style pistol to shoot 
his 36 victims in 32 seconds. Amber Hunt, In Dayton, 32 Seconds That Changed Everything, CIN. 
ENQUIRER (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2019/08/08/dayton-shooting-32-
seconds-changed-everything/1935832001/. 
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mental illness for the mass shootings. He explained, “This is also a mental illness 
problem. . . . These are people that are very, very seriously mentally ill.”18 
While President Trump’s pronouncement of mental illness as the cause of mass 
shootings is not based on expert opinion, education, or training in mental health—
his background is in real estate development—his characterization of the mental state 
of shooters in these events undoubtedly would be echoed by others. However, there 
is a danger in simplifying causation and attributing a common, though general, 
diagnostic explanation to individual behavior not individually examined. Incidents 
of mass violence, including mass shootings, logically raise questions about the 
mental state of the perpetrator, or perpetrators, or accomplices, particularly whether 
these acts could have been prevented by professional intervention. 
The consistent theme in the aftermath of the recurring episodes of mass 
violence involving firearms in the United States over the past few years19 has been 
the typically unanswered questions about the shooter’s state of mind. Speculation 
has focused on symptoms of major mental illness and aberrant thinking or behavior 
exhibited by perpetrators prior to these episodes.20 Evidence of prior treatment by 
                                                          
 
18 Spencer Kimball, Trump Says Mass Shootings in El Paso and Dayton Are a “Mental Illness Problem,” 
CNBC (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/04/trump-says-hate-has-no-place-in-our-country-
after-shootings-in-dayton-and-el-paso.html. 
19 Speculation concerning the cause of a perceived increase in episodes of mass violence, particularly 
focusing on mass shootings, is not necessarily a recent concern at all, however. See, for example, Mark 
Follman, Gavin Aronsen & Deanna Pan, A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 26, 
2020), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map?page=2, for a history of mass 
shooting violence in the United States over the past thirty-five years published five years ago. Mother 
Jones is a liberal/populist publication. For another perspective, see Jesse Singal, Mass Shootings Aren’t 
on the Rise, N.Y. MAG. (June 11, 2014), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/06/mass-shootings-arent-
on-the-rise.html, relating conclusions of nationally prominent Northeastern University criminologist 
James Fox. Mother Jones updated its history that now includes the incidence of mass shootings over the 
past five years. Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen & Deanna Pan, US Mass Shootings, 1982–2019: Data 
From Mother Jones’ Investigation, MOTHER JONES, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/ 
mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data/; see also Mazzei, supra note 10 (“The F.B.I. identified 27 active-
shooter incidents in the United States last year, according to a report the bureau published on Wednesday. 
The episodes, which spanned 16 states, killed 85 people. None was deadlier than the Parkland shooting.”). 
20 See, e.g., Dewey G. Cornell, Gun Violence and Mass Shootings—Myths, Facts and Solutions, WASH. 
POST (June 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/06/11/gun-violence-
and-mass-shootings-myths-facts-and-solutions/. Dr. Cornell, a clinical psychologist and faculty associate 
at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, writes in this guest 
editorial that mental illness is not a common factor in recent acts of mass violence, while noting that 
statistical evidence shows that incidents of mass violence are actually decreasing, not increasing over the 
past twenty years. Id. He explains: 
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mental health professionals is offered to suggest that the tragic deaths of victims,21 
often children targeted in attacks committed at schools and other public forums, 
could have been prevented by appropriate intervention.22 The gun lobby, resisting 
                                                          
 
It seems intuitive that anyone who commits a mass shooting must be mentally 
ill, but this is a misuse of the term “mental illness.” Mental illness is a term 
reserved for the most severe mental disorders where the person has severe 
symptoms such as delusions or hallucinations. Decades of mental health 
research show that only a small proportion of persons with mental illness 
commit violent acts, and together they account for only a fraction of violent 
crime. Some mass shooters have had a mental illness. Most do not. 
Id. Dr. Cornell does explain, however, that mental health intervention is an important factor in preventing 
mass shootings: 
In case after case of mass shootings, we learn later that family members, 
friends, and even mental health professionals were concerned that someone 
needed help. Predicting violence is difficult, but identifying that someone 
needs assistance is not so difficult. This is where we need to readjust our focus 
and concentrate on helping people in distress. This approach requires not only 
a change in police policy but community mental health services that are 
oriented around prevention. 
Id. 
21 Time Magazine published a list of the victims killed as a result of shootings in incidents of mass violence 
on Facebook, with the included explanation: 
To compile this list of 630 victims of mass shootings, we’ve relied on the 
database maintained by the magazine Mother Jones, one of the most 
authoritative records of such incidents. It tracks mass shootings in the United 
States beginning in 1982. There is no one authoritative source on how many 
people have died in mass shootings—or, in fact, what constitutes a mass 
shooting. Until recently, a mass shooting was traditionally defined as an attack 
that kills at least four people, excluding the shooter, in a public space. (The 
federal government reduced its definition to three victims in 2013.) This list 
relies on the federal definition at the time that the attack took place. We 
compiled the names of these 82 attacks using public records and 
contemporaneous news accounts. If you believe any of the names or ages are 
wrongly recorded, please contact us at feedback@time.com. 
Rosalie Chan, David Johnson, Emma Ockerman & Justin Worland, Why Did They Die?, TIME, http:// 
time.com/mass-shootings-victims/ (last visited June 19, 2021). 
22 For example, reports indicate that there was evidence of prior psychological problems known to have 
afflicted the shooter in the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting in Newton, Connecticut, on 
December 14, 2012. See Lauren Fox, Report: Sandy Hook Shooter Adam Lanza Was Obsessed with Mass 
Shootings, US NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/25/report-sandy-
hook-shooter-adam-lanza-was-obsessed-with-mass-shootings. The report noted: 
Lanza struggled with mental illness, a history of obsessive-compulsive 
behaviors and a fascination with mass shootings—particularly the 1999 school 
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calls for greater regulation of firearms, has traditionally argued that mentally-
impaired individuals are excluded from Second Amendment protections and that 
more aggressive identification of those individuals would prevent many acts of gun 
violence.23 Ironically, among the first important actions taken by the Republican-
dominated Congress following the 2016 national election was the reversal of an 
Obama administration policy limiting access to gun purchases for individuals who 
had been determined to have mental disorders.24 As Americans struggle with these 
scenes of violence and seek solutions, the role of mental health professionals in 
identifying potential perpetrators and preventing otherwise irrational acts of mass 
violence25 has necessarily become the subject of debate.26 
                                                          
 
shooting in Columbine, Colo., the report said. Yet, none of the mental health 
specialists he had a record of meeting with predicted he was capable of lashing 
out violently. While Lanza had seen professionals for his mental issues, but 
declined medicines prescribed to help him manage his symptoms. 
Id. 
23 The National Rifle Association (NRA), the nation’s most powerful lobby supporting individual gun 
ownership, has focused on the relationship between mental illness and gun violence through its Institute 
for Legislative Action. See Mental Health and Firearms, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION 
(Jan. 24, 2013), www.nraila.org/articles/20130124/mental-health-andrms (citing The Mentally Ill, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1966). The NRA position has been consistent and has been included in proposed 
congressional legislation, as reported by PBS. Harvi Svreenvihasan, NRA-backed Bill Aims To Keep Guns 
from Mentally Ill, PBS (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/nra-backed-bill-aims-keep-
guns-mentally-ill/. 
24 Ali Vitali, Trump Signs Bill Revoking Obama-Era Gun Checks for People with Mental Illnesses, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-signs-bill-revoking-obama-era-
gun-checks-people-mental-n727221; Editorial Bd., Congress Says, Let the Mentally Ill Buy Guns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/congress-says-let-the-mentally-ill-
buy-guns.html. 
25 Of course, the fact that acts of mass violence may be perceived as irrational by observers, even those 
trained in evaluating intellectual or emotional motivation, may well simply reflect a failure to perceive 
motivations that are understood as rational by their perpetrators. 
26 Consider the position advanced by Charles Peters, founding editor of the Washington Monthly: 
I am a supporter of stringent gun control, but I am troubled by the conviction 
of some pro-control advocates that their position is somehow weakened by 
conceding that serious mental health problems contribute to the violence. The 
Gabby Giffords shooting in Tucson, the shooting at the Aurora movie theater 
in Denver, and the shooting at the primary school in Newtown were all 
committed by men who were quite obviously mentally ill. 
Years ago, after we had been shocked by movies like The Snake Pit, we 
decided to deinstitutionalize the mentally ill, but as the psychiatrist Fuller 
Torrey pointed out in these pages a decade ago, we neglected to fund enough 
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However, even when the evidence suggests a perpetrator acted out of some 
mental impairment, that explanation will not likely be translated into a legal excuse 
for the act in terms of insanity.27 The formulation in M’Naghten, the touchstone for 
most theories of insanity adopted by American jurisdictions, requires an actor to 
prove that he did not understand the nature of his acts or that he could not distinguish 
right from wrong.28 An expanded theory included in the Model Penal Code definition 
of the offense recognizes that insanity may be evidenced by the actor’s inability to 
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law,29 but this legal theory of insanity 
has not been adopted by all jurisdictions and is not available in federal 
prosecutions.30 Moreover, the compromised mental state of the accused also 
                                                          
 
outpatient mental health clinics. Those that were funded tended to favor the 
easier-to-treat neurotics, rather than the more difficult, potentially violent 
patients. And few of us have wanted to face the difficult problem of how to 
compel the potentially violent to take the necessary medication. 
Charles Peters, McCruzyism . . . Too Big to Jail . . . Wake up, Democrats, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar.–Apr. 
2013, https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril-2013/mccruzyism-too-big-to-jail-wake-up-
democrats/. 
27 The States are accorded substantial discretion in defining criminal offenses and recognizing defenses 
and affirmative defenses applicable in responding to charges of criminal violations. Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). No state has been required to recognize a defense based on mental illness, or 
insanity, and any jurisdiction that does afford the accused the option of defending on mental impairment 
grounds has broad discretion to define the parameters of the insanity defense applicable in prosecutions 
for violation of criminal offenses. Id. The issue of whether an accused must be accorded a defense based 
upon impaired mental state, however, is before the Supreme Court in Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-3165, cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019), case below, State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018). 
28 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The rule arose from the attempted killing of English Prime 
Minister Robert Peel by M’Naghten, who believed Peel wanted to kill him. Id. M’Naghten shot Peel’s 
secretary by mistake and at trial, offered medical experts who testified that he was psychotic, leading to 
his acquittal by reason of insanity. Id. Public outcry over the verdict led to formulation of a rule governing 
the defense by the Lords of Justice of the Queen’s Bench. Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and 
Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7 n.26 (1988). 
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.”). 
30 The federal insanity defense, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2018), does not permit reliance on psychiatric evidence 
of mental impairment to establish a defense not based upon inability to distinguish right from wrong. The 
federal statute limits insanity to proof, by clear and convincing evidence, id. at (b), that the defendant 
“was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect 
does not otherwise constitute a defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2018). The federal statute frames the “right 
from wrong” test in terms of the inability to “appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his 
acts.” 
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typically only affords an accused reliance on the defense when the cause of the 
impairment is a qualifying “mental disease or defect.”31 Thus, the Model Penal Code 
excludes mental impairment diagnosed as an antisocial personality disorder, for 
instance.32 To the extent that references to the mass shooter’s “mental illness” 
inaccurately include mischaracterization of less common ideological or religious 
beliefs or personality disorders,33 these factors would likely not qualify the 
                                                          
 
31 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-107(a) (2020): 
(7)(A) “Mental disease or defect” means a: 
(i) Substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory 
that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or 
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life; 
(ii) State of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing 
concurrently with a defect of adaptive behavior that developed during the 
developmental period; or 
(iii) Significant impairment in cognitive functioning acquired as a direct 
consequence of a brain injury or resulting from a progressively deteriorating 
neurological condition. . . . 
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental 
disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct.”). Similarly, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-301(7)(B) (2020) provides: 
(B) As used in the Arkansas Criminal Code, “mental disease or defect” does 
not include an abnormality manifested only by: 
(i) Repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct; 
(ii) Continuous or noncontinuous periods of intoxication, as defined in § 5-2-
207(b)(1), caused by a substance such as alcohol or a drug; or 
(iii) Dependence upon or addiction to any substance such as alcohol or a drug; 
In Montana v. Egelhoff, the Court held that a state is not required to recognize voluntary intoxication as a 
basis for a defense due to impairment compromising the defendant’s ability to form the required intent 
for proof of the offense. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
33 See Emily Campbell, The Psychopath and the Definition of “Mental Disease or Defect” Under the 
Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Question of Psychology or a Question of Law?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 
190 (1990). Personality disorders do not constitute mental illness. The most common diagnoses of 
personality disordered individuals likely to fit mass murderers would be that they exhibit antisocial 
personality disorder. This disorder is characterized by antisocial behavior such as: deceiving others for 
personal gain; committing crimes; disregarding rules or the safety of others; acting impulsively or 
aggressively; acting coldly toward others; lying about big and little things; having few, if any, close 
relationships; having trouble keeping a job or doing schoolwork; or taking unneeded risks. Smitha 
Bhandari, M.D., How Sociopaths and Psychopaths Are Different, WEBMD (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www 
.webmd.com/mental-health/psychopath-sociopath-differences#1. For more on the more specific diagnosis 
of “psychopath,” a similar characterization even more likely to describe mass murderers, see Paul Babiak, 
M.S., Ph.D et al., Psychopathy: An Important Forensic Concept for the 21st Century, FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL. (July 1, 2012), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/psychopathy-an-
important-forensic-concept-for-the-21st-century (“If psychopaths commit a homicide, their killing likely 
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perpetrator for a legitimate, or successful, claim of insanity in the absence of 
evidence that the shooter acted while psychotic. Even when the accused claiming 
mental impairment can establish its existence through expert testimony, the 
jurisdiction’s defense may not include recognition of the mental illness or 
impairment as an excuse based upon its approach on limiting the defense.34 
Evidence that the perpetrator of an act of mass violence planned the offense; 
prepared to commit the act by acquiring semi-automatic weapons; engaged in 
stealthy access to the location of the planned attack; and attempted to conceal the 
attack; or, as in many cases, made a pre-determined decision to be killed or commit 
suicide following the attack may all lead jurors to reject a claim of insanity or other 
impairment. Instead, jurors may infer that the perpetrator’s ability to distinguish right 
from wrong, or appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of the planned action, was 
not compromised by mental illness or defect. Any of these kinds of fact may lead a 
jury simply to reject expert psychiatric opinion that the perpetrator was insane at the 
                                                          
 
will be planned and purposeful, not the result of a loss of emotional control; their motive more commonly 
will involve sadistic gratification.”). The FBI study also reports: 
Psychopathy is not a diagnosis. About one-third of individuals in prison 
deemed “antisocial personality disordered,” the current official Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnosis for the chronically 
antisocial, will meet the criteria for severe psychopathy. In DSM’s upcoming 
fifth edition, psychopathy will become one of five dimensions for describing a 
personality disorder, receiving the official diagnostic blessing of American 
psychiatry after approximately one-half century of research. 
34 For example, in Clark v. Arizona, the Court rejected a challenge to the limitation on use of expert 
opinion on the issue of Clark’s impairment, consistently diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia manifested 
by his belief that alien entities were determined to kill him while posing as law enforcement officers. 548 
U.S. 735, 745 (2006). Clark was charged with first degree murder and hospitalized for two years in order 
for treating psychiatrists to restore him to competence for trial. Id. at 743. While there was consensus in 
the diagnosis and his delusion was found credible by the testifying experts, Clark could not demonstrate 
that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong in committing the homicide. Id. at 745–46. His 
argument that psychiatric opinion demonstrated an excuse, in constitutional terms, was rejected in light 
of Arizona’s limitation imposed on mental state evidence that recognizes only insanity when the actor 
cannot distinguish right from wrong. Thus, his claim that the evidence was admissible to demonstrate that 
he lacked the specific intent to commit murder, a necessary element of proof in the prosecution’s case, 
failed under Arizona law. Id. at 743. In contrast, in Kahler v. Kansas, the Court upheld the alternative 
approach adopted by Kansas, in which ability to distinguish right from wrong plays no role in excusing 
the accused’s conduct, limiting its mental state defense to proof that the accused could not form the 
element or degree of criminal intent to demonstrate that they acted with the required culpable mental state 
for commission of the offense charged. 140 S. Ct. 1041, 1025–26 (2020). 
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time of the commission of the act of mass violence, moreover, and the jury’s 
rejection of an insanity defense will typically be upheld.35 
In a mass shooting case that did come to trial involving the attack by a lone 
gunman in an Aurora, Colorado movie theater in 2012, the insanity defense failed in 
a rather atypical situation—one in which the perpetrator did not die as a result of 
suicide or gunfire from law enforcement officers.36 The shooting occurred during a 
midnight showing of the Batman film The Dark Knight Rises, during which the 
shooter, James Holmes, fired randomly, killing twelve and injuring seventy 
filmgoers.37 Holmes admitted to the killings and pleaded not guilty based on 
insanity.38 The defense offered a plea of guilty in return for the prosecution’s waiver 
of the death penalty,39 but the State declined and the case proceeded to trial. The jury 
                                                          
 
35 See, e.g., Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713 (1979) (no violation of due process if jurors reject even 
uncontroverted forensic opinion that defendant was insane); Davasher v. State, 823 S.W.2d 863, 872 (Ark. 
1992) (“In support of the verdict, the State argues there was evidence that Davasher bought a machete six 
months before the crime, that he attempted to wash his clothes after the crime to remove incriminating 
evidence, and that he burned his hands so the police would have trouble obtaining his fingerprints. These 
steps taken to avoid identification as the culprit indicate Davasher was cognizant of his wrongdoing at the 
time the crime was committed.”). 
36 The recent release of the film JOKER (Warner Bros. Pictures 2019) prompted family members of victims 
of the 2012 shooting to protest the showing of the film in Aurora because of fears the violence in the film 
would again traumatize the community. See Sandra Gonzalez, Families of Aurora Theater Shooting 
Victims Ask Movie Studio to Take Action Ahead of ‘Joker’ Release, CNN (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www 
.cnn.com/2019/09/24/entertainment/joker-aurora-warner-bros/index.html. 
37 Clayton Sandell, Carolyn McKinley & Christina Ng, James Holmes’ Insanity Plea Accepted by Court 
in Colorado Theater Massacre, ABC NEWS (June 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/james-holmes-
insanity-plea-accepted-court-colorado-theater/story?id=19320525. 
38 John Ingold, James Holmes’ Insanity Plea Faces Historically Long Odds, DENVER POST (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2013/06/06/james-holmes-insanity-plea-faces-historically-long-odds/. The 
Denver Post news story includes the interesting observation: 
In pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, James Holmes is trying to do 
something no accused mass shooter in America has done in more than 20 
years: win a mental-health case. 
He will do it in a state that is one of only a handful in the country to put the 
burden of proving a defendant’s sanity on the prosecution. Even so, Holmes 
faces long odds for a defense that studies show is raised in only about 1 percent 
of all felony cases nationally and successful in only about a quarter of those. 
Id. 
39 John Ingold, James Holmes’ May Plead Guilty to Avoid the Death Penalty, Court Documents Show, 
DENVER POST (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/03/27/james-holmes-may-plead-
guilty-to-avoid -death-penalty-court-documents-show/. 
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rejected the insanity plea but imposed a life sentence on each murder count during 
sentencing.40 Even before Holmes was convicted and sentenced, another theater 
shooting occurred in which two patrons were fatally shot and nine others wounded 
before the shooter committed suicide in Louisiana.41 
More recently, mass murders involving shootings have focused on political or 
ideological motives or explanations for resorting to publicly dramatic incidents of 
violence. For instance, the shooting at the Republican Congressional baseball 
practice was apparently precipitated by political opposition and anger directed at the 
election of President Trump.42 The shootings at the Charleston, South Carolina 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church on June 17, 2015, took the lives of 
nine African-American victims, renewing the threat of domestic terrorism grounded 
in the perpetrator’s white supremacist ideology.43 Later, the San Bernardino, 
                                                          
 
40 James Steffen, James Holmes Sentenced to Life in Prison in the Aurora Theater Shooting, DENVER 
POST (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/07/james-holmes-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-
in-the-aurora-theater-shooting/. 
41 Leslie Turk & Liam Stack, Gunman Kills 2 and Himself in Shooting at Movie Theater in Lafayette, 
Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/us/shooting-at-lafayette-la-
movie-theater.html. The suspect’s journal was subsequently released publicly and revealed antipathy 
toward women, LGBTQ individuals, and Black minorities, mentioning presidential candidates including 
Donald Trump, and praise for Dylann Roof, the suspect arrested in the shooting a month earlier at a 
Charleston, South Carolina church. Id. Additionally, reporting included a reference to an episode in 2008 
in which the Lafayette gunman, John Russell Houser, a 59-year-old drifter in which his relatives petitioned 
a Georgia court to order a mental evaluation for him, but later declined to order him involuntarily 
committed, perhaps enabling him to pass a federal background check in 2014 when he legally purchased 
the .40 caliber handgun used in the theater shooting. Michael Kunzelman & Rebecca Santana, No Clear 
Motive Seen in Louisiana Theater Shooter’s Journal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www 
.apnewsarchive.com/2016/No_clear_motive_seen_in_Louisiana_theater_shooter%27s_journal/id-
948fa33ea4af4dc38ff18900cb1f6bd9. 
42 See Michael D. Shear, Adam Goldman & Emily Cochrane, Steve Scalise Among 4 Shot at Baseball 
Field; Suspect Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/us/steve-
scalise-congress-shot-alexandria-virginia.html (detailing shooting of U.S. Representative Steve Scalise, 
R., Louisiana, Congressional aide, lobbyist and two police officers by self-described supporter of Senator 
Bernie Sanders’ 2016 bid for the Democratic Presidential nomination for President, apparently based on 
the shooter’s political views). 
43 Matt Ford & Adam Chandler, ‘Hate Crime’: A Mass Killing at a Historic Church, ATLANTIC (June 19, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/06/shooting-emanuel-ame-charleston/ 
396209/. A state senator was one of the victims in the shooting that occurred at an historic African 
Episcopal Methodist Church committed by Dylann Roof, proclaimed allegiance to white supremacist 
ideology, reportedly reloading his revolver five times and telling a survivor: “I have to do it. . . . You rape 
our women and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.” Id. Roof reportedly sat through part 
of the church service prior to opening fire, later claiming that he did not suffer from a mental illness and 
representing himself at his capital sentencing hearing, being sentenced to serve nine life sentences. The 
Associated Press, Dylann Roof Appeals Death Penalty in South Carolina Church Massacre, NBC NEWS 
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California,44 and Orlando, Florida shootings,45 as well as the Boston Marathon 
bombing,46 have forced authorities to respond to the threat of internationally-based 
terrorist activity prompted by the allegiance of perpetrators to radical Islam and 
ISIL.47 A particularly surprising attack involved the mass murder of military 
                                                          
 
(Jan. 29, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dylann-roof-appeals-death-penalty-
south-carolina-church-massacre-n1125341. 
44 See, e.g., Josh Sanburn, Why the San Bernadino Shooting is Unprecedented, TIME (Dec. 3, 2015), http:// 
time.com/4135049/san-bernardino-shooting-psychology/. The couple who committed the mass shooting 
of a social services center where the husband was employed killed fourteen people, apparently randomly 
targeted, and apparently as a result of radical Islamic ideological leanings. Michael S. Schmidt & Richard 
Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack As Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html. 
45 See Ariel Zambelich & Alyson Hurt, 3 Hours In Orlando: Piecing Together An Attack and Its Aftermath, 
NPR (June 26, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/482322488/orlando-shooting-what-happened-
update. The Guardian reports, in response to the mass shooting at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, that 
occurred on June 13, 2016: 
Sunday’s attack on the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida was the deadliest 
mass shooting in American history—but there were five other mass shootings 
in the US during that weekend alone. 
“We have a pattern now of mass shootings in this country that has no parallel 
anywhere else in the world,” Barack Obama said after the San Bernardino 
attack in December 2015. 
Data compiled by the Gun Violence Archive reveals a shocking human toll: 
there is a mass shooting—defined as four or more people shot in one incident, 
not including the shooter—on five out of every six days, on average. 
1000 Mass Shootings in 1230 Days: This is What America’s Gun Crisis Looks Like, GUARDIAN, http:// 
www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/oct/02/mass-shootings-america-gun-violence (last 
updated June 13, 2016). 
46 See Boston Marathon Bombings, HISTORY (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.history.com/topics/boston-
marathon-bombings (last updated June 7, 2019) (summarizing bombing of Boston Marathon race, when 
two brothers planted bombs killing three spectators and injuring more than 260 others, believed to be 
related to radical Islamic ideological leanings). 
47 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky & Mark Berman, New York Truck Attack Suspect Charged 
with Terrorism Offense as Trump Calls for a Death Sentence, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/11/01/new-york-attack-probe-expands-to-uzbekistan-
as-possible-militant-links-explored/?utm_term=.1198e58a0673 (Early reports relating to the fatal assault 
on a New York City parkway by a driver of a rented truck, killing eight, suggested a terroristic motivation 
as he yelled “‘Allahu akbar’ meaning ‘God is Great,’” upon fleeing from the truck before being shot by a 
New York police officer.). Police recovered other evidence of terrorist motivation: 
Investigators found on Saipov’s phones 90 videos and 3,800 images, many of 
which seemed to be Islamic State propaganda, videos of the group’s fighters 
killing prisoners or bomb-making instructions. He told agents that he wanted 
to kill as many people as he could and considered putting Islamic State flags 
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personnel by a U.S. Army psychiatrist, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who killed thirteen 
and wounded thirty in the attack, including two civilians, on November 5, 2009, at 
Fort Hood, Texas.48 The assailant, an adherent of the Muslim faith, apparently acted 
out of anxiety over being deployed to Afghanistan, where he would be forced to fight 
other Muslims.49 The shooter later declared that he committed the murders to protect 
Taliban leaders. This led to questions about whether the Army’s characterization of 
the attack as an act of “workplace violence” was accurate, instead of it being labeled 
an act of “terrorism.”50 
Apart from the significance attached to the motivation of perpetrators of mass 
violence—typically shootings or bombings—the most concerning aspect of the 
increasing public interest attached to these acts has been the fact that recent events 
often involve randomly selected victims targeted in public locations. Among the 
most tragic and publicly distressing of these events have been shootings at 
educational institutions. School shootings have been prominent over the past two 
decades, including the killings at the following institutions: 
● At Santa Fe, Texas, ten high school students were killed and thirteen 
wounded by a student using a pump shotgun and revolver on May 18, 2018. The 
seventeen-year-old shooter had no apparent history of mental illness but 
reportedly had shown an interest in the alt-right and neo-Nazism.51 
● The February 14, 2018—Valentine’s Day—mass shooting at Marjorie 
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, resulted in seventeen deaths 
                                                          
 
at the front and back of his truck—but ultimately decided it would draw too 
much attention, court papers say. 
Id. 
48 Robert D. McFadden, Army Doctor Held in Ft. Hood Rampage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06forthood.html. 
49 James Dao, Suspect Was ‘Mortified’ About Deployment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06suspect.html. 
50 Manny Fernandez & Alan Blinder, At Fort Hood, Wrestling with Label of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/us/at-fort-hood-wrestling-with-label-of-terrorism 
.html. Major Hasan was prosecuted on a charge of murder, rather than terrorism, which had significant 
implications for victims, as the New York Times article explained: “The issue stretches far beyond 
semantics. The lack of a terrorism declaration prevents victims from receiving combat-related benefits 
and Purple Hearts. It has also become a politicized issue.” Id. 
51 Julie Turkweitz & Jess Bidgood, Who Is Dimitrios Pagourtzis, the Texas Shooting Suspect, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/dimitrios-pagourtzis-gunman-texas-shooting 
.html. 
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and seventeen individuals being wounded by a former student at the school, 
Nicholas Cruz, who used a semi-automatic pistol in the attack. Cruz had a 
documented history of emotional problems and intervention by school and social 
service professionals due to behavior described as “moody, impulsive, angry, 
attention seeking, annoy[ing to] others on purpose and threaten[ing] to hurt 
others.”52 
● Community college students were victims of a mass shooting at Umpqua 
Community College in Oregon, where a student, reacting to criticism by a teacher, 
shot and killed him and eight other students on October 1, 2015.53 
● Twenty schoolchildren and six teachers were shot at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in New Town, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012,54 by a 
twenty-year-old individual suspected of suffering from serious mental health 
problems.55 
● College students were also killed at Virginia Tech Polytechnic Institute 
and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, where thirty-two victims, twenty-
seven students and five teachers, were killed on the campus on April 16, 2007, 
before the shooter, who was described as a “loner” with “mental health problems,” 
killed himself.56 
● Twelve high school students and one teacher, with more than twenty other 
victims, were shot at Columbine High School in Colorado, on April 20, 1999, by 
                                                          
 
52 Olmeda, supra note 8. 
53 Julie Turkowitz, Oregon Gunman Smiled, Then Fired, Student Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/us/roseburg-oregon-shooting-christopher-harper-mercer.html. The 
shooting at the college in Roseburg, Oregon, left one professor and eight students dead. Id. Three years 
earlier, another shooting at Clackamas (Oregon) Towncenter Mall resulted in the death of two patrons. 
Catherine E. Shoichet & Michael Martinez, 3 dead in Oregon mall shooting, CNN (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/oregon-mall-shooting/. The shooter used an AR-15 rifle in the 
apparently random attack. Id. The 2015 college shooting was reportedly the fifth in Oregon since 1998. 
Capi Lynn, Timeline of mass shootings in Oregon, STATESMAN J. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www 
.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/2015/10/02/mass-shootings-oregon-umpqua-roseburg/73163304/. 
54 Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-
hook-timeline/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
55 Aaron Katersky & Suzanna Kim, 5 Disturbing Things We Learned Today About Sandy Hook Shooter 
Adam Lanza, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/disturbing-things-learned-today-
sandy-hook-shooter-adam/story?id=27087140. 
56 Massacre at Virginia Tech Leaves 32 Dead, HISTORY (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/massacre-at-virginia-tech-leaves-32-dead (last updated Apr. 14, 2020). 
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two shooters, aged seventeen and eighteen, who then turned the guns on 
themselves and committed suicide.57 
The use of public venues for the expression of personal disaffection or political 
ideology is particularly troubling because it suggests, both in the openness of the 
forum and in the apparent randomness of choice of victims, a threat to personal and 
public security that casts doubt on the safety of modern life, of shopping at the mall58 
or attending a public event, such as the bombing of the concert attracting a largely 
younger audience in Manchester, England.59 
The evolution of “mass violence” as a commonly-referenced concept has itself 
required re-thinking what the term means. A Washington Post article noted this 
semantic reality, addressing the alternative uses of the term, and the term “mass 
shooting,” in its opening paragraphs: 
On Thursday, a gunman shot and killed three people and injured 14 more in 
Hesston, Kan., before he was killed by police. 
It was the 49th mass shooting of 2016. 
No scratch that, it was the 33rd mass shooting. 
It’s said that the Inuit people have 50 words for snow. Sometimes it seems 
like Americans have nearly as many definitions for “mass shooting.” Which 
definition is correct? They all are—it just depends on what you want to measure. 
Let’s start with the most restrictive one, from the shooting tracker 
maintained by Mother Jones magazine. According to these criteria, a shooting 
becomes a mass shooting if the gunman kills four or more people (excluding 
himself); if he acts alone; and if the shootings take place in public, including 
workplaces, schools, churches and the like.60 
                                                          
 
57 Columbine Shooting, HISTORY (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.history.com/topics/columbine-high-school-
shootings (last updated Mar. 30, 2020). This incident inspired the 2003 Academy Award Oscar-winning 
documentary film, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (United Artists 2002). 
58 See Shoichet & Martinez, supra note 53. 
59 The Latest on the Manchester Bombing Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-uk-bombing-live.html (compendium of articles reported in 
the New York Times relating to the aftermath of the bombing of concert attracting young people and 
children in a Manchester, England arena on May 22, 2017). 
60 Christopher Ingraham, We Have Three Different Definitions of ‘Mass Shooting,’ and Probably Need 
More, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/26/we-
have-three-different-definitions-of-mass-shooting-and-we-probably-need-more/. 
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The continuing focus on the motivation of those who commit acts of mass 
violence, particularly involving firearms, requires consideration of the nature of the 
violent acts themselves and their likely sources. The rise of acts of terrorism, 
evidenced by the San Bernadino61 and Orlando nightclub62 shooting cases and the 
bombing of the Boston Marathon, have added to a range of acts of mass violence that 
complicate the framework for considering the roles of mental illness, or personality 
disorders, or both, in precipitating the kind of carnage now seemingly routine, or 
commonplace. 
The emergence of terrorism as a prime motivating factor in acts of mass 
violence adds to the complexity, suggesting the relationship between deep 
psychological defects and the gravitation of the impaired to radical thinking.63 The 
motivation of those attracted to the political fringe is likely linked to intense 
paranoia, perhaps inspiring acts of domestic terrorism, such as the Oklahoma City 
bombing by white nationalists advocating violent opposition to the national 
government,64 and international terrorism motivated by eschatological extremism. 
Regardless, the rise of mass acts of terrorist violence adds to the difficulties facing 
                                                          
 
61 See Sanburn, supra note 44. 
62 Zambelich & Hurt, supra note 45. The Washington Post noted the following in regard to the shooter’s 
possible motivation: “The FBI has found no evidence so far that Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people and 
wounded more than 53 at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, chose the popular establishment because of its 
gay clientele, U.S. law enforcement officials said.” Adam Goldman, FBI Has Found No Evidence That 
Orlando Shooter Targeted Pulse Because It Was a Gay Club, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/no-evidence-so-far-to-suggest-orlando-shooter-targeted-
club-because-it-was-gay/2016/07/14/a7528674-4907-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html. 
63 For instance, in the wake of the mass shooting at the Orlando nightclub frequented by gay patrons, 
speculation emerged that the shooter, Omar Mateen, was influenced by his prior visits to the nightclub 
and experience with an internet chat and dating site frequented by homosexuals. See Molly Hennessy-
Fiske, Jenny Jarvie & Del Quentin Wilber, Orlando Gunman Had Used Gay Dating App and Visited 
LGBT Nightclub on Other Occasions, Witnesses Say, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.latimes 
.com/nation/la-na-orlando-nightclub-shooting-20160613-snap-story.html. The speculation that there was 
a connection between his Muslim world view and suspected homosexual tendencies, perhaps leading to 
the mass shooting, was heightened by reporting that his former wife believed he was latently homosexual 
and that he had been admonished by his strict Muslim father against homosexuality. See Chris Perez & 
Joe Tacopino, Ex-Wife’s Bombshell Claim: Club Shooter Was Gay, N.Y. POST (June 13, 2016), http:// 
nypost.com/2016/06/13/shooter-used-to-visit-orlando-gay-club-use-gay-dating-apps/. However, other 
investigation apparently has found no link between the shooter’s motivation and homophobia. See 
Goldman, supra note 62. 
64 See Oklahoma City Bombing, FBI HISTORY: FAMOUS CASES & CRIMINALS, https://www.fbi.gov/ 
history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited July 14, 2020); Oklahoma City Bombing, 
HISTORY (Dec. 16, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/1990s/oklahoma-city-bombing. 
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ordered societies in addressing the motivations that lead to these events, which 
include bombings, mass shootings, use of vehicles to inflict injury and damage,65 and 
individual random acts of violence, such as apparently unprovoked stabbings.66 
The role of mental disease or defect in provoking individuals to commit acts of 
mass violence will continue to be a critical element for investigators seeking to 
understand the motivation of perpetrators.67 For those perpetrators not killed in the 
tragedies of their own making, the issue of causation will bear on the approach taken 
by prosecutors and defense counsel in the criminal process in which issues of 
culpability and guilt will be determined. But these concerns do not address the key 
question asked in many of these episodes of violence: could anything have been done 
to prevent these acts of mass violence? In the context of recent history, that will 
likely be the second question asked, following the initial inquiry as to whether the 
violence is linked to terrorism. 
When evidence of prior mental illness or disturbance is raised during the 
investigation of an act of mass violence, or when the perpetrator has been identified, 
                                                          
 
65 These types of attacks are not limited to the United States, of course, with perhaps the most devastating 
having occurred in Nice, France, on July 14, 2017, resulting in death to at least 86 people and injuring 
202 more, when a Tunisian born driver rammed his truck into a “Bastille Day” celebration. See, e.g., Alan 
Yuhas et al., Nice Attack: Truck Driver Named as France Mourns 84 Killed in Bastille Day Atrocity—as 
It Happened, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/14/nice-
bastille-day-france-attack-promenade-des-anglais-vehicle. The report relating to the perpetrator includes 
the following information initially obtained: 
[Mohamed Lahouaie] Bouhlel was known to police because of allegations of 
threats, violence and thefts over the last six years, and he was given a 
suspended six-month prison sentence this year after being convicted of 
violence with a weapon, Molins said. 
Bouhlel’s father, who lives in Tunisia, has revealed that his son showed signs 
of mental health issues—having had multiple nervous breakdowns and volatile 
behavior, said CNN terrorism analyst Paul Cruickshank. 
CNN, Attack in Nice: Truck Driver Identified as 31-Year-Old Tunisia Native, GANT NEWS (July 15, 
2016), https://gantdaily.com/2016/07/15/attack-in-nice-truck-driver-identified-as-31-year-old-tunisia-
native/. The report reflects the suspected link between mental impairment and some terrorist inclinations, 
highlighted by repeated violent acts prior to the terrorist attack involving mass violence. Id. 
66 See, e.g., Doug Brown, Suspect in Portland Hate Crime Murders Is a Known White Supremacist, 
PORTLAND MERCURY (May 27, 2017), http://www.portlandmercury.com/blogtown/2017/05/27/ 
19041594/suspect-in-portland-hate-crime-murders-is-a-known-white-supremacist. 
67 One source offers a breakdown of incidence of mental illness in the history of mass shooters. The 
statistical breakdown for mass shootings surveyed over the period from 1982 through August 2019, shows 
that in 58 of the incidents the shooter had some evidence or signs of mental problems; that in 24 cases it 
was unclear whether there had been evidence of prior mental problems; that in 17 cases there was no 
evidence of prior mental problems; and in 16 cases, it incidence of prior mental health problems could not 
be determined. See Follman et al., supra note 19. 
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the relevant questions will necessarily focus on a history of diagnosis or treatment. 
At that point, the next inquiry will be whether the mental health professional, who 
may have been aware of the threat or potential for violence, should have taken 
precautions to prevent injury to others by their patient. 
However, the realities of acts of mass violence suggest that this expectation—
that warnings about potential violence by dangerous patients will serve to provide 
significant protection against these acts—must likely be viewed as unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, the question of responsibility for prevention has been framed with 
respect to the duty of the mental health professionals, as Professor Mark Rothstein 
explains: 
After recent tragedies involving mass murders on a college campus in 
Virginia, an Army base in Texas, a congressional constituent event at a shopping 
center in Arizona, and a movie theater in Colorado, one might have assumed the 
public had become numb to horrendous and senseless acts of killing. If so, one 
would have been wrong. The public was not prepared for the brutal and cold-
blooded murder of 20 first-grade school children and six teachers and staff at 
Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 
2012. 
Following the all-too-familiar emotional stages of shock, grief, and anger, 
many members of the public and elected officials turned to the issue of how to 
prevent such tragedies in the future. Two main questions quickly became the focus 
of policy makers. First, is it politically feasible and practically effective to restrict 
access to military-style assault weapons and large-capacity magazines that enable 
these mass murders? Second, is it possible for mental health professionals, family 
members, and others to identify serious threats and to intervene with mentally 
unstable individuals in time to prevent future tragedies?68 
                                                          
 
68 Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After Newton, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 104, 104 (2014). In this 
article, Professor Rothstein proposes “a strategy for developing and implementing a unitary, national 
standard for health care providers’ privilege to disclose confidential information and their duty to protect 
individuals threatened by potentially violent mental health patients.” Id. at 104. Professor Rothstein is the 
Herbert F. Boehl Chair of Law and Medicine and the Director of the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy 
and Law at the University of Louisville School of Medicine in Kentucky. Mark A. Rothstein, U. 
LOUISVILLE, https://louisville.edu/bioethics/directory/mark-a.-rothstein. 
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II. THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL’S DUTY TO WARN 
THIRD PERSONS OF POTENTIAL PATIENT VIOLENCE: 
TARASOFF 
A psychiatric outpatient opened fire Thursday inside a psychiatrist’s office at a 
hospital near Philadelphia, killing his caseworker and slightly wounding the 
doctor, who shot the gunman with his personal firearm, authorities said.69 
The possibility that acts of mass violence can be addressed proactively by 
mental health providers in some situations rests on two related, but distinct, courses 
of action arising from the therapeutic relationship between patients who articulate 
violent threats toward others and their treating professionals. First, treatment itself 
may successfully address the sources of frustration, anxiety, and rage that may 
underlie threats that could potentially erupt in violent action. This reality does not 
address prevention in the way discussed with respect to those acts of mass violence 
that have been committed, however. Second, those professionals in a position to 
assess the potential for violence may also be positioned to trigger intervention to 
address an immediate act of violence suggested by disclosure of underlying causes 
of a patient’s propensity for violence. 
The position of the treating professional to address violent tendencies and 
threats of violence does not limit the role of the mental health profession in 
addressing the problem of violence in the aggregate, of course. Understanding and 
insight gained from experience and observation of patient violence may also offer 
particular value in advising other actors, legislators, policymakers, and law 
enforcement officials in their response to the situations that may give rise to violence 
in society, generally. But in terms of specific threats posed by individuals, those 
threats made in the course of therapy with mental health professionals may offer 
unique prospects for the prevention of violent behavior, whether through successful 
treatment or warnings designed to induce action appropriate for deterring the 
actualization of patient violence. 
A. Tarasoff and the Duty to Warn or Protect 
The duty of mental health providers to protect third persons from potential acts 
of violence threatened by their patients was recognized in the California Supreme 
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Court’s landmark decision in Tarasoff v. University of California Board of Regents.70 
The case arose in the initial factual context of a college student’s disclosure to a 
psychologist at the University’s Cowell Memorial Hospital on the Berkeley campus 
that he intended to kill his ex-girlfriend, Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned to 
campus from summer vacation.71 The psychologist directed campus police to take 
the patient, Prosenjit Poddar, into custody to evaluate possible involuntary civil 
commitment, but police decided not to do so after contacting him.72 Once that 
happened, the psychologist was directed by his supervisor in the clinic not to take 
any further action,73 and Tarasoff was never warned of Poddar’s threat to kill her.74 
When Tatiana returned from vacation, Poddar went to her residence and killed her.75 
The Tarasoff court held that statutory immunity barred the action against the 
mental health professionals with the University hospital76 and police77 based on the 
failure to successfully detain Poddar for further psychiatric evaluation. But, it also 
held that no immunity protected the psychologists and psychiatrists involved in 
Poddar’s treatment at the health center from liability based on their failure to take 
appropriate action to at least warn Tatiana or her family of Poddar’s threats.78 
In considering the plaintiff’s argument, the court noted that, at the common law, 
there was no duty for one person to control the conduct of another unless a special 
relationship existed warranting the finding of a duty to prevent injury. It explained, 
“the courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases in which the defendant 
                                                          
 
70 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), on rehearing en banc, 529 P.2d 553 
(Cal. 1974). The en banc decision followed an initial decision, 529 P.2d 553 (1974), in which the court 
had also concluded that the treating psychologist had a duty to warn a third person of a patient’s threat to 
commit an act of violence specifically identifying that person as the intended target of the threat. 529 P.2d 
at 559. The case was originally heard by the California Court of Appeals, which held that the defendant 
therapists were entitled to immunity for their failure to successfully hospitalize Poddar under then-
applicable CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 820.2, 855.6; § 5150. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 
878, 886–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
71 551 P.2d at 341. 
72 Id. at 339–40. 
73 Id. at 340. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 433. 
76 Id. at 351–52. 
77 Id. at 352–53. 
78 Id. at 340. 
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stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be 
controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct.”79 Although 
there was no allegation that the mental health professionals had a special relationship 
with Tatiana that would have established that Poddar’s psychologist had a direct duty 
toward her, the court concluded that the special relationship existing between Poddar 
and his psychotherapist could “support affirmative duties for the benefit of third 
persons.”80 
In its original framing of the duty, the California Supreme Court phrased the 
mental health professional’s duty toward third persons as a duty to warn against 
patient violence. It described the burden imposed on the professional: 
When a doctor or a psychotherapist, in the exercise of his professional skill and 
knowledge, determines, or should determine, that a warning is essential to avert 
danger arising from the medical or psychological condition of his patient, he 
incurs a legal obligation to give that warning. Primarily, the relationship between 
defendant therapists and Poddar as their patient imposes the described duty to 
warn.81 
In initially grounding its recognition of the cause of action for failure to warn, the 
Tarasoff majority carefully limited its holding factually to the identification of a 
specific victim disclosed to the mental health professional, thereby meeting the 
general requirement in tort law of foreseeability. It limited the scope of duty to the 
situation in which there is a special relationship—there, the therapeutic relationship 
between the therapist and the patient, Poddar—that warrants imposition of duty 
arising from that relationship. 
While the special relationship between Poddar and the University psychologist 
did not include Tatiana, the majority concluded that the duty to her as an intended 
victim arose from that relationship. Alternatively, one might conclude that the 
treating psychologist had a duty to protect his patient, Poddar, from the adverse 
                                                          
 
79 Id. at 343. 
80 Id. at 343–44. The court noted, as examples: “[A] hospital must exercise reasonable care to control the 
behavior of a patient which may endanger other persons. A doctor must also warn a patient if the patient’s 
condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car, dangerous to others.” Id. at 343–
44 (citations omitted). 
81 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) 
(emphasis added). 
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consequences that would flow from action taken upon his threat.82 Poddar was 
convicted of Tatiana’s murder83 as a result of acting upon his threat, for instance.84 
On rehearing, the majority reframed the test, expanding the duty beyond 
warning the intended victim: 
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should 
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he 
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against 
such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or 
more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for 
him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, 
                                                          
 
82 Psychiatry professor Bruce J. Cohen notes, in discussing the multiple functions of warning when 
required under the proper circumstances when other options for addressing potential patient violence are 
not successful: 
Notification of the police or of a potential victim ultimately still may prove to 
be necessary. This most likely to be the case when a significant risk to the 
potential victim is likely to remain despite [alternative] interventions. 
However, this still ideally should be turned into a doctor-patient therapy issue 
rather than simply fulfilling of a doctors ethical and legal obligations. After all, 
issuing a warning may actually be in the patient’s best interest if it helps the 
patient avoid committing an impulsive act that he would later regret. 
BRUCE J. COHEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 464 (2003). For discussion of alternative 
interventions available to address patient dangerous in appropriate circumstances, see text accompanying 
infra note 99. 
83 On direct appeal from Poddar’s conviction for murder, the intermediate appellate court noted in its 
opinion that “three psychiatrists and one clinical psychologist agreed that appellant suffered from chronic 
schizoid paranoia.” People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). The state supreme court 
subsequently reversed Poddar’s conviction and the appellate court’s decision in finding that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on implied malice, remanding the case for new trial. 
People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974). 
84 This does not mean, however, that Poddar could have successfully sued for breach of the therapist’s 
duty to protect his, as a patient, from his own act of violence. The Iowa Supreme Court addressed such a 
claim in Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1981). The court summarized the issue: “[W]hether a 
patient may recover in tort from her psychiatrist on a claim that, in his professional capacity, he negligently 
failed to prevent her from committing murder.” Id. at 767. The plaintiff/patient argued that her psychiatrist 
was negligent in failing to take appropriate action to prevent the murder of her ex-husband physician once 
she disclosed her threats to kill him. Id. 
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to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances.85 
The court’s rephrasing of the duty includes the option of warning the potential victim 
of a patient’s threat. But its broad language also affords the mental health 
professional the option of taking action other than requiring direct warning addressed 
to the prospective victim relating to the patient’s threats.86 Arguably, and likely, a 
significant issue is whether warning the prospective victim is the most effective 
means of offering protection. For instance, in some cases, the act of warning itself 
might precipitate violent behavior on the patient’s part, particularly if the warning 
results in aggravation of patient hostility directed against the intended victim or 
others based on the perception that the mental health professional has betrayed the 
patient by disclosing information shared with the expectation of confidentiality. 
Concern for the violation of the confidentiality duty prompted Justice Clark to 
dissent from the majority’s holding in Tarasoff. Justice Clark predicted that an 
increase in actual violence could be expected to result from the warnings or other 
action taken by mental health professionals in their attempt to protect potential 
victims of patient violence.87 The majority, by contrast, considered the significance 
                                                          
 
85 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), on rehearing en banc, 529 P.2d 553 
(Cal. 1974) (emphasis added). For an example of professional advice on the expansion of the mental 
health professional’s duty, see Stephen E. Berger & Michael Berger, Tarasoff “Duty to Warn” Clarified, 
THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST (Mar. 1, 2009), http://nationalpsychologist.com/2009/03/tarasoff-%E2% 
80%9Cduty-to-warn%E2%80%9D-clarified/101056.html (last updated May 31, 2011). 
86 One commentator argued that the change in language did little to actually alter the underlying theory of 
the duty imposed on clinicians. See Paul B. Herbert, The Duty to Warn: A Reconsideration and Critique, 
30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 417, 418 (2002) (arguing that the change in language on rehearing, from 
imposing a “duty to warn” to a “duty to warn or other-wise protect” “is a distinction with little practical 
difference”). 
87 551 P.2d at 354, 361. Justice Clark offered a series of objections to the majority’s reasoning, including 
the following observation: 
The warning itself is an impairment of the psychiatrist’s ability to treat, 
depriving many patients of adequate treatment. It is to be expected that after 
disclosing their threats, a significant number of patients, who would not 
become violent if treated according to existing practices, will engage in violent 
conduct as a result of unsuccessful treatment. In short, the majority’s duty to 
warn will not only impair treatment of many who would never become violent 
but worse, will result in a net increase in violence. 
Id. at 361. 
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of the confidentiality violation and opted for disclosure when necessary to prevent 
injury to identified potential victims. 
Critical to the decision to recognize potential liability was the court’s reliance 
on the fact that the patient’s identification of a specific victim of his threats met the 
foreseeability test in concluding that his intent would be manifested in an act injuring 
her.88 Here, the identification of Tatiana as the intended victim heightened the 
foreseeability that she would suffer injury and that warning of this possibility could 
have averted her murder. The court concluded, “once a therapist does in fact 
determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have 
determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.”89 
The treating psychologist’s assessment of Poddar’s potential for dangerous 
activity was unequivocally demonstrated by the fact that he contacted police about 
detaining Poddar. Poddar’s threats made clear that Tatiana would likely be 
victimized as a result of his anger. 
We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental 
illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy . . . and the consequent 
public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic 
communication. Against this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest 
in safety from violent assault. The Legislature has undertaken the difficult task of 
balancing the countervailing concerns.90 
                                                          
 
88 Id. at 342. Moreover, on the facts presented, the psychologist who counseled Poddar, Dr. Moore, had 
made the determination that Poddar represented a significant threat, as demonstrated by the fact that 
Dr. Moore called the police to warn them of Poddar’s threats and have them pick him up for evaluation 
for civil commitment. Id. at 339–40. 
89 Id. at 335. 
90 Id. at 346–47 (citing In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 561–62 (Cal. 1970) (en banc)). In Lifschutz, the 
court considered a claim by a psychiatrist refusing to testify and produce medical records of a former 
patient in a civil action brought by the patient claiming psychological injuries as a result of the defendant’s 
alleged assault. 467 P.2d at 559. The former patient had not asserted privilege against disclosure and the 
court noted that having filed an action claiming damages for these injuries, he had effectively waived the 
privilege. The psychiatrist was held in contempt for failing to comply, asserting an absolute privilege in 
patient records as essential for therapy arguably based on constitutional grounds. Id. at 562. The court 
rejected this theory. Id. 
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The majority referred to the recognition of a general evidentiary privilege for 
confidential communications made in the course of psychotherapy91 and the 
exception to the general rule “[i]f the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe 
that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself 
or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is 
necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”92 
The majority then addressed the potential conflict between the goal of 
confidentiality in promoting patient disclosures of sources of personal anxiety when 
communicating with a therapist and the imposition of a duty to rely on those same 
disclosures. This includes the disclosure of the patient’s actual communications as a 
basis for acting to protect third persons from violence that might be committed by 
dangerous patients. It explained: 
We realize that the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue 
encourages patients to express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. 
Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats; 
such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient’s relationship with his 
therapist and with the persons threatened. To the contrary, the therapist’s 
obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such 
disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so 
discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the 
fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger.93 
The Tarasoff majority thus addressed the concerns of Justice Clark’s dissent by 
recognizing the continuing need to respect the general duty to maintain 
confidentiality in the psychotherapist/patient relationship. But it found that on the 
specific facts presented, the general obligation for confidentiality must give way to 
the protection of third persons from violence likely to be committed by dangerous 
patients. The need to balance confidentiality and the safety interests of potential 
victims of patient violence remains an important factor in determining both how a 
mental health professional’s duty should be assessed in specific factual settings and 
when patient violence could likely give rise to liability when the dangerous patient 
injures, or kills, a third person not included in the special relationship that exists 
                                                          
 
91 551 P.2d at 346–47 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2020)). As amended the code provisions 
now are §§ 1012, 1015. 
92 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2020). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1018 (West 2020) (discussing the 
confidentiality privilege when patient threatens to commit crime or tort). 
93 551 P.2d at 347. 
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between a patient, and their family members in some cases, and the patient’s 
therapist. 
For the therapist, the appropriate protocol for determining when the potential 
for patient violence warrants action on the mental health professional’s part is 
critically important. This protocol is summarized by Professor Bruce Cohen in his 
psychiatry text: 
[C]linicians should keep in mind that the obligation to potential victims is to take 
precautions to protect them, not simply warn them. Therefore, when a patient has 
a history of violent behavior, or when the patient expresses current desires to harm 
others, the clinician is not automatically obligated to begin warning every person 
with whom the patient might have any contact. Rather, the clinician should 
perform a risk assessment for violence . . . . Warning the victim should be thought 
of as one option for helping to minimize the risk of harm. Other potential options 
include the following: increasing the frequency of sessions; adjusting medications 
to decrease psychotic symptoms; involving the patient’s family in therapy; 
involving the potential victim in therapy (although the goals in such cases need to 
be carefully weighed against the risks); increasing the extent of social supports 
(e.g., the Department of Social Services, a substance rehabilitation program, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, outreach mental health programs for noncompliant 
patients); voluntary hospitalization; and involuntary hospitalization.94 
The litany of professionally acceptable options for addressing expressions of 
violent tendencies by potentially dangerous patients suggests nothing less than the 
difficult decisions individual mental health professionals may need to consider in 
light of any particular factual scenario. The options available, as detailed by 
Professor Cohen, also may serve to complicate the determination about a 
professional’s exercise of their independent judgment in seeking the best treatment 
situation for the patient, which may also cast any reasonable, but unsuccessful, 
therapeutic option actually selected by the treating professional susceptible to a 
retrospective finding of breach of professional duty. All of this illustrates the 
uncertainties that may compromise the work of psychotherapists in pursuing 
successful treatment for their patients, whose very actions in seeking or being 
ordered to therapy indicate their difficulty in adjusting to the normal requirements of 
peaceful life in the communities in which they reside. 
                                                          
 
94 COHEN, supra note 82, at 464. Professor Bruce Cohen, M.D., is Associate Professor of Psychiatry and 
Neurobehavioral Sciences at the University of Virginia. 
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B. The Issue Raised by the Therapist’s Duty of Confidentiality 
Justice Clark’s concern for violation of the clinician’s duty to maintain patient 
confidentiality in his Tarasoff dissent has been consistent with professional concerns 
over the decision’s imposition of a duty to warn or protect third persons from 
dangerous patients. That concern has not been limited to the mental health 
professions but has been shared by the courts and legislators after Tarasoff. 
Significantly, Tarasoff recognized the duty in the context of civil litigation, in which 
the question of liability of treating mental health professionals based on alleged 
violations of confidentiality obligation arose. 
There is no question that the confidentiality duty includes action taken by a 
mental health professional to protect a third person, or persons, from threats of 
violence articulated by the patient. The significance of the patient’s expectation that 
disclosures made in the course of evaluation and therapy will remain confidential has 
not been disregarded; rather, it is the balancing of confidentiality and duty to others 
that has presented problems. With respect to the action of dangerous patients in 
committing acts of mass violence, it would seem logical that no informed medical or 
legal professional would dispute a citizen’s belief that prevention of an act of mass 
violence warrants compromise of the therapeutic relationship. 
In the aftermath of Tarasoff, two distinct responses have proved significant. 
First, the legislative response has focused primarily on the recognition of either 
mandatory or permissive duties to warn or protect potential victims of patient 
violence, resulting in statutory schemes designed to address patient violence by 
directing professionals in breaching confidentiality when necessary. These statutes 
often complement provisions that generally mandate confidentiality for mental 
health professionals. Second, jurisdictions have recognized that confidentiality may 
properly be protected by the adoption of evidentiary rules of privilege that protect 
patient disclosures made in the context of therapy from forced disclosure in litigation, 
with exceptions. Further, protection of confidentiality beyond the scope of 
evidentiary rules may be found in statutory provisions that recognize the duty of 
professionals not to disclose confidential disclosures by their patients, much as 
ethical rules set forth parameters for restriction of disclosures by clients to legal 
counsel.95 
                                                          
 
95 See MARY ALICE FISHER, THE ETHICS OF CONDITIONAL CONFIDENTIALITY: A PRACTICE MODEL FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 220 (2013). Dr. Fisher reports: 
Some privileged communications statutes are very protective of patient 
confidentiality. Thirteen states have privilege statutes that are explicitly 
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1. Confidentiality and the Therapeutic Relationship 
The burden imposed upon mental health providers having a duty to warn 
potential victims of patient violence is not a matter simply discharged by effective 
risk assessment. It also necessarily suggests that the mental evaluation be conducted 
in light of the patient’s likely need for continuing treatment to address the underlying 
causes of the impairment that may give the patient a propensity for violent action 
injuring third persons. 
At the core of the professional relationship between mental health providers 
and their patients is the fiduciary duty owed to the patient by the therapist to protect 
the confidential disclosures made by patients during the course of therapy. The 
significance of the confidentiality duty is reflected in evidentiary rules treating 
disclosures made by patients in the course of therapy as privileged, although the duty 
may be recognized beyond the context of litigation, as it is in the Arizona statute 
governing the duty to maintain client confidences: 
The confidential relations and communication between a client or patient 
and a psychologist licensed pursuant to this chapter, including temporary 
licensees, are placed on the same basis as those provided by law between an 
attorney and client. Unless the client or patient waives the psychologist-client 
privilege in writing or in court testimony, a psychologist shall not voluntarily or 
involuntarily divulge information that is received by reason of the confidential 
nature of the psychologist’s practice. The psychologist shall divulge to the board 
information it requires in connection with any investigation, public hearing or 
other proceeding. The psychologist-client privilege does not extend to cases in 
which the psychologist has a duty to report information as required by law.96 
                                                          
 
modeled after attorney-client privilege, which is very protective unless there 
are extensive exceptions to that privilege within the statute or elsewhere. (See 
statutes for Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Washington.) 
Id. 
96 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2085 (2020). See also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-97-105 (West 2020) (placing 
licensed psychologists and clients on the same basis as attorneys and clients); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/9 
(2020) (authorizing disclosure of communications only as necessary to meet specific goals of statute); 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4508(a) (McKinney 2020) (extending confidentiality duty to licensed master social 
workers and licensed clinical social workers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-60-114 (West 2020) (permitting 
disclosure pursuant to statutory duty to warn, § 58-60-114(2)(b)(iii)). 
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The Arizona statute phrases the confidentiality duty for psychologists in language 
strictly comparing that duty of an attorney to maintain confidentiality for client 
communications. Similar language is used in statutes of other jurisdictions.97 
Similarly, the duty of the psychotherapist to maintain confidentiality with 
respect to patient disclosures in the course of therapy is also seen in the common 
judicial recognition of evidentiary privilege, protecting patient confidentiality in the 
course of litigation. In Jaffee v. Redmond,98 the Supreme Court recognized the need 
for an evidentiary privilege that would protect the psychotherapist/patient 
relationship by insulating confidential information learned during that relationship 
from compelled disclosure in legal proceedings. Justice Stevens wrote for the 
majority: 
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is “rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.” Treatment 
by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis 
of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and the 
results of diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank 
and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the 
sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, 
disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may 
cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of 
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for 
successful treatment.99 
                                                          
 
97 For example, the Arkansas statute governing confidentiality for psychologists provides; 
For the purpose of this chapter, the confidential relations and communications 
between a licensed psychologist or a psychological examiner and a client are 
placed upon the same basis as those provided by law between an attorney and 
a client. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any such 
privileged communication to be disclosed. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-97-105 (West 2020). 
98 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
99 Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The majority noted that the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee had recommended adoption of an evidentiary privilege to protect confidential 
disclosures made to a psychotherapist by a patient during the course of treatment more than twenty years 
earlier, explaining: “[T]there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful 
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The Court’s decision in Jaffee v. Redmond resulted in recognition of an 
evidentiary privilege for psychotherapist/patient communications pursuant to the 
authority of federal courts under Evidence Rule 501.100 In reaching this conclusion, 
the majority noted “[t]hat it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a 
psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States 
and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist 
privilege.”101 The Court mentioned the sources of protection for patient 
confidentiality in both legislation and by judicial decision, observing, “[i]t is of no 
consequence that recognition of the privilege in the vast majority of States is the 
product of legislative action rather than judicial decision. Although common-law 
rulings may once have been the primary source of new developments in federal 
privilege law, that is no longer the case.”102 
Not only does the federal evidentiary privilege preclude disclosures by 
psychiatrists and psychologists, but the Jaffee Court also recognized the need to 
extend the privilege, based on the confidentiality obligation, to other professionals 
                                                          
 
psychiatric treatment.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 
Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (Advisory Committee Note)). 
100 The Federal Rule of Evidence dealing with privileges in general provides: 
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason 
and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following 
provides otherwise: 
● the United States Constitution; 
● a federal statute; or 
● rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for 
which state law supplies the rule of decision. 
FED. R. EVID. 501. 
101 518 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added). The reasoning of the Jaffee majority was anticipated by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Sypault, 800 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. 1990), where the court addressed questions 
relating to invocation of Rule 503 to prevent disclosure of confidential communications made during the 
course of therapy, explaining that “[t]he policy behind the physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege 
is to encourage patients to communicate openly with their physicians and therapists and to prevent 
disclosure of the patient’s infirmities.” Id. at 404. The Sypault Court referred to the privilege as one “that 
has been firmly entrenched in Arkansas law since 1889.” Id. (emphasis added). 
102 518 U.S. at 13. 
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involved in mental health therapy.103 It specifically addressed the need to recognize 
the counseling role performed by social workers.104 
With respect to the duty to warn, however, the general obligation imposed upon 
mental health professionals to maintain the confidentiality of patient disclosures 
gives way to the obligation to protect third persons from prospective patient violence. 
The right that is found in recognition of an evidentiary privilege is not coextensive 
with a general duty to treat such disclosures as confidential, based on the therapeutic 
relationship between provider and patient. The evidentiary rule governs disclosure 
in the course of litigation; while it may reflect a general policy favoring non-
disclosure, the evidentiary privilege is enforceable only through exclusion of 
evidence in official proceedings or in protecting the patient in circumstances 
attendant to litigation, such as depositions or discovery proceedings. 
The recognition of confidentiality in the adoption of evidentiary privilege rules, 
whether the product of judicial or legislative action, does not preclude liability for 
practitioners who fail to warn or take appropriate action to protect third persons from 
dangerous patients, however. Civil liability for failure to protect third persons from 
violent acts committed by patients is a matter of policy within individual 
jurisdictions. 
The concern for patient confidentiality as a key component in the therapeutic 
relationship led the Illinois Supreme Court to reject liability for practitioners for 
failure to warn or protect third persons from patient violence in Tedrick v. 
Community Resource Center, Inc.105 The case involved allegations that the patient’s 
therapist failed to warn the patient’s wife of his threats toward her prior to her 
murder.106 The court conducted a review of prior Illinois decisions that had fairly 
consistently held that third persons could not recover for injuries caused by patients 
based on claims of liability against their treating therapists.107 It then rested its 
                                                          
 
103 Id. at 15. 
104 Id. at 15–18; see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT R. EVID. 506(a)–(b) (2020) (defining “counselor” and 
privilege for patient communications). 
105 920 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. 2009). 
106 Id. at 221. 
107 Id. at 224–25 (citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 398–99 (1987) 
(recovery against physician claimed strictly liable by third party passenger injured in automobile accident 
caused when discharged patient under influence of prescribed psychiatric medication and alcohol recovery 
not available under state law where plaintiff claimed physician did not warn patient of effects of 
medication, but no special relationship existed between physician and passenger); Doe v. McKay, 700 
N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ill. 1998) (denying recovery based on father’s claim that psychologist’s negligence 
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continuing adherence to the preclusion of recovery for claimed therapist negligence 
causing injuries to third persons by their patients based on the strong public policy 
interests favoring protection of the confidential relationship between mental health 
professionals and their patients.108 
Tedrick and other decisions109 illustrate a seeming internal inconsistency that 
may limit reliance on Tarasoff for third persons injured by violent patients. While a 
jurisdiction may impose a duty on the mental health professional to warn a dangerous 
patient’s potential victim, the failure of the therapist to warn or take other measures 
to protect the victim will not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for the third 
person who is injured. In fact, however, there are quite different public policy 
considerations that would support even an inconsistent approach to the issues of duty 
and liability for mental health professionals addressing concerns regarding 
potentially dangerous patients. In balancing the critical interests involved in 
protecting patient confidentiality as a key element for successful therapy against the 
need to encourage mental health professionals to take action to protect third persons, 
the moderating factor relied upon may well not be promoting liability as a 
                                                          
 
caused daughter to erroneously believe father had sexually molested her as a child, injuring 
father/daughter relationship where no relationship existed between father and therapist with respect to this 
specific allegation)). In Kirk, moreover, there was no allegation that the treating physician was aware of 
any threat to the safety of the passenger, or allegation that the discharged patient was known to have 
violent propensities. 513 N.E.2d 387. The claim was grounded in strict liability, rather than negligence, 
in an apparent effort to address the lack of evidence of the physician’s malpractice or actual negligence. 
Id. at 394. 
108 920 N.E.2d at 224. The court referred to its earlier decisions in Kirk and Doe explaining: “[T]he 
problem of divided loyalties and the concerns about compromising patient confidentiality, ‘argue strongly 
against imposing on therapists a duty of care toward nonpatients.’” Id. (citing Doe, 700 N.E.2d at 1024–
25). 
109 See, e.g., Chatman v. Millis, 517 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Ark. 1975) (privity doctrine precludes recovery 
against mental health professional for damages inflicted by patient where injured party not a patient of the 
professional because the therapist only owes a duty to their patient). Similarly, in reviewing a Tarasoff 
claim for psychiatrist’s failure to warn unidentified third person killed by patient, Judge Harrison, in a 
concurring opinion in Fleming v. Vest, 475 S.W.3d 576, 582–83 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015), rejected the 
plaintiff’s theory of recovery for medical malpractice, arguing that the cause of action sounded in 
negligence and did not arise under the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-
201 (2020). Id. at 582, 586. None of the three judges on the court of appeals panel addressed the need to 
reconsider the viability of Chatman and the application of the privity doctrine in malpractice cases, 
although the majority rested their reasoning on the application of the malpractice act on its broad language: 
“‘Action for medical injury’ means all actions against a medical care provider, whether based in tort, 
contract, or otherwise, to recover damages on account of medical injury as defined in this section[.]” 
Fleming, 475 S.W.3d at 580; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-201(1) (2020). 
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consequence of patient violence, but immunity for those professionals reasonably 
acting in good faith in attempting to balance the two concerns. 
2. Confidentiality and Conflicting Public Policy Concerns 
The balance between respect for patient confidentiality and the desirability of 
preventing injury to third persons by dangerous patients likely favors the protection 
of innocent persons over the need for confidentiality as an important, if not 
necessary, element in the therapeutic relationship. This approach is perhaps most 
clearly reflected in legislative action designed to protect children from maltreatment 
by requiring reporting of incidents of abuse or suspicion of abuse by those whose 
relationships with children represent the most obvious means by preventing further 
abuse through mandatory reporting.110 
State111 and federal112 statutes typically identify those persons engaged in 
professional activities involving children as “mandatory reporters” having an 
affirmative duty to report suspected child abuse to appropriate agencies that 
                                                          
 
110 See FISHER, supra note 95, at 222–24. Professor Fisher states: 
All states have laws and/or regulations mandating the reporting of suspected 
child abuse or neglect, and most states also mandate the reporting of suspected 
abuse or neglect of elderly and/or vulnerable and/or incapacitated adults. These 
laws can be found in the state civil code or criminal code, or both . . . . All such 
laws include mental health care providers in the list of mandated reporters and 
include definitions of the person/conditions which must be reported. The 
wording of the reporting mandate varies; however, therapists are never 
required to investigate first, but instead are to report if they have “reason to 
suspect” or “reasonable cause to suspect” the abuse/neglect. 
Id. at 222. 
111 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. 33, § 4913(c) (2020) requires mandatory reporter, as defined in subsection 
(a), “who reasonably suspects abuse or neglect of a child shall report in accordance with the provisions of 
section 4914 of this title within 24 hours of the time information regarding the suspected abuse or neglect 
was first received or observed.” In sharp contrast, under Texas law, the reporting duty is extended beyond 
identified mandatory reporters to any person “having cause to believe that a child’s physical or mental 
health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person shall immediately make 
a report as provided by this subchapter.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.101(a) (West 2020) (emphasis added). 
112 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 20341 (Supp. II 2020) (requiring a mandatory reporter, as defined under the 
statute, who “learns of facts that give reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, 
shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to” an appropriate agency, as identified in 
the statute. Medical professionals are designated as mandatory reporters under subsection (b)(1), while 
subsection (b)(2) includes as mandatory reporters “psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health 
professionals.”). 
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investigate incidents of abuse.113 The statutes reflect a strong public policy 
promoting the protection of children by imposing the statutory duty to report, 
facilitating investigation that may lead to the criminal prosecution of offenders. 
The criminal charge in the Arkansas decision, State v. Sypult,114 implicated this 
important public policy by requiring mandatory reporters to report suspected child 
abuse to the Arkansas intake agency, the Child Abuse Hotline, for investigation of 
reports of suspected abuse.115 The applicable statute required that evidentiary 
privileges, other than the attorney-client privilege and later the clergy-penitent 
privilege, that would otherwise preclude disclosure of statements made in confidence 
must give way to the important policy of protecting children from abuse, and thus, 
such statements can be admitted at trial.116 
The Sypult decision clearly tilts the policy balance in favor of the protection of 
children and does so by potentially penalizing the prospective patient’s decision to 
seek professional treatment. The reporting duty imposed by the statute essentially 
transforms the patient disclosing misconduct involving a child into a perpetrator, at 
least for purposes of investigation of the report by the appropriate agency.117 Sypult 
makes the proposed patient’s decision to seek treatment relevant and admissible 
evidence in the criminal trial. The courts’ determination of the admissibility of that 
decision and the subsequent report of the treatment to appropriate legal authorities 
imposes a significant burden on a patient who does seek treatment. It means that 
while their specific statements made in the course of diagnosis and treatment are 
excluded as privileged under Rule 503, the very act of seeking help from the mental 
health professional is subject to disclosure, which may be used as powerful evidence 
for the prosecution in the criminal proceeding. 
                                                          
 
113 See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 3, 5–68 (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf. 
114 800 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. 1990) (noting court’s recognition of confidentiality privilege as long-standing 
feature of Arkansas law). 
115 The statute requiring reporting of suspected child abuse at issue in Sypult was ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-511, repealed by Acts of 2009, Act 749, § 2 (effective July 31, 2009). Under the current law, 
individuals identified as “mandatory reporters” are required to report suspected abuse supported by 
reasonable cause to the statutorily established Arkansas Child Abuse Hotline. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-
18-301; 12-18-402 (2020). 
116 ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-18-402(b)(29)(A), (b)(41)(c)(1) (2020). 
117 Under Arkansas law, individuals making reports mandated by the statute are shielded from subsequent 
litigation brought by individuals who have been reported, as long as the reporter has acted in good faith. 
Cundiff v. Crider, 792 S.W.2d 604 (Ark. 1990). 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 2 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
The determination that an individual’s decision to seek treatment by a mental 
health professional for conduct may be subject to prosecution itself necessarily 
would serve to frustrate the proposed patient’s expectation that treatment is available 
without the prospect of criminal prosecution. Because offenses relating to the abuse 
of children are viewed as extremely serious in criminal law, the mere fact of seeking 
treatment implicitly suggests conviction and imprisonment. Ironically, incarceration 
will almost certainly compromise any attempt to obtain treatment for the perceived 
impairment that prompted the search for professional help. 
Ultimately, the Sypult Court’s expressed recognition of the significance of 
confidentiality in the therapeutic relationship may actually prove to be rather hollow 
to patients for alternative reasons. It may well be that professional treatment really 
does not address the underlying motivation for assaults on children, particularly 
sexual assaults. Moreover, it may be that prospective patients seeking treatment for 
offenses they have committed are using the treatment option cynically in an effort to 
avoid prosecution, develop a defense to prosecution, or mitigate punishment without 
true acceptance of responsibility for their antisocial behavior. The effect of the 
court’s holding, whether or not intended, may be to use the promise of the evidentiary 
privilege, protecting a patient’s confidential disclosures, to induce offenders to seek 
treatment that will necessarily lead to their identification as a result of the mandatory 
reporting duty imposed on mental health professionals. Or, it may actually be that 
the meaning of Sypult is that protection of child victims is paramount, and the law 
itself cynically, but perhaps unintentionally, uses the promise of evidentiary privilege 
to induce perpetrators to disclose misconduct leading to the identification 
punishment of an offender through the mandatory reporting process imposed upon 
mental health professionals.118 
III. THE RESPONSE TO TARASOFF FROM THE MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONS AND THE COURTS 
Tarasoff resulted in the development of two independent lines of response from 
the judicial and legislative constituencies most affected by its reasoning. First, the 
decision directly influenced the understanding of the scope of duty imposed upon 
mental health professionals dealing with dangerous patients who articulate threats of 
violence directed at third persons or pose threats of violence within the context of 
                                                          
 
118 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402(b) identifies the following individuals as mandatory reporters, among 
others: “[a] licensed nurse”; [“[m]edical personnel] who may be engaged in the admission, examination, 
care, or treatment of persons”; “[a] mental health professional or paraprofessional”; “[a] physician”; and 
“[a] social worker.” 
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their expressions of hostility without making direct threats.119 For the mental health 
professionals treating dangerous patients, Tarasoff underscored the need to take 
appropriate action not only to warn or protect potential victims of patient violence 
but also the need to make professional decisions with an eye toward exposure to civil 
liability for failure to act. 
Second, Tarasoff signaled the need, or opportunity, for legislative bodies to 
address the problem of patient violence by mandating or permitting disclosures for 
mental health professionals, regardless of whether civil liability or immunity would 
result from the discharge of the obligation to warn or protect. Professor Mark A. 
Rothstein notes the prevalence of legislative action responding to Tarasoff: 
In reviewing the state statutes, it is clear there is no single Tarasoff duty, but 
51 jurisdiction-specific duties. As of 2014, 29 states have laws mandating the 
reporting of serious threats, 16 states and the District of Columbia have permissive 
reporting laws, four states have no duty to report, and one state (Georgia) has its 
own unique law. 
Some state statutes apply different standards to different professionals (e.g., 
psychologists, social workers). Other state laws differ on the circumstances when 
warnings or other actions are appropriate or vary in the individuals or entities that 
must be protected. Finally, some states grant immunity from liability if the mental 
health professional complies with certain statutory requirements.120 
Thus, in examining the legacy of Tarasoff, or legacies, it is important to note 
that the recognition of a duty to warn or protect has led in two distinct directions that 
do not necessarily overlap unless a jurisdiction has also imposed civil liability for 
failure to comply with a legislative recognition of the mental health professional’s 
duty to warn. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision became a touchstone for subsequent 
consideration of the duty of the mental health profession to warn potential victims of 
patient threats of violence. The ramifications of the holding spread throughout the 
                                                          
 
119 Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994) (“Tarasoff is the Palsgraf [Palsgraf 
v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)] of its generation, a case with meta-significance which 
endures beyond its jurisdiction, time, place, and perhaps its particular holding.”). 
120 Rothstein, supra note 68, at 104, 106 nn.23–30 (citing Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, 
NAT’L. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 12, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-
professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx). 
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legal system, with other courts, state121 and federal,122 considering claims brought 
against mental health providers based on violent acts committed by dangerous 
patients. The Tarasoff legacy has been extended to the highly authoritative statement 
of tort law by the American Law Institute in both its second and third editions of the 
Restatement of Torts, including, in Section 41 of the Restatement (Third): 
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable care 
to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other that arise within the scope 
of the relationship. 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection (a) 
include: . . . 
(4) a mental-health professional with patients.123 
Tarasoff has resulted in significant commentary by both mental health 
professionals and lawyers,124 as well as widespread legislative action.125 For 
instance, Harvard professor Alan A. Stone wrote in the almost immediate aftermath 
                                                          
 
121 See, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 638–39 (Tex. 1999) (holding no cause of action for 
breach of duty to warn in light of TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 611.002 (West 1999) creating statutory 
duty to maintain patient confidentiality and rejecting Tarasoff in refusing to create new cause of action). 
122 See, e.g., Brady v. Hopper, M.D., 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (finding no breach of duty to warn by psychiatrist based on his treatment of patient John 
Hinkley’s action in attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, which occurred in context of 
shooting in which Presidential Aide James Brady was severely wounded, finding no foreseeable risk of 
injury). 
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). See Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & 
Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 156 A.3d 436, 444–45 (Vt. 2016) (noting language of Section 41 of 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS predecessor provisions in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 
124 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the clinician: Problems in Fulfilling the Duty to Protect, 
142 AM. J. PSYCH. 425–29 (1985); Lake, supra note 119, at 98; Christopher A. Tumminia & Marshall A. 
Glen, The Duty to Warn in Oklahoma: A Survey of Law Across Licensed or Certified Psychotherapists, 
38 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 81, 91–101 (2013) (examining and comparing statutes providing for duty to 
warn for differing groups of regulated mental health professionals under state law); Rothstein, supra note 
68; J. Thomas Sullivan, Arkansas, Meet Tarasoff: The Question of Expanded Liability to Third Persons 
for Mental Health Professionals, 69 ARK. L. REV. 987 (2017) (analyzing liability in light of traditional 
privity requirement for professional liability); William F. Doverspike, The So-Called Duty to Warn: 
Protecting the Public Versus Protecting the Patient, 61 GEORGIA PSYCH. 20 (2007), https://www 
.gapsychology.org/page/188 (discussing precedent in Georgia recognizing duty to protect third person 
against patient violence in Bradley Center, Inc v. Wessner et al., 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982), but arguing 
state courts have not recognized duty to “warn”). 
125 See Rothstein, supra note 68. 
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of the issuance of the Tarasoff rehearing opinion criticizing the adoption of a duty to 
warn or take other action to protect prospective victims of dangerous patient violence 
instead of relying on the involuntary civil commitment process as the preferable 
response in those situations.126 He argued that the move toward alternatives to civil 
commitment represented an unwise rejection of that formal process, reflecting 
greater concern for patient liberty and protection of patient confidences than public 
safety: 
[T]he duty which the Tarasoff court imposes will reduce rather than increase 
public safety because it will diminish the ability and motivation of therapists to 
treat effectively mentally disturbed and potentially dangerous people. Public 
safety may nonetheless be served, and the moral duty of the therapist fulfilled, in 
more traditional ways: the therapist who believes that his patient poses a serious 
danger to third parties should attempt to have that person committed or, if that 
fails, should call the police when he is convinced that such action will protect both 
the victim and his patient. That has been the traditional moral and prudential view, 
and I believe it is still valid.127 
Involuntary civil commitment remains an important option for addressing patient 
dangerousness and threats of violence, but strained resources for mental health care 
may compromise the ability of public mental healthcare facilities to provide an 
adequate response in immediate or longer-term contexts.128 Fiscal and logistical 
constraints may typically lead to greater reliance on the criminal justice system—
                                                          
 
126 Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychiatrists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
358 (1976). Professor Stone is Touroff-Glueck Professor Emeritus of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard, 
holding a medical degree from Yale, and has served as President of the American Psychiatric Association. 
Alan A. Stone, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: FACULTY PROFILES, http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/ 
10853/Stone (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). His essay was highly critical of John Fleming & Bruce 
Maximov’s The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist’s Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025 (1974), 
published while Tarasoff was pending in the California appellate courts and which Professor Stone argued 
influenced the reasoning of the California Supreme Court. Stone, supra note 126, at 361–62. The article 
was cited with approval by the Tarasoff majority. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 352 
(Cal. 1976), on rehearing en banc, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974). John M. Fleming, Professor Emeritus of 
Law at the University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law, who died in 1997, was the author of an 
influential treatise, The Law of Torts (1957), now in its 10th edition from Thomson-Reuters. 
127 Stone, supra note 126, at 373–74. 
128 NRI, TRACKING THE HISTORY OF STATE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL CLOSURES, 1997–2015, at 1 (2015), 
https://www.nri-inc.org/media/1111/2015-tracking-the-history-of-state-psychiatric-hospital-closures-
lutterman.pdf (“Since the 1950s, the number of beds in state psychiatric hospitals has declined by over 91 
percent.”). 
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jails and prisons—as institutional destinations for patients evidencing dangerous 
attitudes and behavior.129 
Despite criticism from informed observers like Professor Stone, Tarasoff has 
profoundly impacted the development of the law relating to the duty of mental health 
professions to warn or take other measures to protect third persons from patient 
violence over the past forty years. Perhaps most significantly, the duty of mental 
health professionals to warn third persons of patient dangerousness has consistently 
been the subject of study by professional organizations most directly involved in 
advising those professionals with respect to their obligations, such as the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law,130 the American Psychological Association,131 
                                                          
 
129 See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric Inpatient Care From Hospitals 
to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOL. & L. 529 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7347/ 
b6e62abbbce5dcc657aa74868f856d5670a6.pdf. Dr. Lamb is Professor of Psychiatry and Director, 
Division of Psychiatry, Law, and Public Policy, and Dr. Weinberger is Professor of Clinical Psychiatry 
and Chief Psychologist, Institute of Psychiatry, Law, and Behavioral Sciences, Keck School of Medicine, 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. The authors observe: 
Over the past few decades in the United States, there has been a profound 
paradigm or model shift in the care of persons with severe mental illness. For 
many, their psychiatric inpatient care is now provided in jails and prisons. This, 
in large part, may be the result of structural changes that have been made in 
the mental health system—namely, a radical reduction in long-term, 
intermediate, and short-term psychiatric inpatient treatment under mental 
health’s jurisdiction. Moreover, few in the mental health field discuss the need 
for inpatient treatment, despite evidence that some persons with severe mental 
illness cannot be effectively treated and/or managed in the community and 
require 24-hour structured care. 
Id. 
130 See, e.g., Alan R. Felthous, Warning a Potential Victim of a Person’s Dangerousness: Clinician’s Duty 
or Victim’s Right?, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOL. & L. 338 (2006), http://jaapl.org/content/34/3/338 
(national survey of judicial decisions involving state approaches to Tarasoff duty); Rebecca Johnson, 
Govind Persad & Dominic Sisti, The Tarasoff Rule: The Implication of Interstate Variation and Gaps of 
Professional Training, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOL. & L. 469 (2014) (evaluating efficacy of duties imposed 
on mental health professionals to warn intended victims of potential violence by patients and noting flaws 
in warning protocol based on lack of national and professional uniformity in approach); Kristen Lambert 
& Moira Wertheimer, What is My Duty to Warn?, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://psychnews 
.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.pn.2016.1b1; Matthew F. Soulier, Andrea Maislen & James 
C. Beck, Status of the Psychiatric Duty to Protect, Circa 2006, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 457 
(2010) (observing that most post-Tarasoff litigation has resulted in verdicts favoring clinicians). 
131 See, e.g., Stephen Behnke, Disclosing Confidential Information, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 44 (2014), 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/disclosing-information.aspx (The author, director of the APA’s 
Ethics Office, discusses the duty to warn imposed by statute in Massachusetts pursuant to Massachusetts 
General Laws, chapter 123, section 36B, including his explanation that statute does not require warning 
where warning itself could contribute to escalation of dangerousness into violence and also discusses the 
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and the National Association of Social Workers.132 National attention to the 
development of a duty to warn or protect third persons from dangerous patients is 
also reflected in other sources of collected information. For instance, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures has collected data relating to state legislative action 
tracking developments in Tarasoff-based statutory duties, providing a detailed fifty-
state summary of statutes that mandate warnings or other protective measures; that 
permit confidentiality to be breached by issuing a warning or pursuing other 
protective measures; or that prohibit breaches of confidentiality for the purpose of 
issuing warnings.133 
For mental health professionals, Tarasoff threatened a substantial change in 
therapeutic protocol because it created a heightened expectation for therapists to 
accurately assess the risk of whether a patient’s threats would be manifested in actual 
acts of violence. But the adoption and application of standards incorporating the most 
significant aspects of the Tarasoff approach to liability have not been limited to 
judicial interpretation; Tarasoff has also triggered a substantial and varied legislative 
response that poses a significant concern for mental health professionals placed in 
the position of evaluating legal duties in light of their professional judgments. 
Dr. Alan R. Felthous, Professor and Director of Forensic Psychiatry at St. Louis 
University School of Medicine, offered a comprehensive review of Tarasoff-based 
litigation and legislation in his article in the Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law in September 2006.134 Professor Felthous analyzed the 
                                                          
 
duty of psychologists to report child abuse.); Yvona L. Pabian, Elizabeth Welfel & Ronald S. Beebe, 
Psychologists’ Knowledge of Their States’ Laws Pertaining to Tarasoff-Type Situations, 40 PROF. 
PSYCHOL. 8 (2009), http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2009-01453-012 
(reporting study showing general lack of understanding with respect to reporting duties under state law); 
Damon Muir Walcott, Pat Cerundolo & James C. Beck, Current Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: An 
Evolution Towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect, 19 BEHAV. SCI. L. 19, 325–43 (2001), http:// 
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bsl.444/full; see also Michael R. Quattrocchi & Robert F. Schopp, 
Tarasaurus Rex: A Standard of Care That Could Not Adapt, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L. 109 (2005), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.109 (criticizing “lay” responses dictated by Tarasoff in light of 
professional norms). 
132 See, e.g., Elizabeth Gaskill, Duty to Warn, NAT’L ASS’N SOC. WORKERS, MASS. CHAPTER (Nov. 1996), 
http://www.naswma.org/?116 (discussing duty to warn under Massachusetts statute); Stephen Granich, 
Duty to Warn; Duty to Protect, NEW SOC. WORKER, Winter 2012, at 4 (hypothetical ethical problems 
faced by social workers). 
133 See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, supra note 120; GRIFFIN SIMS EDWARDS, DATABASE 
OF STATE TARASOFF LAWS (Feb. 11, 2010), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1551505. 
134 See Felthous, supra note 130. 
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complexity of the scope of duty imposed in light of the treatment of the duty by 
courts and the subsequent legislative action in advising mental health professionals 
of the circumstances under which the need to take specific action arises.135 He posited 
that the duty could be viewed from both the clinician’s perspective, in which the duty 
is “driven primarily by the clinician’s duty to warn of a recognized danger,” or from 
the perspective of a victim, in which their interest is in being “warned based on a 
concern-arousing event.”136 
The legacy of Tarasoff is complicated by inconsistency in judicial applications 
that may focus too sympathetically on the injury sustained by a third party and too 
unsympathetically on the reality of the therapeutic relationship. Professor Felthous 
explains: 
Warning practices vary over a spectrum ranging from those that are 
essentially legally required duties of clinicians to those based on rights of actual 
or potential victims to be warned. These warning practices can be categorized as 
following: (1) warning of the risk of violence after the clinician appraised the risk 
to be serious and probable; (2) warning of the threat of violated based only the 
threat itself; (3) requested warning, based on a potential victim’s perceived risk of 
threat to self; and (4) required criminal victim warning mandated by statute when 
requested by a person who had already been criminally victimized by the offender 
in question. In contrast to the first three practices, warnings to individuals who 
have already been criminally victimized do not involve participation of mental 
health professionals.137 
Professor Felthous cautions that while Tarasoff may be taken to mean that the 
therapist issues a warning to an intended victim when a specific threat has been made, 
in fact, the duty to warn is based upon an assessment that the victim is subject to 
“danger” for which warning is the “appropriate protective measure.”138 He points to 
an early post-Tarasoff decision, McIntosh v. Milano,139 in which the New Jersey 
                                                          
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 338. 
137 Id. at 338–39. 
138 Id. at 340. The author explained: “According to the Tarasoff principle, the intended victim is to be 
warned of the ‘danger’. . . posed by the patient, not simply of the patient’s verbal threat.” Id. at 340; see 
also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976), on rehearing en banc, 529 P.2d 
553 (Cal. 1974). 
139 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). 
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Superior Court denied summary judgment sought by the therapist on a claim of 
liability to a third party injured by the patient. The court found that breach of duty to 
warn or protect was consistent with state law140 but noted that post-Tarasoff legal 
commentary reflected substantial doubt concerning the ability of therapists to be able 
to make reasonably accurate conclusions about which patients presented an actual 
likelihood of acting upon hostile thoughts in committing violent acts.141 
At roughly this same point in time, the issue of the ability of mental health 
professionals to predict “future dangerousness” was a critically important, emerging 
issue in criminal justice contexts, largely attributable to the finding of “future 
dangerousness” as the key issue in capital punishment decisions rendered by Texas 
juries in death penalty trials. In Barefoot v. Estelle,142 the Supreme Court upheld the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a stay of execution 
in rejecting Barefoot’s attack on the prosecution’s use of forensic expert’s opinion 
responding to a hypothetical question regarding the probability that he would 
commit acts of criminal violence in the future if sentenced to life imprisonment.143 
The Court upheld both the denial of the stay and the circuit court’s rejection of 
Barefoot’s argument that the expert testimony could not be based on hypothetical 
questions but required an in-person examination.144 The Court had previously upheld 
the use of forensic opinion evidence on the issue of “future dangerousness” of 
convicted capital defendants in Estelle v. Smith,145 noting approval of the statutory 
scheme adopted in Texas to require capital juries to consider whether the imposition 
of a death sentence would be warranted as part of the sentencing process.146 
The problem posed by risk assessment is critical for the determination of 
whether a breach of the standard of care has resulted from a therapist’s failure to 
warn or take other protective action, of course, because the imposition of a duty to 
                                                          
 
140 Id. at 509, 511–12. 
141 Id. at 505 n.8. 
142 463 U.S. 880, aff’g 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1983). 
143 Id. at 902–03. 
144 Id. at 896–98. 
145 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981). 
146 Id. (discussing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)). In Jurek, the Court construed TEX. CODE OF 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1975–76) as constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, which 
includes a special issue for juror determination regarding “whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” 428 U.S. at 
269. 
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act is theoretically dependent upon whether the mental health professional can be 
expected to correctly assess patient threat or propensity for violence. It may be the 
case that on any given set of facts, no therapist could be expected to make a 
determination sufficiently accurate to reasonably impose a duty to take protective 
measures. Moreover, even if the risk assessment does point toward action, another 
problem lies in determining exactly what corrective measure would be necessary or 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Focusing on California decisions in his analysis, Professor Felthous references 
the factually troubling case of Jablonski, by Pauls, v. United States.147 There, the trial 
court found that the treating Veterans Administration (VA) psychiatrists had a duty 
to warn the homicide victim, Melinda Kimball, of the patient’s potential for violence 
directed toward women based on his attempted rape of her mother, Isobel Pahls.148 
When the VA doctor warned Ms. Kimball that Philip Jablonski presented a threat to 
Kimball, with whom he lived, she rejected his suggestion that she leave Jablonski, 
explaining, “I love him.” The psychiatrist did not warn her further because “she 
would not listen to him.”149 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
psychiatrist failed to take sufficient action to warn Kimball of the perceived threat, 
deferring to the finding of the trial court. It also deferred to the trial court’s finding 
that the VA therapists were negligent in failing to access and review Phillip 
Jablonski’s medical history in assessing the violence risk, a finding contested by the 
Government on the basis of the evidentiary record, holding that the finding was not 
clearly erroneous.150 
The court’s conclusions reflect the sort of problems that may arise in a post-
Tarasoff action. Here, the VA psychiatrists apparently made a correct professional 
judgment in assessing the risk posed by Phillip Jablonski and they also correctly 
anticipated that Melinda Kimball was in the scope of danger, even though the 
                                                          
 
147 Felthous, supra note 130, at 340. See 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting de novo review of 
interpretation of state law, rather than deferring to district court’s interpretation unless clearly erroneous 
in diversity action). Isobel Pahls, Meghan Jablonski’s grandmother, brought the wrongful death action as 
guardian for her granddaughter. 
148 712 F.2d at 393. While the Circuit Court included considerable discussion of statutory immunity in its 
analysis, it addressed the single issue of the liability of the Veterans Administration hospital in resolving 
the plaintiff’s outstanding claim. Id. at 397 (“Only the liability of the hospital is presented to us in this 
appeal.”). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 398–99. 
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decision includes no reference to any specific threat directed at her personally. 
Jablonski had, however, attacked Kimball’s mother, Isobel Pauls, and attempted to 
rape her. During a significant history following the incident in which he attacked 
Pauls, Jablonski, accompanied by Kimball, sought diagnosis and treatment at the VA 
hospital. It ultimately proved unsuccessful when Jablonski murdered Kimball.151 
Liability was based on the wrongful death action brought by Kimball’s daughter, 
Meghan, based on Jablonski’s murder of her mother. The VA psychiatrist had 
warned Kimball of the danger he perceived but was rebuffed by her response to his 
suggestion that she leave him. Moreover, the record showed that Kimball had, 
herself, disclosed her fear of Jablonski.152 
One might well question exactly what more the defendants could have been 
expected to do in terms of warning Kimball that she was in danger. Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit found a breach of his duty, perhaps resting its finding of negligence on 
the fact that she was eventually murdered.153 
There were additional facts warranting immediate action or the involuntary 
hospitalization of Jablonski. These facts included Jablonski’s prior conviction and 
five-year prison sentence for raping his wife; the incident involving Pahls four days 
prior to his interview at the VA; and the fact that the investigating officer had 
disclosed his record and recommendation that Jablonski be treated as an in-patient 
to the head of psychiatric services at the VA, who failed to relate this information to 
the psychiatrist evaluating Jablonski.154 Jablonski had also been treated for 
schizophrenia in a military hospital with documented threats to his wife.155 The 
                                                          
 
151 Id. at 393–94. 
152 In contrast to the disposition in Jablonski, the Iowa court in Estate of Votteler, declined to apply 
Tarasoff in holding that the psychiatrist was not liable for a third person’s injuries inflicted by his patient 
when the third person herself was fully aware of the patient’s violent disposition and previous threats to 
kill her. 327 N.W.2d 759, 761–62 (Iowa 1982); accord Cantrell v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 6670 
(E.D.N.C. 1988); Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 835–36 (Kan. 1995) (stating there is no liability when 
victim already aware of threat); Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982). 
153 Professor Cohen explains that assessment of the therapist’s lack of warning about a potentially 
dangerous patient’s facts “can be exacerbated by ‘hindsight bias’ by a plaintiff’s expert, since it is always 
easier for a somebody retrospectively reviewing a patient’s chart (i.e., after the patient has killed or 
seriously injured another person) to recognize how ‘obvious it should have been’ that a particular patient 
was dangerous. In actuality, things aren’t as clear prospectively.” COHEN, supra note 82, at 463. 
154 712 F.2d at 397 (“The district court’s primary findings of malpractice concerned a failure to record and 
communicate the warning by the police, the failure to secure Jablonski’s prior records, and the failure to 
warn Kimball.”). 
155 The Jablonski court noted: 
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treating psychiatrist testified that, had he had this information, he would have 
pursued involuntary hospitalization after Jablonski refused to voluntarily commit 
himself.156 Despite the consistent opinion that he was dangerous, the VA 
psychiatrists concluded that he did not present a case for involuntary hospitalization 
and directed Jablonski to return for a follow-up appointment the following Monday, 
three days later. Jablonski killed Kimball that Sunday.157 
The decision suggests that the duty on the part of the mental health professional 
is not fulfilled simply by a timely warning directed to an identified, or reasonably 
identifiable, victim. Instead, the duty may be breached when the therapist’s warning 
proves insufficient and the evidence warrants further action, such as emergency, 
involuntary hospitalization. But in the case of Jablonski, the therapist likely could 
not have known what additional action would have been required; instead, the 
therapist only learned that the warning failed once Kimball was murdered. Even 
though the entire body of evidence relating to the patient’s history of violence and 
diagnosis presents a compelling argument for finding a breach of the standard of 
care, from the therapist’s perspective, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis would almost 
certainly lead to a conclusion that it is simply too difficult to understand what 
precisely the duty encompasses in terms of protecting the injured third person, given 
Kimball’s expressed refusal to leave Jablonski when advised to do so. 
Two additional questions that might be asked concern the procedural history of 
the case in the trial process. First, the wrongful death suit was brought pursuant to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act158 against the United States, rather than against one or 
more of the individual psychiatrists who could have been named and theoretically 
held personally liable in a private action. Had the three doctors named in the court’s 
opinion been sued personally, rather than identified as staff of the Veterans 
                                                          
 
The El Paso records reported that Jablonski had a “homicidal ideation toward 
his wife,” that on numerous occasions he had tried to kill her, that he “had 
probably suffered a psychotic break and the possibility of future violent 
behavior was a distinct probability,” and that he was “demonstrating some 
masculine identification in beating his wife as his father did frequently to his 
mother.” The final diagnosis concluded in part that Jablonski had a 
“schizophrenic reaction, undifferentiated type, chronic, moderate; manifested 
by homicidal behavior toward his wife.” 
Id. at 393–94. 
156 Id. at 393. 
157 Id. at 394. 
158 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b); 2671–80 (2018). 
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Administration hospital where Jablonski was seen shortly before the murder, the trial 
court might have been inclined to consider the defense’s comparative negligence 
claim, based on Kimball’s refusal to heed the warning to leave Jablonski. Second, 
one might consider the effect of the case being tried by a judge rather than a jury, 
which might have been far more skeptical of Kimball’s behavior despite her admitted 
fear of Jablonski in assessing the liability of the psychiatrists who warned her of his 
dangerousness.159 
Much of the mental health community’s opposition to Tarasoff liability is based 
on questioning the assumption that therapists are actually able to assess, with a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, when hostility and anger will escalate into 
acts of violence against intended or unknown victims. Professor Cohen noted that 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) “strongly disagreed” with Tarasoff, in 
part because of the difficulty in predicting violent behavior, noting: “Since most 
patients don’t go on to commit serious violence, clinicians would be forced to make 
many unnecessary warnings [based on the Tarasoff rationale], violating 
confidentiality in each of these cases.”160 
For instance, the APA’s amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle161 argued against 
prosecutors’ reliance on long-term violence predictions rendered by psychiatrists in 
Texas capital sentencing proceedings. While conceding that short-term predictions 
are far more reliable than long-term predictions of dangerousness,162 the APA argued 
that the latter are more reliably based on factors that are unrelated to mental illness, 
such as prior history of criminal behavior, sex, age, race, substance or alcohol abuse, 
and history of chronic unemployment, all statistical facts that could be presented 
through lay witnesses without the unintended effect of clothing testimony witness 
credibility with undeserved emphasis on psychiatric expertise.163 
                                                          
 
159 712 F.2d at 393 (“In a private conference following the diagnostic interview, Kimball told Kopiloff 
that she felt insecure around Jablonski and was concerned about his unusual behavior. Kopiloff 
recommended that she leave Jablonski at least while he was being evaluated. When Kimball responded ‘I 
love him,’ Kopiloff did not warn her further because he believed she would not listen to him.”). Even after 
Kimball moved out of Jablonski’s apartment and in with her mother, “Kimball continued to see Jablonski, 
however, and drove him to the hospital for his second appointment.” Id. at 394. 
160 See COHEN, supra note 82, at 463. 
161 Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–8, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). 
162 Id. at 4 n.7. 
163 Id. at 5–6. 
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The APA’s position in Barefoot presented a viable argument against reliance 
on forensic prediction of the probability of a capital defendant committing acts of 
criminal violence in the future, relevant in the context of the sentencing proceeding 
in which imposition of a death sentence is being considered by the jury. But, its 
argument also provides support for the imposition of a duty to respond to immediate 
threats or evidence of violent, dangerous predisposition on the part of a patient.164 In 
differentiating between the accepted ability of mental health professionals to make 
judgments as to the likelihood of patient violence in the near-term, the APA 
explained: 
Predictions of short-term future behavior are to be distinguished from 
predictions of long-term future dangerousness in this regard. In civil commitment 
cases, for example, as this Court recognized in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979), psychiatrists are commonly called on to make predictions about short-term 
prognoses, and such predictions sometimes include potential violence. The 
psychiatrist is able to evaluate the patient’s current mental condition and to 
discern its likely effect on behavioral patterns, including potentially violent 
behavior in the near future. Such situations, however, are clinically different from 
predictions of long-term dangerousness because they are made in the context of 
specific and usually acute mental illnesses (for example, severe depression), and 
they are made with knowledge of the individual’s short-run environmental 
situation, which may have a direct bearing on the likelihood that he will act 
dangerously.165 
What the APA’s position in Barefoot shows for purposes of Tarasoff liability is that 
regardless of the professional discomfort over the imposition of duties to warn or 
take other protective action, even the APA acknowledges that mental health 
professionals, undoubtedly with varying degrees of proficiency, can make 
reasonably accurate assessments of risk with respect to potential patient violence in 
appropriate situations.166 Those factors that enhance accuracy may themselves vary, 
but almost always will start within the patient-therapist relationship, the exception 
likely being a controlled situation in which patients are subject to observation by 
professionals not actively engaged in therapy at the time. 
                                                          
 
164 Id. at 4 n.6. 
165 Id. at 4 n.7 (emphasis added). 
166 Id. 
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Despite the widespread influence of Tarasoff on other courts, its reasoning has 
been resisted in some jurisdictions, such as Texas, where the state supreme court 
refused to impose civil liability on a psychiatrist based on failure to warn claim in 
Thapar v. Zezulka.167 The Texas Supreme Court did not engage in analysis of the 
comparative values of confidentiality and prevention of injury, unlike the Tarasoff 
court. The case involved Dr. Thapar’s treatment of Freddy Ray Lilly over a three-
year period after her initial diagnosis of the patient’s “moderate to severe post-
traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse, and paranoid and delusional beliefs 
concerning his stepfather, Henry Zezulka, and people of certain ethnic 
backgrounds.”168 Lilly disclosed his wish to kill Zezulka during a period of 
hospitalization, but Dr. Thapar concluded that he had decided not to kill his 
stepfather and discharged him. Within a month, Lilly shot and killed Zezulka.169 
In reversing the intermediate appellate court,170 the Texas Supreme Court 
reinstated the summary judgment granted to Dr. Thapar on the ground that Texas 
law did not recognize a cause of action based on the duty of a mental health 
professional to warn a third person of a patient’s disclosed threat to commit an act of 
violence toward the third person.171 It relied on continuing recognition of the privity 
requirement to preclude an action for professional negligence or malpractice.172 
Since the therapist did not have a professional relationship with the victim’s wife, 
she owed no duty to her based on a failure to correctly diagnose Lilly’s danger to his 
stepfather.173 Thus, the theory of Dr. Thapar’s liability was inconsistent with Texas 
precedent limiting professional liability to circumstances in which the physician-
patient relationship would govern the mental health professional’s duty arising 
directly from that relationship. 
                                                          
 
167 994 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1999). 
168 Id. at 636. 
169 Id. 
170 Zezulka v. Thapar, 961 S.W.2d 506, 511–12 (Tex. App. 1997). 
171 Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 640. 
172 Id. (“Because of the Legislature’s stated policy, we decline to impose a common law duty on mental-
health professionals to warn third parties of their patient’s threats. Accordingly, we conclude that Thapar 
was entitled to summary judgment because she owed no duty to Zezulka, a third-party nonpatient.”). The 
legislative policy referenced by the court is found in TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 611.002 (West 
1996). 
173 Id. at 638. 
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The court of appeals had essentially held that the gravamen of the complaint 
was not the misdiagnosis—a claim for medical malpractice—but rather the failure to 
warn the victim,174 referencing Tarasoff and noting other Texas decisions in which 
Tarasoff had been discussed in the warning context.175 The supreme court initially 
rejected this distinction, holding that because Zezulka’s complaint was grounded in 
the misdiagnosis of Lilly, the therapist had not violated a duty arising from diagnosis 
because Zezulka was not her patient.176 
The Texas Supreme Court then considered the conclusion of the intermediate 
court that Dr. Thapar owed a duty to Zezulka to convey Lilly’s threat to kill him, 
predicated on a common law theory of duty not based upon professional negligence, 
distinguishing these two theories of liability.177 It explained: 
We are not faced here with the question of whether a doctor owes a duty to third 
parties to warn a patient of risks from treatment which may endanger third 
parties.13 Instead, we are asked whether a mental-health professional owes a duty 
to directly warn third parties of a patient’s threats.178 
The supreme court did not adopt Tarasoff’s approach to the traditional 
recognition of a duty at common law to protect individuals within the scope of 
foreseeability of injury.179 There was no apparent consideration of the importance of 
confidentiality in maintaining a therapeutic relationship based upon trust but focused 
instead on the potential liability of psychotherapists. 
                                                          
 
174 961 S.W.2d at 511. 
175 Id. at 511 n.2. 
176 Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 638. The court relied on Texas precedent, holding that a physician owes no 
duty to non-patients who ultimately is injured by the patient to correctly diagnose a patient, unless the 
physician provides a prescription. Id. (citing Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 365–66 (Tex. App. 1983) 
(Where the physician prescribed Quaalude, there was a duty to warn the patient not to drive that extended 
to third party later injured.); Flynn v. Houston Emergicare, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 403, 405–06 (Tex. App. 
1994) (A doctor treating a patient for cocaine abuse had no duty to warn third person injured by patient 
while driving under influence of cocaine because the injury was not attributable to any impairment cause 
by physician’s diagnosis.)). 
177 Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 638–39. 
178 Id. at 638. 
179 Id. at 638 n.15. The court noted that the intermediate appellate court had relied on Tarasoff in finding 
Thapar potentially liable and cited prior decisions of Texas intermediate appellate courts discussing 
Tarasoff. See Zezulka, 961 S.W.2d at 511 n.2. 
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Instead, it predicated its holding on the statutory protection afforded to patient 
confidentiality. In responding to the question, the court relied upon Texas law 
affirming the duty of the mental health professional to maintain the patient’s 
confidence in disclosures made in the course of treatment or therapy.180 The 
applicable statute181 recognized a limited exception to the confidentiality duty: 
(a) A professional may disclose confidential information only: . . . 
(2) to medical or law enforcement personnel if the professional determines that 
there is a probability of imminent physical injury by the patient to the patient or 
others or there is a probability of immediate mental or emotional injury to the 
patient . . . .182 
Thus, the court concluded that the confidentiality statute did not require mental 
health professionals to disclose patient threats to prospective victims but only 
permitted the professional to disclose a threat to “medical or law enforcement 
personnel.”183 
The problem posed by this permissive warning approach recognized by the 
Texas Supreme Court under state law is that it affords little direction or protection to 
the mental health providers in addressing the potential consequences of patient 
threats of violence. The statute limits disclosure of threats to medical or law 
enforcement personnel but does not include an identified victim of the threat. This 
limits liability in actions brought by victims or their families when the threatened 
action is actualized and results in injury or death, and this provides significant 
protection for the therapist. However, because no specific duty to warn or protect is 
included in the statute, arguably, the therapist is placed in the position of assessing 
whether the “patient or others” might be injured by the patient’s actions consistent 
with a disclosed threat.184 
                                                          
 
180 Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 639. 
181 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 611.004(a)(2). 
182 Id. The court noted the original language found in § 4, 1979 TEX. GEN. LAWS 514, was consistent with 
the language included in the HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE. 994 S.W.2d at 639. 
183 Id. at 639 (“The statute, however, permits these disclosures but does not require them . . . .”). 
184 HEALTH & SAFETY § 611.004(a)(2). 
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Moreover, the therapist would be exposed to potential liability for any warning 
or other protective action in the event the assessment of the seriousness of the 
patient’s threat was incorrect, as the court explained: 
[T]he statute does not shield mental-health professionals from civil liability for 
disclosing threats in good faith. On the contrary, mental-health professionals 
make disclosures at their peril. Thus, if a common-law duty to warn is imposed, 
mental-health professionals face a Catch-22. They either disclose a confidential 
communication that later proves to be an idle threat and incur liability to the 
patient, or they fail to disclose a confidential communication that later proves to 
be a truthful threat and incur liability to the victim and the victim’s family.185 
Thus, the therapist could be held accountable for violating the confidentiality duty 
imposed under the statute, even if the therapist has acted in good faith. The statute 
simply offers no immunity when the warning or protective act is the result of 
diagnostic error or overreaction on the therapist’s part. 
This permissive approach, which neither imposes a statutory duty to warn or 
protect nor affords immunity when the therapist acts in good faith, subjects the 
therapist to potential liability for acting based on a moral duty to attempt to prevent 
violence or injury to a patient’s intended victim. It reflects a rejection of Tarasoff, 
creating something of a default position for therapists to decline action when 
confronted by uncertainty with respect to the dangerous patient’s willingness or 
ability to actually act, and favors inaction even when dangerousness is likely certain 
to result in violence or injuries to others. The Texas position remains a minority view 
with respect to the duty imposed upon mental health professionals, however. 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TARASOFF 
Most states have laws that either require or permit mental health professionals to 
disclose information about patients who may become violent. Those laws are 
receiving increased attention following recent mass shootings, such as those in 
Aurora, Colo., and Newtown, Conn. 
A New York law enacted Jan. 15, 2013, moves that state’s law from a permissive 
to a mandatory duty for mental health professionals to report when they believe 
patients may pose a danger to themselves or others but protects therapists from 
both civil and criminal liability for failure to report if they act “in good faith.” 
                                                          
 
185 Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 640 (emphasis added). 
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New York’s new law also allows law enforcement to remove firearms owned by 
patients reported to be likely to be dangerous.186 
A. Statutory Schemes Authorizing Seizure of Weapons, or “Red 
Flag” Laws 
Less than two weeks after the most deadly mass shooting in Canadian history, 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that possession of “military-grade assault” 
weapons was immediately banned in the country, including some 1,500 models and 
makes of these weapons.187 The ban resulted from the fatal shootings of at least 
twenty-three people over April 18–19, 2020, with the Prime Minister explaining, 
“[t]hese weapons were designed for one purpose and one purpose only: to kill the 
largest number of people in the shortest amount of time. There is no use and no place 
for such weapons in Canada.”188 
There has been no comparable rapid response to mass violence leading to 
significant restrictions on ownership of similar weapons in the United States, 
attributable in significant part to the Supreme Court’s selective incorporation of the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms in McDonald v. City of Chicago.189 
The perceived or demonstrated links between mental illness or other 
impairment and mass violence, however, has prompted legislative responses that 
                                                          
 
186 See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, supra note 120; McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 
505 n.8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). 
187 See Amanda Coletta, Canada Announces Immediate Ban on ‘Military-Grade’ Assault Weapons, 
WASH. POST (May 1, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-bans-military 
-grade-assault-weapons/2020/05/01/1a5b524c-8bc4-11ea-80df-d24b35a568ae_story.html. 
188 See Ian Austen, Canada Bans Assault Weapons in Wake of Deadly Mass Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/world/canada/canada-bans-assault-weapons.html (“The 
ban means that Canadians will no longer be able to own rifles like the AR-15, the military-style weapon 
used in several mass shootings in the United States including those in Sandy Hook, Conn.; Orlando, Fla.; 
and Parkland, Fla.”). On the same day as the announcement of the Canadian ban on military grade assault 
weapons, protesters, many armed with weapons similar to those banned in Canada, entered the Michigan 
state capitol to oppose Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s continuing enforcement of the state’s social 
distancing restrictions designed to combat the COVID-19 epidemic designated a national emergency by 
President Trump, while he tweeted support for the protesters. See Jason Slotkin, Protesters Swarm 
Michigan Capitol Amid Showdown Over Governor’s Emergency Powers, NPR (May 1, 2020), https:// 
www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/01/849017021/protestors-swarm-michigan-
capitol-amid-showdown-over-governors-emergency-powers. 
189 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010). 
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may indirectly address the potential for mass murder.190 These responses typically 
focus on restricting access to weapons, principally firearms, by mentally impaired 
individuals—“red flag laws” or “Extreme Risk Protection Orders.”191 These laws, 
which authorize seizure of firearms from potentially dangerous individuals by law 
enforcement,192 contemplate statutory schemes that facilitate preemptive action by 
mental health professionals, to whom patients will often express interest in violent 
acts, or more specifically, in terms of threatened violence toward others.193 
                                                          
 
190 See Noel Brinkerhoff & Steve Straehley, Two States Allow Seizing Guns from Mentally Ill; Other States 
on Hold, ALLGOV (July 8, 2014), http://www.allgov.com/news/controversies/two-states-allow-seizing-
guns-from-mentally-ill-other-states-on-hold-140708?news=853622. Other jurisdictions did eventually 
adopt so-called “red flag laws.” See Nick Wing & Melissa Jeltsen, Wave of ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws Shows 
Power of the Parkland Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/red-
flag-laws-parkland-florida-massacre_n_5b24099fe4b056b22639d8cb (updated June 17, 2018). For a 
discussion of red flag laws particularly relevant to problems arising from possession of weapons by elderly 
individuals who may suffer from diminished mental capacity, see Tara Sklar, Elderly Gun Ownership and 
the Wave of Red Flag Laws: An Unintended Consequence That Could Help Many, 27 ELDER L.J. 35, 44–
46 (2019) (table referencing state adoption of “red flag” laws permitting seizure of weapons from 
individuals suspected of being dangerous). 
191 See, e.g., Redington v. State, 121 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“‘Red flag laws’ generally 
allow law enforcement to seek a court order temporarily restricting a person’s access to firearms if that 
person shows ‘red flags’ of being a threat of danger to themselves or others.”). 
192 Sklar, supra note 190, at 40–43 (providing an overview of state adoption of red flag laws and “Extreme 
Risk Protection Orders,” focusing particularly on the problems of gun access for the elderly, a segment of 
the population often most prone to suicide). The author describes these state laws: 
Red flag laws, also referred to as Extreme Risk Protection Orders (“ERPO”), 
allow law enforcement—and in eight states, family or household members—
to file a petition for a court order to temporarily remove a person’s access to 
guns when they show “red flags” by exhibiting dangerous behavior.7 These 
laws are often referenced in the media and by legislators as a response to curb 
mass shootings, as evidenced by the number of states with red flag laws having 
doubled since the mass school shooting in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 
2018. 
Id. at 37. On the matter of the success of the Connecticut firearms seizure law, see Jeffrey W. Swanson, 
Michael A. Norko, Hsiu-Ju Lin, Kelly Alanis-Hirsch, Linda K. Frisman, Madelon V. Baranoski, Michele 
M. Easter, Allison G. Robertson, Marvin S. Swartz & Richard J. Bonnie, Implementation and 
Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2017) (“[E]nacting and implementing laws like Connecticut’s civil risk warrant 
statute in other states could significantly mitigate the risk posed by that small proportion of legal gun 
owners who, at times, may pose a significant danger to themselves or others. Such laws could thus save 
many lives and prove to be an important piece in the complex puzzle of gun violence prevention in the 
United States.”). 
193 The Supreme Court has historically recognized the legality of state laws providing for the involuntary 
hospitalization, or civil commitment of mentally disturbed individuals who have injured or threatened to 
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Connecticut enacted legislation authorizing the seizure of weapons from 
dangerous individuals in 1999,194 following a workplace mass shooting at the 
Connecticut state lottery committed by an employee.195 The statute provides for the 
seizure of weapons,196 based on a detailed list of acts supporting the issuance of a 
warrant, including: 
(1) Recent threats or acts of violence by such person directed toward other 
persons; (2) recent threats or acts of violence by such person directed toward 
himself or herself; and (3) recent acts of cruelty to animals as provided in 
subsection (b) of section 53-247 by such person. In evaluating whether such recent 
threats or acts of violence constitute probable cause to believe that such person 
poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others, the 
judge may consider other factors including, but not limited to (A) the reckless use, 
display or brandishing of a firearm by such person, (B) a history of the use, 
attempted use or threatened use of physical force by such person against other 
persons, (C) prior involuntary confinement of such person in a hospital for persons 
with psychiatric disabilities, and (D) the illegal use of controlled substances or 
abuse of alcohol by such person.197 
                                                          
 
injure others or themselves. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“The state has a 
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because 
of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect 
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 
U.S. 113, 131 (1990) (confinement of mentally ill based on threat of violence demands protection from 
violation of due process rights); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“A finding of ‘mental 
illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in 
simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that 
the ‘mentally ill’ can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for 
confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.”). 
194 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c (West 2020). 
195 Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rampage in Connecticut: The Overview; Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4, 
then Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/nyregion/rampage-
connecticut-overview-connecticut-lottery-worker-kills-4-bosses-then.html. 
196 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(a) (West 2020). 
197 § 29-38c(b). One reported incident, however, demonstrates the flaw that undermines the prospects for 
achieving the goal of removing firearms from the mentally ill over the long-term, however. Michael Luo 
& Mike McIntire, When the Right to Bear Arms Includes the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/when-the-right-to-bear-arms-includes-the-mentally-ill.html. The 
New York Times reported: 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 4 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
The statutory scheme identifies situations in which potential use of firearms in mass 
shootings could be addressed by preemptive action by law enforcement and the 
courts. However, only section (C), which refers to “prior involuntary confinement” 
of the individual for “psychiatric disabilities,” actually ties the seizure of weapons to 
mental illness, although the alternatives may indicate some propensity or possibility 
of violent use of the individual’s weapons. 
Section (C), which links the emergency seizure of weapons to the firearm 
owner’s history of mental illness or behavior warranting involuntary civil 
commitment, builds on the general process for hospitalization of individuals whose 
behavior warrants temporary loss of liberty. Involuntary civil commitment for 
mental diagnosis or treatment is traditionally accepted as an option for authorities to 
deal with individuals whose impairments are manifested by acts or threats of 
violence against others or themselves.198 Moreover, it is an option generally available 
for use by mental health professionals, law enforcement officers, or concerned 
individuals to prevent injury in emergency situations.199 However, this involuntary 
                                                          
 
Last April, workers at Middlesex Hospital in Connecticut called the police to 
report that a psychiatric patient named Mark Russo had threatened to shoot his 
mother if officers tried to take the 18 rifles and shotguns he kept at her house. 
Mr. Russo, who was off his medication for paranoid schizophrenia, also talked 
about the recent elementary school massacre in Newtown and told a nurse that 
he “could take a chair and kill you or bash your head in between the eyes,” 
court records show. 
Id. Following seizure of the patient’s seven firearms, he began to take his medication once again and, 
under Connecticut law, was eligible to seek their return after one year. Id. He was quoted as saying: “I 
don’t think they ever should have been taken out of my house,” he said. “I plan to get all my guns and 
ammo and knives back in April.” Id. The article references a number of instances in which mentally ill 
individuals, often suspects or others involved in confrontations with law enforcement, have engaged in 
acts of fatal gun violence. 
198 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in 
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the 
state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of 
some who are mentally ill.”). Given the infringement on the involuntarily-committed patient’s liberty 
interest, the Addington Court concluded that the State prove that the proposed patient suffers from a mental 
impairment and that the patient presents a threat to himself or others by “clear and convincing evidence”—
the intermediate standard of proof for infringement on personal liberty interests between the reasonable 
doubt standard imposed for criminal convictions and the preponderance of evidence standards generally 
applicable in civil actions—in order to prevent unjust or unreasonable violations of individual liberty more 
likely if the preponderance standard is used. Id. at 432–33. 
199 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-502 (West 2020). The statute provides for involuntary 
commitment of any person who, in the opinion of a physician, “has psychiatric disabilities and is 
dangerous to himself or others or gravely disabled, and is in need of immediate care and treatment in a 
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civil commitment process failed in Tarasoff when, despite the therapist’s concern 
about Poddar’s potential for violence, the officers did not take him into custody after 
questioning him.200 
The Connecticut weapon seizure law, however, does not involve an acceptable 
infringement on an individual’s liberty interest due to involuntary hospitalization 
based on evidence of violence or violent threats attributed to mental state. Instead, it 
raises an altogether different infringement, the loss of access to weapons, now 
constitutionally protected under the Second Amendment.201 When confronted by a 
challenge to the weapon seizure law based on the guarantee of the right to bear arms 
in Hope v. State,202 the Connecticut Court of Appeals rejected the challenge, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.203 There, the 
Court explained that state legislatures could resort to statutory restrictions “to 
prevent the violence associated with firearms.”204 The state court concluded: 
Section 29–38c does not implicate the second amendment, as it does not 
restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their 
homes. It restricts for up to one year the rights of only those whom a court has 
adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves or others after 
affording due process protection to challenge the seizure of the firearms.205 
The parameters of the Second Amendment protection afforded individuals in 
possession of firearms have yet to be precisely defined by the Supreme Court with 
respect to seizure statutes—“red flag laws”—that permit state authorities to seize 
                                                          
 
hospital for psychiatric disabilities, may be confined in such a hospital, either public or private, under an 
emergency certificate as hereinafter provided for not more than fifteen days. . . .” Id. 
200 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339–40 (Cal. 1976). 
201 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008). 
202 133 A.3d 519 (Conn. App. 2015). 
203 Id. at 524 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626) (holding that the right to possess firearms is not absolute 
under the Second Amendment). 
204 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 636. 
205 Hope, 133 A.3d at 52425. The court noted that the California Court of Appeals had reached a similar 
conclusion in City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 650–54 (2013), in holding that the 
California statute allowing state to seize firearms from persons detained for examination due to mental 
illness who are likely to cause a danger did not violate the Second Amendment. 
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firearms based on a showing of an individual’s history of cruelty to animals, mental 
illness, or abuse of alcohol.206 Given the history of mass shootings and state efforts 
to prevent violence committed with firearms, it seems probable that this issue will 
eventually reach the Supreme Court for the purpose of express delineation of the 
protection afforded by the individual’s constitutional “right to bear arms.”207 
A number of states have adopted “red flag laws” authorizing the seizure of 
firearms or other weapons from individuals suspected of having the potential for 
violence toward themselves or others208 since the action initially undertaken by the 
Connecticut legislature.209 States that have adopted this approach include Florida, 
with the state legislature acting210 in the aftermath of the shooting at the high school 
in Parkland to adopt the popularly titled “Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School 
Public Safety Act.”211 The legislature explained the basis for its action: 
The Legislature finds there is a need to comprehensively address the crisis 
of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses. 
The Legislature intends to address this crisis by providing law enforcement and 
the courts with the tools to enhance public safety by temporarily restricting 
firearm possession by a person who is undergoing a mental health crisis and when 
there is evidence of a threat of violence, and by promoting school safety and 
                                                          
 
206 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(b) (2020) for evidentiary factors the court may consider in authorizing 
a seizure of the individual’s firearms. 
207 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
208 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.9 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13–14.5–101 to –114 
(2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448C (West 2019); D.C. CODE §§ 7–2510.01–.12 (2019); FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.401 (2018); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/1–67/80 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5–601 to 
–610 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 131R–131Y (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.525–.543 
(2018); 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-1 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.030 (West 2020). 
209 See, e.g., Redington v. State, 121 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Prior to February 2018, 
five states including Indiana had red flag laws. After the February 14, 2018, shooting at Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, at least eight other states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted a red flag law.”). California adopted legislation permitting removal of firearms on petition of a 
family member who believes a relative poses a threat in response to the mass shooting killing six and 
wounding 13 others near the University of California at Santa Barbara before the shooter killed himself. 
Ryan J. Foley & Don Thompson, Few States Let Courts Take Guns from People Deemed a Threat, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/d1bcb2afb9e24df8bdacf3eacde95352. 
210 FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (2018). 
211 Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 280 So. 3d 524, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
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enhanced coordination between education and law enforcement entities at the state 
and local level.212 
The statutory scheme expressly predicates the action to seize firearms on a showing 
that the individual suspected of threatening violence be “undergoing a mental health 
crisis,” arguably requiring evaluation by a mental health professional.213 However, 
the findings supporting an order for seizure of the individual’s firearms do not 
include or even reference a finding by a mental health professional that the 
respondent is undergoing or has undergone “a mental health crisis.”214 
Over a decade earlier, Indiana enacted legislation in 2005215 authorizing 
authorities to seize firearms under a warrant issued based upon a credible showing 
by police that an individual has demonstrated “dangerousness” resulting from mental 
illness, emotional instability, or propensity for violence.216 With respect to the 
required showing of an individual’s dangerousness, the statute provides: 
(a) For the purposes of this chapter, an individual is “dangerous” if: 
(1) the individual presents an imminent risk of personal injury to the individual or 
to another individual; or 
(2) It is probable that the individual will present a risk of personal injury to the 
individual or to another individual in the future and the individual: 
                                                          
 
212 Id. at 532 (emphasis added) (quoting 2018 FLA. LAWS 1-3). 
213 Id. There is no statutory requirement for the evaluation of the respondent by a mental health 
professional, however. In Davis, the trial court heard evidence from a neuropsychologist called by Davis 
who opined that his violent behavior was “probably relatively normal” in light of stress he was suffering 
at the time, but rejected this expert opinion worth “little weight.” Id. at 529. 
214 FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3)(c). 
215 IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-1 to 35-47-14-13 (2020). Indiana authorized seizure of guns from dangerous 
persons believed to suffer from mental impairment as a strategic response to the need to prevent gun 
violence in 2005. See States Look to Gun Seizure Law After Mass Killings, FOX NEWS, https://www 
.foxnews.com/politics/states-look-to-gun-seizure-law-after-mass-killings (last updated Dec. 20, 2015). 
But the existence of a “red flag law” does not assure that the public will be protected from the acts of a 
mass shooter, as the incident at the FedEx distribution center in Indianapolis on April 15, 2021 illustrates. 
See infra Part VII and Epilogue. Local law enforcement officials had previously arrested the perpetrator 
of the mass shooting and seized a shotgun, but failed to take necessary legal action under the Indiana “red 
flag” law to confiscate the weapon. The shooter subsequently purchased two semi-automatic weapons 
used the FedEx shooting. 
216 § 35-47-14-2. This section authorizes a court to issue a warrant for the seizure of “a firearm in the 
possession of an individual who is dangerous,” once the court determines that “probable cause exists to 
believe that the individual is (A) dangerous; and (B) in possession of a firearm.” Id. § 35-47-14-2 (a)(3). 
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(A) has a mental illness (as defined in IC 12-7-2-130) that may be controlled 
by medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntarily and consistently 
taking the individual’s medication while not under supervision; or 
(B) is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a 
reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent or suicidal 
conduct.217 
Not only does the Indiana statute address the potential for violence attributable to a 
statutorily-defined “mental illness,”218 it is sufficient to prove that the individual 
poses an imminent risk of injury to himself or another person. This alternative basis 
for relief disregards the mental state of the respondent but does not provide any basis 
for hospitalization based on impaired mental state, which would result in an 
infringement on the individual respondent’s personal liberty interest in being free 
from confinement.219 
State “red flag” laws that address dangerousness without requiring proof of 
impaired mental state are designed primarily to authorize action based on the need 
to protect others, or the respondent, from injury inflicted through the use of firearms, 
rather than any legislative intent to tie access to firearms to mental impairment.220 
Thus, the threat of injury, not treatment of mental illness or other impairment, is the 
focus of the legislation, while other statutory provisions serve to address the need for 
involuntary civil commitment to deal with the range of psychiatric problems that 
might precipitate injury to the impaired individual or other persons. In Addington v. 
Texas, the Court recognized the traditional process of involuntary civil commitment 
for hospitalization of a mentally disturbed individual threatening the safety of others, 
or himself.221 
                                                          
 
217 See § 35-47-14-1. 
218 § 35-47-14-2(a)(2)(A). 
219 Although, in appropriate circumstances, this infringement on personal liberty of the patient who is 
involuntarily hospitalized, is warranted based on the threat posed by the impaired individual who is shown 
to be a threat to others or himself. 
220 §§ 35-47-14-1(a)(1), (2)(A). 
221 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The Court addressed the constitutionally-required burden of proof placed upon 
the State when seeking to civilly commit an individual for hospitalization for an “emotional disturbance,” 
id. at 425, affirming: 
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing 
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
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The “red flag” law, permitting seizure of firearms without a required showing 
that the respondent suffers from an impaired mental state, represents an important 
middle ground in terms of providing options to authorities in an effort to prevent 
violence. This is likely particularly true in situations involving the potential for 
domestic violence in which interpersonal antagonism, rather than diagnosed mental 
impairment, represents the most likely reason for injury. These statutes permit law 
enforcement to take affirmative action to prevent violence, rather than forcing them 
to respond only after it has been reported and victims have been harmed by the 
violent actor. This may be especially important with respect to acts of domestic 
violence involving the use of firearms. 
Federal constitutional protection of individual liberty interests effectively bars 
the State from using indefinite commitment of violent individuals to protect others, 
as the Supreme Court explained in Foucha v. Louisiana.222 There, the Court rejected 
continuing confinement of an insanity acquittee once mental health professionals 
concluded that Foucha did not suffer from a mental state impairment warranting 
involuntary civil commitment or hospitalization necessary for treatment.223 Instead, 
the state hospital staff sought to continue his commitment because of their conclusion 
that while not mentally ill, Foucha’s violent nature posed a continuing threat of injury 
to others.224 The Court held, however, that an insanity acquittee is “‘entitled to 
release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,’ i.e., the acquittee 
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.”225 
B. Legislation Addressing the Therapist’s Duty to Protect or 
Warn 
While legislation addressing the use of firearms in the commission of violent 
acts places the focus on the availability of weaponry to facilitate individual or mass 
                                                          
 
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the 
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 
Id. at 426. The Court held that the standard of proof required for involuntary commitment is “clear and 
convincing evidence.” Id. at 431–32. 
222 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
223 Id. at 74–75, 78, 80. 
224 Id. at 75–76. 
225 Id. at 77 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)) (holding that insanity acquittee may 
be confined upon acquittal for mental defect because the conviction establishes the acquittee’s 
dangerousness and the insanity establishes the mental impairment warranting involuntary hospitalization 
without requirement of proof under Addington, 441 U.S. 418). 
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shootings, the alternative approach focuses on addressing the impaired mental state 
of many individuals involved in targeted or random violence. State laws have long 
provided mental health professionals and others with the option of seeking 
immediate, emergency hospitalization by the civil commitment of those patients 
disclosing credible threats of intent to commit violent acts or who display symptoms 
of psychosis warranting intervention. 
But state statutes are inconsistent in their focus on the action to be taken by the 
mental health professional confronting a dangerous patient, particularly when the 
patient has evidenced hostility or articulated general or specific threats, the latter 
which may involve identification of intended victims. When the identification of an 
intended victim is available to the therapist, the obligation for warning logically 
increases, based on Tarasoff’s reasoning.226 
 
Figure 1. Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Protect/Warn 
This 2018 survey by the National Conference of State Legislatures227 of state laws 
governing the duty of mental health professionals to warn or take protective 
measures to prevent injury to third persons by dangerous patients illustrates the 
significant legislative response to the problem of patient violence, even in 
jurisdictions that have been less aggressive in terms of developing theories of civil 
                                                          
 
226 The victim in Tarasoff, Tatiana, was readily “identifiable.” Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 
P.2d 334, 341, 345 n.11 (Cal. 1976) (noting that duty will vary depending upon facts of each case). 
227 See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, supra note 120; EDWARDS, supra note 133. 
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liability arising from injuries sustained by third persons. The approaches taken by 
the states lack uniformity, but they have been categorized in one study as follows: 
In addressing this question, we can distinguish between three general 
categories of states: those that mandate some duty to warn or protect (and that 
often specify whether law enforcement, the victim, or a combination should be 
“warned”); those that allow therapists to warn by protecting them from liability 
for breach of confidentiality if they do so, but do not require them to issue a 
warning; and those that offer no statutory or case law guidance. We highlight the 
ethics-based and legal implications of this variation for health professionals.228 
The authors then analyze the ways in which variation in statutory approaches impact 
the performance of professional duties in specific ways based on the respective 
legislative directives, concluding, in part: 
Interstate variation in the duty to warn or protect raises normative questions 
about how this variability may impede mental health professionals’ knowledge of 
their duties. Inadequate knowledge not only exposes therapists to legal risks, but 
also may impede a therapist’s ability to fulfill an identifiable victim’s moral claim 
to be warned about or protected from substantial harm. When legal scholars have 
difficulty parsing the reasoning behind various Tarasoff-related rulings, it seems 
unreasonable to expect mental health care professionals and law enforcement 
officers to discharge these duties correctly without increased guidance and 
support.229 
They also offer an interesting conclusion about the implications of Tarasoff in civil 
actions in their 2014 analysis: while Tarasoff generated significant concern and 
speculation that imposition of a duty to warn or protect against patient violence 
would threaten to “compromise the therapeutic relationship,” jury verdicts tended to 
                                                          
 
228 See Johnson et al., supra note 130, at 470. 
229 Id. at 476. 
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favor therapists.230 Jury verdicts favoring victims were the result of the most 
egregious violations of the standard of care.231 
C. Variations in the Legislative Approach 
Even a cursory review of a few state statutes imposing a duty on mental health 
professionals to respond to potential violence on the part of dangerous patients 
demonstrates considerable variation in the approaches taken both with respect to the 
factor triggering professional action and the action expected of the professional once 
evidence of this potential for violence arises.232 Only four states are identified by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures as having no statutory regulation 
addressing warnings: Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nevada.233 
                                                          
 
230 Id. at 475. The authors noted: 
Whereas much of the early commentary surrounding Tarasoff consisted of dire 
proclamations about the damaging effect the rulings would have on 
psychotherapy, with commentators arguing that the therapeutic relationship 
would be irremediably compromised by the ensuing regulations, recent court 
cases illustrate that therapists are very rarely held liable. [A]n analysis of 70 
appellate cases from 1985 to 2006, found that 46 were decided in favor of the 
mental health professional, 6 were decided in favor of the plaintiff (although 
only 4 of these used Tarasoff statutes), and 17 were returned to trial courts for 
further litigation. Mental health professionals were exonerated on the 
following bases: no imminent threat was communicated to a therapist about an 
identifiable victim; the victim was already aware of the danger; or the therapist 
warned the victim, but the victim took actions that went against the warning. 
Courts appeared to rule in favor of the victims only in marked cases of 
negligence by the mental health professional or institution. 
Id. at 475 (citing Soulier et al., supra note 130). 
231 Id. at 475–76. 
232 Id. at 469. 
233 Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, supra note 120 (map of states with respect to warning 
statutes). 
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1. Mandatory Duty to Warn or Protect 
a. Imposition of Duty by Statute: The New York 
Statute 
Some state statutes, like New York’s, expressly impose a duty on mental health 
professionals to take protective measures to ensure the safety of third persons from 
dangerous patients. Amended in 2013,234 the statute provides: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, when a mental health professional 
currently providing treatment services to a person determines, in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment, that such person is likely to engage in conduct 
that would result in serious harm to self or others, he or she shall be required to 
report, as soon as practicable, to the director of community services, or the 
director’s designee, who shall report to the division of criminal justice services 
whenever he or she agrees that the person is likely to engage in such conduct.235 
The New York statute does not obligate the mental health professional to report a 
determination that the patient is dangerous to an identified victim, but rather to law 
enforcement. Nor does it rest on disclosure of a specific threat or disclosure of an 
intended victim by the patient, instead providing for a report of a generalized finding 
of dangerousness in the course of treatment. 
b. Imposition of Duty and Immunity: The Colorado 
Statute 
A common feature in many state statutes involves the creation or extension of 
statutory immunity for mental health providers in reporting patient threats or 
assessments of dangerousness. The Colorado statute236 combines both a mandatory 
duty to report and immunity for reporting psychotherapists: 
(2)(a) A mental health provider is not liable for damages in any civil action for 
failure to warn or protect a specific person or persons, including those identifiable 
by their association with a specific location or entity, against the violent behavior 
of a person receiving treatment from the mental health provider, and any such 
mental health provider must not be held civilly liable for failure to predict such 
                                                          
 
234 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46 (McKinney 2020). 
235 Id. § 9.46(b). 
236 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2020). 
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violent behavior except where the patient has communicated to the mental health 
provider a serious threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person 
or persons, including those identifiable by their association with a specific 
location or entity.237 
Subsection (2)(a) provides statutory immunity for the mental health provider who 
reports potential patient violence by warning or taking other protective action, 
limiting the duty to identified or identifiable victims. Subsection (2)(b) then explains 
that the alternative protective action also includes notification of an “appropriate law 
enforcement agency” and may include involuntary, emergency hospitalization. But 
the provision also requires warnings to identified or identifiable victims, or those 
appropriate when a threat indicates a particular venue where violence may occur. 
The subsection then reiterates the general immunity protection afforded mental 
health professionals reporting potential patient violence. This compromise directive 
expressly provides: 
(b) When there is a duty to warn and protect under the provisions of paragraph (a) 
of this subsection (2), the mental health provider shall make reasonable and timely 
efforts to notify the person or persons, or the person or persons responsible for a 
specific location or entity, that is specifically threatened, as well as to notify an 
appropriate law enforcement agency or to take other appropriate action, including 
but not limited to hospitalizing the patient. A mental health provider is not liable 
for damages in any civil action for warning a specific person or persons, or a 
person or persons responsible for a specific location or entity, against or predicting 
the violent behavior of a person receiving treatment from the mental health 
provider.238 
Significantly, in light of recent acts of mass violence that apparently involve random 
victims, the requirement of warning based on a particular “location or entity” where 
mass violence may be targeted, such as a school, workplace, or public venue, 
expands the duty beyond those formulations of the duty that focus only on identified 
or identifiable victims. 
                                                          
 
237 Id. § 13-21-117(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
238 Id. § 13-21-117(2)(b). 
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c. Statutory Duty Based on Case Law: The California 
Scheme 
The California statute governing the duty to protect prospective victims of 
patient violence,239 § 43.92 of the Civil Code, addresses the duty in negative terms 
and predicates the discharge of the duty only when the patient has made “a serious 
threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims” as 
expressly included in subsection (a): 
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall 
arise against, any person who is a psychotherapist as defined in Section 1010 of 
the Evidence Code in failing to protect from a patient’s threatened violent 
behavior or failing to predict and protect from a patient’s violent behavior except 
if the patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical 
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims. 
(b) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall 
arise against, a psychotherapist who, under the limited circumstances specified in 
subdivision (a), discharges his or her duty to protect by making reasonable efforts 
to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement 
agency.240 
Rather than affirmatively defining the duty, the statute actually provides immunity 
from liability for monetary damages241 when a psychotherapist makes an appropriate 
effort to protect a prospective victim242 who is the subject of a patient’s threat to 
                                                          
 
239 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2020). 
240 Id. 
241 Subsection (a), moreover, not only insulates mental health professionals taking appropriate action to 
protect third persons from injury, but also provides that there is no cause of action based upon the 
therapist’s action. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117(2)(a). If an attempt to protect victims from injury 
fails because the effort was unsuccessful, perhaps even due to some negligence on the part of the 
protecting therapist, based on the language in subsection (b) referring to “reasonable efforts” to 
communicate the threat to either the intended victim or law enforcement, the mental health provider is not 
liable for damages. Id. § 13-21-117(2)(b). Other state statutes use immunity to stimulate warnings or other 
acts designed to protect potential victims. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-8A-24 (2020). 
242 The statute was amended effective in 2013 to change the duty from one of giving warning, to a duty to 
protect identifiable victims from patient violence as explained in statutory language explaining the 
amendment: 
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments made by the act1 
adding this subdivision only change the name of the duty referenced in this 
section from a duty to warn and protect to a duty to protect. Nothing in this 
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commit an act of violence. However, the statute providing for immunity builds upon 
Tarasoff and other California decisions that recognized the duty to warn or protect 
and, thus, serve to afford an important incentive for psychotherapists to comply with 
the judicially-created duty in responding to specific threats made by dangerous 
patients. 
Dr. Felthous points out, moreover, that the California statute provides that the 
duty which will afford the therapist immunity is triggered only by a serious threat of 
violence directed at an identified or identifiable victim and not by any other 
assessment of the patient’s propensity for violent action against others.243 It is the 
specific threat that is the focus of the duty and concomitant protection contemplated 
by the statute.244 
2. The “Permissive” Approach to the Duty to Warn or 
Protect 
In contrast to legislative action directing mental health professionals to 
affirmatively act to protect third persons from injury threatened by dangerous 
patients, a minority of jurisdictions have adopted a “permissive” approach to the 
therapist’s exercise of discretion, as the National Conference of State Legislatures 
notes.245 
The permissive approach essentially assigns discretion for reporting a threat to 
the therapist but imposes no duty to report on therapists who are privy to the kind of 
specific threat that would entail liability for failure to warn under Tarasoff-like case 
law. But, the therapist may still be found liable if, in fact, the patient acts upon the 
                                                          
 
section shall be construed to be a substantive change, and any duty of a 
psychotherapist shall not be modified as a result of changing the wording in 
this section. 
(d) It is the intent of the Legislature that a court interpret this section, as 
amended by the act adding this subdivision, in a manner consistent with the 
interpretation of this section as it read prior to January 1, 2013. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (amended by 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 149 (West)). 
243 Felthous, supra note 130, at 341. 
244 See id. (“Tarasoff statutes are typically mute on the matter of assessment and refer to threats as 
triggering events, not clinically established risks of violence.”). 
245 See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, supra note 120, at 133, 186, 227, and accompanying 
text. In its survey of state statutes, the Conference characterized state laws governing reporting of 
confidential disclosures made by patients to therapists as either “mandatory,” or “permissive.” Id. A 
majority of jurisdictions, as indicated on the illustrated map, are characterized as “mandatory” reporting 
jurisdictions. Id. 
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threat and commits an act of violence injuring a third party, if the jurisdiction 
recognizes a cause of action based upon patient acts injuring third parties. 
Episodic mass violence may influence state legislatures to become more 
proactive in mandating warnings by mental health professionals, particularly if the 
continuing identification of mental illness as a cause for these acts induces the 
adoption of mandatory warning requirements by jurisdictions in which the legislature 
has been hostile to gun control efforts. 
a. The Permissive Approach to Warning: Connecticut 
The Connecticut statutory provisions addressing the duty to warn or protect 
reflect statutory changes in language applicable in 2019. The provision directed to 
“psychiatric health care providers” now reads: 
Communications or records may be disclosed when the psychiatric mental health 
provider determines that there is substantial risk of imminent physical injury by 
the patient to himself or others or when a psychiatric mental health provider, in 
the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, finds it necessary to disclose 
the communications or records for the purpose of placing the patient in a mental 
health facility, by certification, commitment or otherwise, provided the provisions 
of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, as amended by this act, shall continue 
in effect after the patient is in the facility.246 
This provision does not mandate notification of potential victims or police with 
respect to the potential for violence disclosed by patients during the course of 
treatment or therapy. Instead, it provides that the psychiatric mental health provider 
“may” disclose information raising a “substantial risk of imminent physical injury” 
that might be suffered by the patient or others. It, thus, reflects the permissive 
characterization described by the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Consistent with the permissive approach taken by the legislature, Connecticut 
courts have not recognized a Tarasoff-based cause of action for injuries sustained as 
a result of patient violence. In Jarmie v. Troncale,247 the state supreme court 
generally observed, in considering the imposition of liability on health care 
                                                          
 
246 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146f (West 2020) (emphasis added). Sections 52-146d through 146j 
address confidentiality duties and circumstances in which reporting of confidential disclosures may be 
authorized. 
247 50 A.3d 802 (Conn. 2012). 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 5 9   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
providers: “There is no well established common-law rule that a physician owes a 
duty to warn or advise a patient for the benefit of another person.”248 The court then 
referenced state decisions in which liability for physicians, including mental health 
professionals, had not been imposed to support causes of action for injuries to third 
persons.249 The court did note, however, its prior experience in considering Tarasoff-
based liability in answering a certified question regarding state law respecting 
liability for patient injuries inflicted on third persons. The court explained: 
The only time that we have even contemplated enlarging the duty of a health care 
provider to include a person who is not a patient was when we considered whether 
a psychotherapist owed a duty to a third party to control an outpatient, who was 
not known to have been dangerous. In that case, we determined that no duty 
existed “in the absence of a showing that the victim was either individually 
identifiable or, possibly, was either a member of a class of identifiable victims or 
within the zone of risk to an identifiable victim.” Accordingly, although there is 
no directly comparable Connecticut case law on which to rely, our precedent, in 
general, does not support extending the duty of care in the present case because, 
with one limited exception that does not apply . . . we repeatedly have declined, 
in a variety of situations, to extend the duty of health care providers to persons 
who are not their patients.250 
The court provided a thorough discussion of policy considerations against the 
imposition of liability against health professionals for injuries sustained by third 
parties. In Fraser, the facts arose from the claimed negligence of a mental health 
professional in failing to anticipate violent behavior committed by an outpatient upon 
a victim not known to the therapist.251 On those facts, the court declined to consider 
recognition of a broader theory of liability for mental health professionals. The court 
held that no duty to prevent injury would be imposed under Connecticut law in this 
situation based on the general rule that liability for negligence does not afford 
liability for injuries sustained by unidentifiable victims.252 
                                                          
 
248 Id. at 811. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. (quoting Fraser v. United States, 674 A.2d 811, 813–14 (Conn. 1996)). 
251 Fraser, 674 A.2d at 811. 
252 Id. at 814–15. The court explained more fully: 
Turning now to the merits of the certified question, we are persuaded that, as 
a matter of law in the circumstances of this case, the medical center 
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The inference to be drawn from Jarmie and Fraser is that liability for injury 
committed by an individual being treated by a mental health professional upon a third 
person could, theoretically, afford liability for a therapist upon a showing that the 
therapist was aware of the identity of a potential victim. But the statute imposes no 
duty to warn even in such a situation, and the reasonableness of the psychiatric 
mental health professional’s action in failing to warn might serve as a defense in a 
Tarasoff-based action. 
The statute addressing the problem of potentially violent patients applicable for 
psychologists similarly does not mandate a duty to warn or protect third persons, 
providing: 
(c) Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person’s 
communications: 
. . . 
(3) If the psychologist believes in good faith that there is risk of imminent personal 
injury to the person or to other individuals or risk of imminent injury to the 
property of other individuals; 
(4) If child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual or abuse of an individual who is 
disabled or incompetent is known or in good faith suspected;253 
This statute, like those governing disclosures of privileged communications made by 
patients during therapy or treatment with psychiatric mental health providers, 
provides only an exception to the confidentiality requirement. It does not direct the 
practitioner to warn a potential victim or law enforcement agency concerning an 
articulated or perceived threat by a patient to commit an act of violence. Nor does it 
                                                          
 
psychotherapists had no duty to exercise control over Doe to prevent him from 
assaulting Fraser. We reach this conclusion for four reasons: (1) our decisions 
defining negligence do not impose a duty to those who are not identifiable 
victims; (2) in related areas of our common law, we have concluded that there 
is no duty except to identifiable persons; (3) policy reasons inherent in the 
psychotherapeutic relationship and in the due process rights of mental patients 
counsel against imposing expansive duties to exercise control over such 
patients; and (4) courts in other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly declined to 
extend any duty to control to encompass harm to unidentifiable third persons. 
Id. 
253 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West 2020). Section (a)(1) provides: “(1) ‘Person’ means an 
individual who consults a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.” 
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expressly immunize the therapist from liability to third persons injured by a violent 
patient based on a report or determination not to report. 
This consideration is significant because the Connecticut Supreme Court 
unequivocally explained its concern that the issuance of warnings by mental health 
professionals will jeopardize the trust relationship necessary for effective treatment. 
The court explained in Jarmie, for instance, that litigation brought by third persons 
based on lack of warning of potential danger as a result of patient action would 
expose the patient to the disclosure of confidential information related to the therapist 
sued by a third party during the course of treatment.254 But the facts in the case were 
hardly as egregious as those in Tarasoff because the negligence claim involved a 
failure of a physician to warn the patient of the risk of accident due to the effects of 
prescribed medication.255 Even given the factual disparity between the claimed 
negligence in these cases, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s concern for 
expanding physician liability and its potential consequences for impairing the trust 
relationship necessary for successful treatment is apparent.256 The court explained: 
[E]xtending the duty of physicians, as the plaintiff suggests, would impermissibly 
interfere with the physician-patient relationship. 
The proposed duty also would result in increased litigation because it would open 
the door to an entirely new category of claims against health care providers, not 
only in the present context, but in the context of other treatment decisions that 
might indirectly cause injury to third parties, thereby greatly expanding the 
liability of health care providers and creating an additional burden on the courts.257 
The court’s response to the question certified by the federal court in Fraser, however, 
clearly indicates that a true Tarasoff circumstance, including the identification of a 
specific victim by a patient whose ability to act upon a threat to consider violence 
should have been deemed credible, would support a claim for negligence in the 
therapist’s failure to warn or take other action to protect the victim. 
                                                          
 
254 Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 820–21 (Conn. 2012). 
255 Id. at 804. 
256 Id. at 821–23. 
257 Id. at 822–23. 
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b. A Hybrid Approach to Warning: Florida 
The Florida statutory scheme retains an important element of discretion for the 
mental health provider, although the precise language of the current statutory scheme 
suggests that the permissive characterization of the state approach may be in flux. 
Three statutory provisions describe the expectations of psychiatrists,258 
psychologists,259 and other mental health providers,260 respectively. Section 90.503 
recognizes a general requirement for confidentiality applicable to mental health 
providers.261 However, the statutes addressing the confidentiality of communications 
between patients and psychiatrists and psychologists specifically recognize the 
option for those mental health professionals to warn third persons targeted for 
violence by patients.262 For instance, § 546.059 provides that when a psychiatrist 
learns of “a specific threat to cause serious bodily injury or death to an identified or 
a readily available person”263 he or she “may disclose patient communications to the 
extent necessary to warn any potential victim and must disclose patient 
communications to the extent necessary to communicate the threat to a law 
enforcement agency.”264 The statutory scheme thus affords the psychiatrist discretion 
in disclosing a patient threat to the intended victim, making this a permissive 
legislatively-recognized duty in one sense; but, the scheme is also mandatory 
because the psychiatrist has an affirmative duty to report the threat to a law 
enforcement agency. Section 459.059(3) then requires affirmative action by the 
agency warned, providing, “a law enforcement agency that receives notification of a 
specific threat under this section must take appropriate action to prevent the risk of 
harm, including, but not limited to, notifying the intended victim of such threat or 
initiating a risk protection order.”265 
The mandatory report to law enforcement serves to shift the duty to protect the 
third party identified in the patient’s threat from the treating psychiatrist to an agency 
charged with prevention of violence, which may well be more effective than a direct 
warning from the physician in terms of defusing a potentially violent situation. This 
                                                          
 
258 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059 (West 2020). 
259 § 491.0147. 
260 § 90.503. 
261 § 456.059. The statutorily-defined rule recognizing evidentiary privilege recognizes the duty to 
maintain confidentiality for patient disclosures and includes the range of mental health professionals 
typically involved in treatment for mental illness or emotional problems, including physicians engaged in 
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, such as alcoholism and other drug addiction; 
psychologists; licensed or certified clinical social workers, marriage and family therapists, or mental 
health counselors. § 90.503(A)(1)(a). 
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shift does not necessarily avoid the patient’s sense that the trust relationship with the 
treating professional has been compromised, even when law enforcement, rather than 
the psychiatrist, takes whatever action may be appropriate. If, for example, the 
warning or proactive action taken includes a law enforcement officer’s direct 
confrontation with the patient, the patient may still conclude that their treating 
professional has breached the duty of confidentiality in disclosing the threat to law 
enforcement, even if there is no personal warning to the prospective victim from the 
treating psychiatrist directly. 
On the other hand, the statute appears to provide an important level of 
protection for potential victims of patient violence by bringing law enforcement into 
the situation in which the treating psychiatrist has concluded that the patient’s threat 
is credible. The statute requires that threats that warrant disclosure breaching 
confidentiality involve “a clinical judgment that the patient has the apparent intent 
and ability to imminently or immediately carry out such threat.”266 
Similarly, confidential communications involving patient threats of violence 
directed at third persons may warrant action by psychologists to warn those potential 
victims under § 490.0147.267 The statute provides that confidentiality of disclosures 
made to a psychologist may be waived:268 
(c) When a patient or client has communicated to the psychologist a specific threat 
to cause serious bodily injury or death to an identified or readily available person, 
and the psychologist makes a clinical judgment that the patient or client has the 
apparent intent and ability to imminently or immediately carry out such threat, and 
the psychologist communicates the information to the potential victim. A 
disclosure of confidential communications by a psychologist when 
                                                          
 
262 See, e.g., § 456.059 (governing the confidentiality duty imposed on psychiatrists, which expressly 
modifies the general duty to maintain patient confidences protected by the statutory privilege created by 
Section 90.053 with respect to disclosure of threatened violence by patients). 
263 § 456.059(2)–(3) (The duty to warn is premised on a finding that the “treating psychiatrist makes a 
clinical judgment that the patient has the apparent intent and ability to imminently or immediately carry 
out such threat. . . .”). 
264 Id. (emphasis added). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 § 456.0147. 
268 § 456.0147(1). 
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communicating a threat pursuant to this subsection may not be the basis of any 
legal action or criminal or civil liability against the psychologist.269 
The provision protects the therapist by providing that disclosure is necessitated by 
the determination that the patient has both the intent and ability to carry out such 
threat. It does not, however, mandate disclosure of the intended threat to the potential 
victim disclosed by the patient; instead, the guarantee of immunity serves to 
encourage the therapist to act affirmatively to warn the intended victim. Parallel to 
the duty imposed on a psychiatrist, the statutory scheme mandates disclosure of the 
threat to cause serious bodily injury or death to “the extent necessary to communicate 
the threat to a law enforcement agency.”270 
Significantly, the statutory scheme also mandates that a law enforcement 
agency notified of a patient’s threatened violence “must take appropriate action to 
prevent the risk of harm, including, but not limited to, notifying the intended victim 
of such threat or initiating a risk protection order.”271 This provision serves to protect 
a therapist issuing the required warning to law enforcement about potential patient 
violence from civil liability. The fact that the therapist has warned law enforcement 
implies, of course, that the therapist has concluded that the threat of violence is 
serious and that the patient is believed to have the ability to carry out the threat. Thus, 
the statutory immunity from civil liability promotes the public policy of protecting 
third persons from violence committed by patients being treated by mental health 
professionals. It also protects the therapist issuing the warning to law enforcement 
from civil liability for disclosing the basis for the conclusion that the expression of 
violent intent is both seriously expressed and accompanied by the ability to carry out 
the threat.272 
The Florida approach thus defers to the mental health professional’s assessment 
of the credibility of the patient’s threat in light of the perceived seriousness of intent 
to actually commit a violent attack toward an identified or readily available person 
and the patient’s ability to act on the threat. Once the therapist involves law 
enforcement by disclosing the threat, the statutory scheme directs law enforcement 
officers to act upon the threat, rather than engage in any consideration of the 
seriousness of the threat that has been disclosed, presumably in an effort to ensure 
that the breach of patient/therapist confidentiality implicit in the referral by the 
                                                          
 
269 § 456.0147(1)(c). 
270 § 456.0147(2). 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
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mental health professional is not functionally ignored. Action by law enforcement is 
required to protect the potential victim but also warrants immunity for the treating 
psychiatrist or psychologist whose professional judgment has led to the referral. 
Thus, the balance between the need for confidentiality and protection of third persons 
is resolved in favor of protection by theoretically, at least, assuring that such 
disclosures will not go unheeded while possibly compromising the patient’s 
expectation of confidentiality. 
3. The Arkansas Immunity Model 
Another example of the permissive approach to the mental health professional’s 
duty to warn or protect is reflected in the expanded immunity afforded to Arkansas 
professionals by statute. The Arkansas General Assembly attempted to address the 
interrelated problems of mental impairment and violence with the passage of Act 
1212 in the 2013 General Session,273 but not by targeting firearms possessed by 
potentially dangerous individuals or patients. Instead, it did so by offering the 
community of mental health providers statutory immunity for preventive action 
taken to prevent violence by patients against third persons or themselves. Mental 
health providers are defined in § 201(4) of the statute as “a licensed certified social 
worker, licensed marriage and family therapist, licensed professional counselor, 
physician, psychologist, or registered nurse who provides mental health 
services. . . .”274 
The General Assembly intended to further the goal of preventing acts of 
violence, including mass violence, by creating immunity for “mental health services 
providers” who comply with the statutory directive to report potential patient 
violence to law enforcement agencies. Section 202(b) provides: 
(b) A duty owed by a mental health services provider to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent harm threatened by a patient is discharged, as a matter of 
law, if the mental health services provider in a timely manner: 
(1) Notifies: 
(A) A law enforcement agency in the county in which the potential victim 
resides; 
(B) A law enforcement agency in the county in which the patient resides; or 
                                                          
 
273 2013 ARK. ACTS 4964 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-201 to 202 (2013)). Section 202 is titled: 
“Duty of mental health services provider to take precautions against threatened patient violence—Duty to 
warn.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202. 
274 § 20-45-201(4). 
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(C) The Department of Arkansas State Police; or 
(2) Arranges for the patient’s immediate voluntary or involuntary 
hospitalization.275 
Section 202(a) creates the statutory immunity from civil liability based on harm to 
third persons or property, provided the provider makes the appropriate report: 
A mental health services provider, hospital, facility, community mental health 
center, or clinic is not subject to liability, suit, or a claim under § 19-10-204 on 
grounds that a mental health services provider did not prevent harm to an 
individual or to property caused by a patient if: 
(1) The patient communicates to the mental health services provider an explicit 
and imminent threat to kill or seriously injure a clearly or reasonably identifiable 
potential victim or to commit a specific violent act or to destroy property under 
circumstances that could easily lead to serious personal injury or death and the 
patient has an apparent intent and ability to carry out the threat; and 
(2) The mental health services provider takes the precautions specified in 
subsection (b) of this section in an attempt to prevent the threatened harm.276 
Although the title of the statute indicates that it is designed to create or 
recognize a duty to warn, the statutory language fails to define the duty or its scope. 
Instead, subsection (b) merely refers to “A duty owed by a mental health services 
provider to take reasonable precautions to prevent harm threatened by a patient.”277 
It seemingly refers to a duty that had yet to be defined in either judicial decision or 
by another statutory provision at the time of Act 1212’s adoption. Arguably, the 
decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Fleming v. Vest,278 which rested on 
differing grounds argued by the majority and concurring judges,279 necessarily 
                                                          
 
275 § 20-45-202(b). 
276 § 20-45-202(a) (emphasis added). Section 19-10-204 authorizes claims against the State otherwise 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. § 19-10-204. Thus, the immunity afforded under the statute 
extends to claims against state actors or institutions and precludes an action in the Arkansas Claims 
Commission when the mental health professional has made the appropriate warning. 
277 § 20-45-202(b) (emphasis added). 
278 475 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). See Sullivan, supra note 124, at 1022–43 (noting that the 
decision was not rendered by the Arkansas Supreme Court and reflected disagreement among judges as 
to the appropriate theory of liability, if any, based on the facts of the case). 
279 Id. at 1026–35. The majority of the appellate court’s panel held that the duty was inferred from the 
state’s medical malpractice statute, while the concurring judge rejected the argument that the duty to warn 
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involved recognition of a duty owed by mental health professionals to warn or protect 
third persons from patient violence. 
The passage of Act 1212 appears to further the goal of preventing harm to third 
parties or property, but it likely will prove troubling for mental health providers who 
must make decisions based on violence risk assessments. It creates, perhaps by 
necessity, a policy balancing act in which mental health providers are given primary 
responsibility for these precautionary decisions—which are particularly difficult 
because of the lack of certainty in predicting violence—that must be made in the 
context of the confidential relationship between the provider and the patient. 
Subsection (a) of the statute implicitly recognizes that mental health providers 
are subject to civil liability for injuries sustained by third persons or, arguably, the 
patient, as a result of violence committed by the patient.280 By focusing the protection 
presumably afforded by the warning requirement on the mental health professional’s 
opportunity to secure immunity from civil liability, the statute has likely created 
immunity for the mental health provider not previously recognized under state 
law.281 But, in the only Arkansas decision to even mention Tarasoff, Fleming v. 
Vest282—and then, only in the concurring opinion—283there is no clear expression of 
the duty that will render a mental health professional liable for injuries imposed by 
a patient who has threatened violence.284 In fact, the split in the court of appeals panel 
                                                          
 
third persons arose in the context of treating a patient, but rather was based on general negligent concepts. 
Id. Moreover, the appellate court’s review was based on two procedural issues involving the applicable 
statute of limitations for Fleming’s Estate’s claim and the application of the summary judgment test for 
sufficiency of the evidence to establish a cause of action under state law. Id. 
280 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202(a). 
281 § 20-45-202. Section 202 of the Arkansas statute is titled: “Duty of mental health services provider to 
take precautions against threatened patient violence—Duty to warn.” Id. The title suggests nothing less 
than mental health professionals are under a duty to warn or protect third persons from patient-inflicted 
injuries. 
282 475 S.W.3d 576. 
283 Id. at 584. 
284 In the Arkansas Court of Appeals the case turned on whether the two-year statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice claims, Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-114-201 to -203, 
or the three-year limitations period for negligence claims applied to the Estate’s action. Fleming, 475 
S.W.3d at 580. Perhaps surprisingly, the majority opinion does not directly address the issue of liability 
to third parties. See id. Instead, this issue is entangled in the discussion of other issues, including the 
applicability of the Medical Malpractice Act and its two-year statute of limitations. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-114-203(a). Instead, Judge Harrison in his concurring opinion actually opens the door to the 
fundamental question of liability for claims made by third parties: “What duty, if any, did Dr. Vest owe 
to Fleming under the circumstances? That is the underlying issue in this case, and courts have split over 
 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 




ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
was particularly significant because the opinions issued by the majority and 
concurring judges do not make clear that the psychiatrist, Dr. Vest, was even aware 
of the violent tendency of his patient, or that the patient had made any threat that 
would have logically triggered a warning designed to prevent injury to the deceased, 
Fleming, who was apparently unknown to Dr. Vest. 
If the mental health provider is “not subject to liability, suit or claim under § 19-
10-204” when the provider complies with the directive to notify authorities of the 
potential for violence posed by a patient, then the logical corollary is that a provider 
not notifying authorities can be held liable for injuries caused by patient violence.285 
Because the recognition of a cause of action against mental health providers 
who fail to properly assess a risk of violence or fail to report potential violence on 
the part of their patients represents a significant development in Arkansas law that 
bears directly, and perhaps, somewhat adversely, on the relationship of mental health 
professionals and their patients, its unintended consequences are particularly 
important. In failing to address the parameters of the obligation on the part of mental 
health professionals seeking to avail themselves of the statutory immunity, the statute 
fails to actually afford the notice that would have at least informed Dr. Vest that he 
would owe a duty to third persons injured by his patients, even when they were 
otherwise unknown or not disclosed in the course of treatment of the patient, or when 
the patient had never expressed a threat to commit any act of violence. The breadth 
of the holding in Fleming v. Vest, in light of the lack of reference to facts supporting 
a claim of negligence or medical malpractice on the psychiatrist’s part, would 
seemingly create an unlimited source of strict liability for mental health practitioners 
whose patients injure others, without a required showing of any knowledge of a 
patient’s violent tendencies or specific anger toward any particular individual. 
The statutory immunity scheme is also inherently flawed for a number of 
reasons. There is an absence of either statutory language or judicial decisions that 
clearly notify mental health providers of the precise parameters of their professional 
duty to protect third persons from injuries committed by their patients. Yet, that is 
the stated legislative purpose for the protection it affords, given the title of the statute: 
                                                          
 
this question since the seminal case Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.” Fleming, 475 S.W.3d 
at 584 (Harrison, J., concurring). 
285 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202(a). 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 6 9   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
“Duty of mental health services provider to take precautions against threatened 
patient violence—Duty to warn.”286 
First, the duty to warn may be discharged by the treating professional by a 
disclosure of actual or perceived threat by reporting the therapist’s concern to an 
appropriate law enforcement agency.287 The statutory immunity scheme fails to 
appreciate an intended or prospective victim’s need for the very information that 
might facilitate avoidance of danger or confrontation with the patient. Although in 
Tarasoff the mental health professionals alerted police to the need to confine Poddar, 
the assailant, for emergency commitment, his intended victim was not personally 
informed, leading the court to point out, tersely: “No one warned Tatiana of her 
peril.”288 While reporting a threat or perceived threat of violence to law enforcement 
might appear to secure the safety of the potential victim to a significant extent, the 
potential victim’s safety is wholly dependent upon law enforcement to take some 
action contemplated by the statute, beyond the responsibility of the mental health 
professional.289 Yet, the contemplated action on the part of law enforcement may not 
happen at all, perhaps because of internal communication failure within the policing 
agencies to whom the threat is disclosed.290 Or, the officers charged with acting upon 
                                                          
 
286 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-45-202. 
287 § 20-45-202(b)(1). See supra note 281 for text of statutory provision permitting the mental provider to 
discharge their duty to report a patient’s threat to commit an active of violence against a third person, or 
persons, by reporting the threat to a law enforcement agency having authority in the jurisdiction where 
the intended victim—if identified—lives or to the Arkansas State Police, pursuant to § 101(b)(1)(c). 
288 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). 
289 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.059(3), 456.0147(2). In contrast to the Florida scheme, the Arkansas 
statute does not include any directive to law enforcement regarding the required response by law 
enforcement when a mental health professional does report a threat of potential patient violence directed 
toward an identified individual or general threat. 
290 The immunity statute does not include any directive to law enforcement regarding specific duty to act 
on the threat or perceived threat reported by the mental health professional, nor does it refer to specific 
action that may be taken. Law enforcement officers do have a general duty to arrest insane and drunken 
persons under ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-101: 
It shall be the duty of all peace officers to arrest any insane or drunken persons 
whom they may find at large and not in the care of some discreet person. The 
officer shall take him or her before some magistrate of the county, city, or town 
in which the arrest is made. 
If the therapist, or any other person, petitions for the emergency confinement of an impaired, dangerous 
person under the Arkansas civil commitment statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-201, the probate court 
may order law enforcement authorities to act specifically to address the situation, as provided for: 
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the threat may simply conclude that action is not required. In Tarasoff, for instance, 
the officers who were to take Poddar into custody for emergency hospitalization to 
protect Tatiana confronted him and decided that he did not exhibit threatening 
behavior warranting arrest.291 He later murdered Tatiana, precipitating the lawsuit. 
While reporting to law enforcement would logically provide information 
concerning the patient’s potential for violence, in the absence of a specific threat, it 
is simply not necessarily the case that the report will result in any action unless and 
until the impaired patient actually commits a criminal offense.292 Or, even if a law 
                                                          
 
(a) Whenever it appears that a person is of danger to himself or herself or 
others, as defined in § 20-47-207, and immediate confinement appears 
necessary to avoid harm to the person or others: 
(1) An interested citizen may take the person to a hospital or to a receiving 
facility or program. If no other safe means of transporting the individual is 
available, it shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement agency that 
exercises jurisdiction at the site where the individual is physically located and 
requiring transportation, or unless otherwise ordered by the judge. A petition, 
as provided in § 20-47-207, shall be filed in the probate court of the county in 
which the person resides or is detained within seventy-two (72) hours, 
excluding weekends and holidays, and a hearing, as provided in § 20- 47-
209(a)(1) shall be held; 
. . . 
(b)(1) When a petition for involuntary admission with a request for immediate 
confinement appended thereto is filed, the petitioner shall then appear before 
a probate judge of the county where the person sought to be immediately 
confined resides or is found. 
. . . 
(3) If the probate judge determines that immediate confinement is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily harm to either the person sought to be 
involuntarily admitted or to others, the judge shall order the law enforcement 
agency that exercises jurisdiction at the site where the individual is physically 
present to transport the individual to an appropriate receiving facility. A 
hearing, as provided for in § 20-47-209(a)(1), shall be held within seventy-two 
(72) hours of the person’s detention and confinement. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-210 (a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(3) (emphasis added). 
291 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40. 
292 Like the failure of law enforcement in Tarasoff, law enforcement officials notified of the psychotic 
threats made by Elliot Rodger, perpetrator of the Santa Barbara, California, rampage of stabbings and 
shootings in May 2014, either ignored his family’s warnings of his potential for violence or failed to 
appreciate the his extremely aberrant thinking, resulting in their failure to take appropriate action to 
restrain him. In reviewing the failure of law enforcement, CBS News reported: 
Just three weeks before his murderous rampage, Rodger met sheriff’s deputies 
at his door. 
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enforcement officer intervenes proactively, the disclosure that a threat has been 
reported can likely have little effect if the impaired patient is intent upon committing 
an act of violence against another person or herself. Moreover, an officer’s well-
intentioned intervention might serve to precipitate action by the impaired patient that 
might otherwise not have been undertaken. 
The intervention by a law enforcement officer almost certainly will result in the 
patient understanding that their treating professional has reported threats or 
threatening information disclosed in the context of the confidential relationship. This 
could lead to retaliation against the mental health professional treating the patient, 
perhaps including violent retaliation or litigation, and would very likely jeopardize 
the relationship between the patient and therapist, compromising a critical element 
for success in treatment. Once the patient’s trust in the protection of confidential 
communications afforded by the patient/therapist relationship has been compromised 
by warning, it may not only destroy the relationship with the therapist who has 
warned but may also serve to prevent the patient from ever trusting a mental health 
professional in the future.293 
Subsection (c)(1) references the traditionally recognized recourse for the 
mental health professional in addressing violence or credible threat of violence 
disclosed during the course of therapy: emergency hospitalization.294 This provision 
is redundant to existing immunity afforded to mental health professionals and all 
other persons acting in good faith in the emergency hospitalization or involuntary 
                                                          
 
Relatives had seen Rodger’s threatening Internet posts, and they notified a 
social worker, who alerted police. 
Sheriff Brown told CBS’ “Face the Nation” on Sunday: “Rodger was polite 
and courteous to his officers.” 
“He was able to make a very convincing story that there was no problem, that 
he wasn’t going to hurt himself or anyone else. He just didn’t meet the criteria 
for any further intervention at that point.” 
Despite Warning Signs, Cops Saw No Threat In Elliot Rodger, CBS NEWS (May 26, 2014, 1:21 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/santa-barbara-massacre-despite-warning-signs-cops-were-handcuffed-
in-elliot-rodger-case/. 
293 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
294 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c)(1), authorizes involuntary civil commitment for hospitalization in 
order to address potential violence committed by mental impairment, as provided generally: “Involuntary 
Admission Criteria. A person shall be eligible for involuntary admission if he or she is in such a mental 
condition as a result of mental illness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear and present danger 
to himself or herself or others.” 
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civil commitment process under Arkansas law.295 With respect to the option of 
petitioning for emergency restraint of an individual credibly meeting the requirement 
of involuntary hospitalization for mental evaluation and treatment, Act 1212 creates 
no additional express duty upon mental health professionals to warn or take action 
to prevent violence directed at third persons, or generally, doing little to enhance 
protection for the community while ensuring protection from civil liability for those 
professionals who do elect to issue warnings. 
The problem posed by the structure of the Arkansas statute is that warnings 
ensuring civil immunity become the default position for mental health professionals. 
Ultimately, this approach could elevate the value of the warning above the 
professional concern for confidentiality of patient communications. Logically, this 
default position could so threaten the therapeutic environment necessary for those 
professionals to address patient frustration and anger that can materialize as violent 
action that mental health treatment would be irreparably impaired by the pressure to 
avoid civil liability by resorting to warnings that would not otherwise be necessary 
as matters of professional judgment. 
V. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN IDENTIFYING RISK OF VIOLENCE 
WARRANTING PROTECTIVE ACTION 
Tarasoff, carefully limited to its facts, requires threat disclosure or other action 
only when the mental professional is able to assess the credibility of a patient’s threat 
and perform an assessment of the patient’s capability to actually act on the hostility 
or threat. For instance, inquiry regarding the patient’s experience with and access to 
firearms or other weaponry may prove a critical factor in the assessment not only of 
the seriousness of the patient’s disclosed hostility or threat but also the likelihood 
that they would have the resources to act upon the threat.296 Consequently, a threat 
expressed by a patient confined in a hospital or correctional facility may well be 
genuine in terms of the patient’s intent but less likely to be actualized because of the 
circumstances in which the mental health professional interacts with the patient. 
A. Circumstances Giving Rise to the Duty to Warn or Protect, 
Generally 
Tarasoff arose in perhaps the most obvious factual scenario in which liability 
for mental health professionals could be imposed. There was evidence of a specific 
                                                          
 
295 § 20-47-227 (“Exclusion from liability. No officer, physician, or other person shall be held civilly liable 
for his or her actions pursuant to this subchapter in the absence of proof of bad faith, malice, or gross 
negligence.”). 
296 Experience with firearms or access to firearms is described as a “situational variable,” a dynamic 
variable in the assessment of the risk of patient violence. COHEN, supra note 82, at 451. 
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threat to commit an act of violence. The threat arose in the context of a common 
context in which significant anxiety is likely to be experienced by patients—the 
failure of an interpersonal relationship, whether fantasized or initially reciprocated. 
The identity of the intended victim was disclosed. And finally, the treating 
psychologist’s initial response to the threat—an attempt to have the patient taken into 
custody for purposes of further evaluation and treatment through emergency 
hospitalization, if warranted—demonstrated the therapist’s conclusion of the 
seriousness of the perceived risk of violence. In this complex of facts, the imposition 
of liability that would require affirmative action by the therapist could readily be 
justified in terms of foreseeability analysis and the existence of the special 
relationship upon which the therapist’s duty rested.297 
The specificity of the threat expressed by the patient may also suggest the 
appropriateness of the finding of a duty to warn or protect. In Peck v. Counseling 
Service of Addison County, Inc.,298 John, an outpatient irritated by his father’s 
description of him as “sick and mentally ill,” left his home and went to see his 
psychotherapist.299 He explained his anger toward his father, and when questioned 
about whether he intended to “get back at his father,” he told the therapist, “I don’t 
know. I could burn down his barn.”300 After further discussion with the 
psychotherapist, the patient promised not to burn the barn.301 “Believing that John 
would keep his promise, the therapist did not disclose John’s threats to any other 
                                                          
 
297 It is the “special relationship” that triggers the duty to act on the part of the mental health profession in 
the Tarasoff reasoning, warranting a departure from the common law rule: “[U]under the common law, 
as a general rule, one person owed no duty to control the conduct of another.” Tarasoff v. Regents of Uni. 
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). The majority explained that the common law rule has given way 
to expansion of duty to protect against injury: 
Morally questionable, the rule owes its survival to “the difficulties of setting 
any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable 
rule to cover possible situations where fifty people might fail to rescue . . .” 
. . . . Because of these practical difficulties, the courts have increased the 
number of instances in which affirmative duties are imposed not by direct 
rejection of the common law rule, but by expanding the list of special 
relationships which will justify departure from that rule. 
Id. at 343 n.5 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 341, 348–50 (4th ed. 
1971)). 
298 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985). 
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staff member of the Counseling Service or to the plaintiffs [John’s parents].”302 John 
apparently forgot the promise. Or, perhaps he just lied. 
The Vermont court rejected the defendants’ reliance on Professor Stone’s 
assertion that therapists have no control over outpatients,303 citing Tarasoff304 and 
explaining: 
Whether or not there is actual control over an outpatient in a mental health clinic 
setting similar to that exercised over institutionalized patients, the relationship 
between a clinical therapist and his or her patient “is sufficient to create a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s conduct.”305 
The court found the disclosed threat necessitated warning or other action to prevent 
the injury, but also upheld the trial court’s finding that the parents, clearly aware of 
their son’s propensity for violence, were fifty percent comparatively negligent.306 
While the court did not evaluate the role of the specific nature of the patient’s 
threat—to burn the barn—it would seem reasonable that the parent’s appreciation of 
their son’s violent tendencies did not absolve the defendants’ liability because he 
followed through on the precise threat he had made—the burning of the barn, much 
like the specific threat made by Poddar to kill Tatiana in Tarasoff.307 
But the fact complex presented in Tarasoff is simply not shared in many cases 
in which patient dangerousness or articulated threats to commit acts of violence 
materializes in acts of physical violence committed against third persons. This is 
perhaps most remote when the patient’s violence is random, not being directed 
toward those who are the most obvious sources of anxiety and hostility for the 
patient. Realistically, the duty imposed upon treating therapists should be viewed not 
only in terms of the expectation for skilled assessment of the risk of patient violence, 
but also on sheer reasonableness in assuming that a therapist can anticipate the scope 
                                                          
 
302 Id. 
303 Stone, supra note 126, at 366. 
304 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). 
305 Peck, 499 A.2d at 425 (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343). 
306 Id. at 427. 
307 551 P.2d at 339. 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 7 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
of an act of patient violence when there has been no express identification of 
prospective targets or an express threat. 
Significantly, the California Supreme Court addressed the scope of the duty to 
warn or protect shortly after Tarasoff in Thompson v. County of Alameda,308 a 1980 
decision arising out of an assault committed by a juvenile offender released from 
detention who had exhibited violent tendencies toward younger children. Within 
twenty-four hours of the offender’s release by County authorities, who had been 
aware of his propensity and professed interest in killing a child—and who had not 
notified the offender’s mother of his desire to kill a neighborhood child—the 
offender killed a five-year-old whose family lived a few doors from the offender’s 
residence.309 
The juvenile murderer had not disclosed the identity of his potential victim to 
authorities prior to his release from custody.310 In response to the plaintiff’s claims 
that the County was grossly negligent in releasing the offender from custody, the 
state supreme court held that the decision to release was subject to immunity under 
state law.311 The court similarly held that the County was immune from liability for 
the decision to release the juvenile offender to the custody of his mother and any 
failure to supervise her subsequent actions.312 The court explained: 
Choosing a proper custodian to direct the attempted rehabilitation of a minor with 
a prior history of antisocial behavior is a complex task. The determination 
involves a careful consideration and balancing of such factors as the protection of 
                                                          
 
308 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980). 
309 Id. at 746. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 747–48. Similarly, in Tarasoff, the University health clinic professionals were afforded the benefit 
of statutory immunity typically given to encourage mental health professionals to make decisions 
regarding involuntary civil commitment for purposes of treatment for prospective patients suffering from 
mental disorders who present a threat to commit acts of violence to themselves or others. 551 P.2d at 351–
52. The campus police officers who decided not to take Poddar into custody on request from the University 
psychologist were also shielded by statutory immunity based on their actions in the emergency 
commitment process. Id. at 353. Statutory immunity afforded actors in the emergency commitment 
process is common. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-227 (2020) (giving immunity to “officer[s], 
physician[s], or other person[s]” involved in seeking involuntary civil commitment of a mentally impaired 
individual believed dangerous “in the absence of proof of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence”); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.31.110(6) (2020) (giving immunity to police officers acting in good faith when arresting 
individual with mental disorders). 
312 Thompson, 614 P.2d at 738. 
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the public, the physical and psychological needs of the minor, the relative 
suitability of the home environment, the availability of other resources such as 
halfway houses and community centers, and the need to reintegrate the minor into 
the community. The decision, requiring as it does, comparisons, choices, 
judgments, and evaluations, comprises the very essence of the exercise of 
“discretion” and we conclude that such decisions are immunized under section 
[CAL. GOV’T CODE] 820.2.313 
The court characterizes the complexity of decision-making with respect to the 
evaluation of a minor who has engaged in antisocial behavior; but the considerations 
the court noted above likely influence every decision that must be made by mental 
health professionals when addressing potential violence expressed or suggested by 
dangerous patients. 
The court then considered the question of whether the failure of County 
officials to warn characterizing this as the most “troublesome contention” advanced 
by the plaintiffs.314 The court did not, however, find that the public officials or 
officers violated of a duty to the plaintiffs in the case. Rather, it distinguished the 
facts from a prior decision in Johnson v. State of California,315 in which the state 
agency was found liable when it placed a minor with known “homicidal tendencies” 
and a history of violence in the plaintiff’s home.316 The Thompson court 
distinguished the factual scenario in Johnson based on the existence of a special 
relationship in the earlier case rooted in the placement of the juvenile with the 
plaintiff, explaining: 
As the party placing the youth with Mrs. Johnson, the state’s relationship to 
plaintiff was such that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous qualities 
suggested by the parolee’s history or character. These cases [Johnson and 
Tarasoff] impose a duty upon those who create a foreseeable peril, not readily 
discoverable by endangered persons, to warn them of such potential peril. 
                                                          
 
313 Id. at 732 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
314 Id. at 731–32. 
315 Id. at 733. 
316 Johnson v. California, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968). 
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Accordingly, the state owed a duty to inform Mrs. Johnson of any matter that its 
agents knew or should have known that might endanger the Johnson family.317 
The facts in Thompson were different, according to the court, because the public 
officials or officers involved in the decision to release the dangerous juvenile had no 
special relationship with the family of the child who was murdered shortly after the 
juvenile’s release.318 It concluded that the “County bore no special and continuous 
relationship with the specific plaintiffs nor did [the] County knowingly place the 
specific plaintiffs’ decedent into a foreseeably dangerous position.”319 
Based on the lack of a special relationship between authorities and the family 
of the murdered child and the fact that there was no identification of a specific victim 
of the juvenile’s intended act of violence, the Thompson court refused to impose 
liability on the County for failure to warn of the juvenile’s violent propensity.320 It 
expressed skepticism that extensive, general warnings would have significant 
practical benefit in avoiding potential danger to the public, noting the difference 
between general warnings and scenarios where knowledge of specific potential 
victims who might logically be protected by discrete warnings, as in fact situations 
presented in Tarasoff and Johnson.321 Consequently, the court declined to find that 
the violence was foreseeable and rejected the plaintiff’s theory of liability.322 
Noting the legislatively imposed registration obligation for sex offenders 
released on probation or parole, the court pointed out that even in this context, the 
legislation did not require authorities to notify the community of the presence of a 
sex offender or otherwise supervise the offender.323 Further, the legislative immunity 
granted to public entities which precluded liability for confinement or release of 
dangerous persons applied in Thompson, but the court’s conclusion also precluded 
                                                          
 
317 Thompson, 614 P.2d at 733 (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson, 447 P.2d at 355). 
318 Id. at 733. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 734. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. The court also found that the plaintiff’s murdered child was not “a foreseeable or readily identifiable 
target of the juvenile offender’s threats.” Id. 
323 Id. at 736–37 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2020)). 
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liability even had the statutory provision not been controlling,324 reasoning from both 
foreseeability analysis and public policy.325 
Although the Thompson court’s reliance on the controlling legislative grant of 
immunity for public entities and officials was clearly required, it is less clear that 
imposition of a duty to warn, rather than a duty to protect based on continuing 
confinement of the dangerous individual, was consistent with the underlying theory 
of duty embraced in Tarasoff and Johnson. The juvenile offender released in 
Thompson had expressed a specific intent to commit an act of violence even though 
no specific victim had been identified. As a minor, he was more likely restricted to 
a neighborhood than might have been true had he been an adult. A warning to 
neighbors living within a reasonably close distance to the juvenile and his mother 
could have provided a strong potential for protection of young children in the 
neighborhood; a general warning to the entire community would not have been 
necessary to significantly increase awareness of the possibility that the offender 
would target neighborhood children. 
This approach reflects the position advanced by Justice Tobriner, the author of 
the majority opinion in Tarasoff, in his dissent in Thompson.326 He chided the 
majority’s limited understanding of the foreseeability principle applied in Tarasoff, 
arguing: 
The complaint alleges that James had threatened to “take the life of a young child 
residing in the neighborhood”; since Jonathan falls within that description his 
killing was clearly a foreseeable consequence of James’ release and subsequent 
lack of supervision. Whether Jonathan was also an identifiable victim is relevant 
                                                          
 
324 Id. at 732. 
325 The court explained that public policy considerations weighed against liability for decisions made 
regarding release of even those individuals who had been convicted of crimes of violence in the criminal 
justice system: 
[P]ublic entities and employees have no affirmative duty to warn of the release 
of an inmate with a violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm 
directed at nonspecific victims. Obviously aware of the risk of failure of 
probation and parole programs the Legislature has nonetheless as a matter of 
public policy elected to continue those programs even though such risks must 
be borne by the public. 
Id. at 735 (emphasis omitted). 
326 Id. at 738. 
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not to the existence of a duty of care, but only to whether a warning to Jonathan 
personally was a reasonable means of discharging that duty.327 
For Justice Tobriner and Justice Mosk, joining the dissent, the specific threat 
was the critical element factoring into the foreseeability analysis, not the 
identification of a specific, intended victim.328 Imposing liability on a mental health 
professional for failing to warn the neighborhood of the threat posed by the release 
of the dangerous juvenile might have been seen as unfair in terms of public policy 
because it extended the duty to warn to unidentified, potential victims. However, 
liability for damages would not have been borne by an individual defendant suffering 
retroactive application of a new rule. Instead, economic damages would have been 
spread throughout the community, necessarily leading to the development of sound 
public policy for limited warnings to be afforded to potential victims in similar 
situations. 
An interesting example of treatment of the foreseeability issue is illustrated in 
a recent decision rendered by the Vermont Supreme Court. In Kuligoski v. 
Brattleboro Retreat, the court extended the “zone of danger,” requiring mental health 
professionals to anticipate injuries caused by their patients involving unidentified 
victims.329 The case involved the release of a voluntarily hospitalized330 and 
potentially dangerous patient, E.R., into the custody of his parents, arguably without 
sufficient instruction for them as they, as his “caregivers,” would need to protect 
third persons against violence that might be committed by E.R.331 His parents, who 
had monitored E.R. “closely” while he was a patient at the Vermont State Hospital 
                                                          
 
327 Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
328 Id. at 739 (“The principles underlying the Tarasoff decision indicate that even the existence of an 
identifiable victim is not essential to the cause of action. Our decision rested upon the basic tenet of tort 
law that a ‘defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct.’”). 
329 Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 156 A.3d 436, 450–51 (Vt. 2016); see 
Rafik Sidaros & Kevin V. Trueblood, Expansion of the Duty to Protect Includes Foreseeable Victims in 
the Zone of Danger, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 111 (2017). 
330 The court noted that although the patient had been diagnosed as “dangerous” and warranting 
involuntary hospitalization, there was no evidence in the record that there had been any effort to proceed 
with commitment. Kuligoski, 156 A.3d at 441. The court explained: “We recognize that his status as a 
voluntary patient seems inconsistent with some of the later facts, including his attempt to escape from the 
Vermont State Hospital. Inconsistencies of this type are not unusual in a complaint.” Id. at 441 n.2. 
331 Id. at 450 (“[S]everal other courts have held that a duty to warn is owed not only to specifically 
identified or identifiable victims, but to foreseeable victims or to those whose membership in a particular 
class—for example, those living with the patient—places them within a zone of danger.”). 
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and defendant Brattleboro Retreat,332 assumed custody upon his release.333 When 
they took him with them to an apartment building owned by his grandparents, he left 
them and went into the basement, where he assaulted the plaintiff, who was working 
on the building furnace at the time.334 
The plaintiffs directed the underlying theme of their complaint to the failure of 
the treating mental health professionals to properly address their obligations to E.R.’s 
parents as his “caregivers.”335 The plaintiffs claimed the treating health professionals 
essentially failed to prepare E.R.’s parents to prevent injury to third persons by their 
son,336 and specifically, in discharging E.R.337 Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat 
suggests the significant extent to which liability for mental health professionals can 
be predicated on logical streams of action that can be included within the notion of 
“foreseeability.” The problem with imposing liability based upon relying on the logic 
of any particular set of events lies in requiring them to be anticipated rather than 
reconstructed in hindsight. 
Moreover, the problem with expecting warnings or other protective action to 
prevent violence based on the training and experience of mental health professionals 
lies in the obvious fact that unless an individual with violent propensity is either in a 
therapeutic relationship or being examined pursuant to a court order or other outside 
source of authority, the opportunity to make a competent risk assessment is simply 
not available. The success of the warning, or duty to warn, is, thus, dependent on the 
situational scenario in which the mental health professional has access to the 
individual who exhibits a propensity or disposition for violence. 
                                                          
 
332 Id. at 442. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. The court related the forensic findings regarding E.R.’s mental state at the time of the assault: 
The forensic psychiatrist who evaluated E.R. at the request of the criminal 
court stated that the night before the offense E.R. had not slept well, awoke 
early that morning, was just “sitting and staring,” and was paranoid that people 
were staring at him en route to the apartment. The psychiatrist believed that 
E.R. likely was in a “psychotic haze” at the time of the offense, having been 
“overcome by the symptoms of his condition to the degree where he acted 
while in a psychotic storm.” 
Id. 
335 Id. at 442–43. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 442. 
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B. Common Scenarios Involving Dangerous Patients 
There are at least four scenarios in which the imposition of liability for failure 
to warn or protect, under the appropriate circumstances, logically makes sense. These 
scenarios reflect more predictable violence than might otherwise be subject to 
evaluation because they fit more common patterns and likely have rational bases for 
the hostility that may erupt in acts of physical violence. With respect to those 
scenarios in which risk assessment and protective action might appear most 
appropriate, the ability to identify a specific or likely victim would be the basic key 
to the imposition of a duty to warn or protect. These scenarios, in which warnings or 
other corrective action may be necessary, likely arise because of the nature of the 
apparent relationship between the patient and any intended victim. 
1. Scenarios Most Likely Warranting a Duty to Warn or 
Protect 
Clearly, the optimal situation for the therapist who has determined that a 
patient’s expressions of hostility pose a serious risk of metastasizing into physical 
violence will be one in which the patient has disclosed the intended victim or victims 
of a specific, credible threat. The post-Tarasoff history of judicial and legislative 
concern with the therapist’s duty to address potential violence has focused 
significantly on the question of how far to extend a duty to warn when potential 
victims of patient violence have not been identified, or when threats are perceived as 
reflecting a serious risk of violence but are general in nature with no identification 
of victims who might be personally warned of the threat of violence. 
a. Situations Involving Institutional Restraint of the 
Patient 
One of the most difficult questions about Tarasoff liability involves the scope 
of foreseeability when the dangerous patient or other individual has already been 
restrained by emergency or involuntary civil commitment for diagnosis and 
treatment. Once a dangerous patient has been restrained through the civil 
commitment process generally recognized as constitutionally mandated by the 
Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas,338 there is an explicit finding that the civil 
committee suffers from a mental disorder of some kind and represents a danger to 
himself or herself or to others.339 But, the question of liability for violence committed 
                                                          
 
338 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
339 Id. at 429. In Addington, the Court held that constitutionally required burden of proof to be applied in 
an involuntary civil commitment proceeding is one equivalent “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 
433. In ruling on this question of due process, the Court implicitly accepted the substantive requirements 
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by a patient upon a third person may actually militate against the conclusion that, 
once released, the patient posed a threat requiring further action. The release itself 
serves to provide some evidence that mental health professionals have determined 
that the involuntarily committed patient no longer poses a threat to himself or others. 
But, as the Vermont decision in Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat demonstrates,340 the 
release of the dangerous patient may still result in liability, even if professional 
judgment has warranted discharge from confinement. 
In Leonard v. State of Iowa,341 the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the problem 
posed by the claim that the mental health professionals were negligent in failing to 
warn of the potential for violence committed by a patient when there was no 
identifiable victim of any threat made by the patient.342 In Tarasoff, an important 
factor in the court’s decision was that the therapists knew that Tatiana was Poddar’s 
intended victim, so it was not unreasonable to expect that she be notified of his 
threats and permitted to take action to avoid injury.343 In contrast, in Leonard, there 
was no indication that anyone had any reason to believe that the victim was 
personally threatened by the potentially violent patient, Parrish.344 
Diagnosed with bipolar disorder, Parrish had been discharged from a mental 
health facility after reaching “maximum inpatient psychiatric benefits,” according to 
the discharge summary.345 He returned to work as a demolition contractor with 
directions to continue outpatient therapy and hired plaintiff Leonard to work for 
him.346 Following a day when the two men spent their time drinking rather than 
                                                          
 
for involuntary commitment: “Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or 
others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by 
expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Id. at 429 (emphasis in original). In Foucha v. Louisiana, the 
Court cited Addington in affirming the substantive issues that must be addressed in the involuntary civil 
commitment process: “[T]o commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the State is 
required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing evidence the two statutory 
preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to be committed is mentally ill and that he requires 
hospitalization for his own welfare and protection of others.” 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992). 
340 156 A.3d at 440–41. 
341 491 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (Iowa 1992). 
342 Id. at 510. 
343 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). 
344 491 N.W.2d at 511. 
345 Id. at 509–10. 
346 Id. at 510. 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 8 3   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
working, they returned to Parrish’s residence where Parrish subsequently beat 
Leonard severely about his head and body, leaving him unconscious and locked 
inside his house. Parrish was subsequently convicted of kidnapping and attempted 
murder.347 
Leonard brought his action against the State and its mental health facility under 
the Iowa Tort Claims Act,348 alleging negligence and specifically asserting that “the 
defendants failed to provide Parrish with proper care and treatment and that they 
subsequently discharged him knowing that he posed a threat to those with whom he 
might come in contact.”349 What Leonard was able to show was that Parrish had a 
lengthy history of psychiatric hospitalizations and criminal charges for minor but 
somewhat violent offenses. What he could not demonstrate was that the State and its 
mental health professional employees had a basis for knowing that he was an 
intended victim of Parrish. Nor could he demonstrate that he was injured under 
circumstances in which the therapists would have been unable to reasonably 
conclude that he was a potential victim of Parrish, as opposed to simply being 
assaulted only because he was with Parrish while his employer was intoxicated.350 
The Iowa court’s opinion never mentioned Tarasoff but clearly addressed the 
broader question of the scope of the mental health professional’s duty to protect third 
persons from injuries committed by their patients. Acknowledging the existence of 
the special relationship that exists between therapists and patients, it framed the 
question as follows: 
There can be little doubt that a special relationship existed between Parrish 
and his treating physician at MHI. His continuing involuntary commitment only 
serves to reinforce that bond. Therefore MHI had a duty to control Parrish’s 
conduct, or at least not negligently release him from custody. But the Restatement 
                                                          
 
347 Id. 
348 IOWA CODE §§ 669.1–.25 (1993). Under the Act, individuals injured as a result of negligence on the 
part of a state employee may recover “under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be 
liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.” § 669.2(3)(a). In contrast, Arkansas does 
not provide a civil remedy for actions by the State or its officials or employees acting within the course 
of their official duties, insulating those potential defendants to civil liability pursuant to the constitutional 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20; ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305(a) (1993). 
Instead, a party injured by the State may proceed by filing a claim with the Arkansas Claims Commission. 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-201 to -216 (2019). 
349 Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 510. 
350 Id. at 511. 
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rules cited above do not answer the precise question before us: Does the duty to 
refrain from negligently releasing dangerous persons from custody run from the 
custodian to the public at large or only to the reasonably foreseeable victims of 
the patient’s dangerous tendencies?351 
The Iowa court declined to adopt and apply Tarasoff in a later decision, Estate 
of Long ex rel. Smith v. Broadlawns Medical Center.352 There, the claim for 
malpractice was predicated on the murder of a patient’s wife after the patient, Gerald, 
was released from hospitalization necessitated by a complex diagnosis of disorders 
or symptoms, including post-traumatic stress disorder and polysubstance abuse, that 
initially included hallucinations and flashbacks.353 The cause of action was actually 
based upon the failure of the institution to notify the patient’s wife, Jillene, of his 
discharge so that she could leave the marital residence before he was able to confront 
her again.354 He was discharged from Broadlawns to travel to a center for chemical 
dependency, but he left that facility and then “went to a local pawnshop, pawned his 
watch, and bought a bus ticket back to Des Moines. Gerald returned to the marital 
residence, perhaps to lie in wait for Jillene. When Jillene returned to the home that 
evening, Gerald shot her several times, killing her.”355 
The Iowa court again expressly declined to hold that Tarasoff would apply in 
this case: “We have not previously adopted the duty principles enunciated in Tarasoff 
                                                          
 
351 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 319 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). Both Restatement 
sections address the exceptions to the general common law rule that “a person has no duty to control the 
conduct of another.” 491 N.W.2d at 511. Section 319 recognizes an exception to the general rule: “One 
who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent 
him from doing such harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The court 
also noted the Restatement’s illustration of this proposition, noting, “the liability of a hospital to a person 
infected by a diseased patient who is negligently released, and the liability of an insane asylum for injury 
caused by the negligent release of a homicidal maniac.” 491 N.W.2d at 511 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 cmt. a, illus. 1, 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
352 656 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 2002), abrogated by Thompson v. Kacinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Iowa 2009). 
The court in Thompson adopted a “foreseeability” analysis with a “risk” analysis test for liability applied 
by drafters of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1996). 774 N.W.2d at 834–35. 
353 Smith, 656 N.W.2d at 77–78. 
354 Id. at 83. 
355 Id. at 78. 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  7 8 5   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
and do not do so at this time.”356 Still, the court upheld the finding of negligence 
based on the failure to notify the patient’s wife of his discharge. However, it found 
Tarasoff inapplicable because the “special relationship” underlying that decision 
existed between the patient and treating institution, whereas here the wife’s death 
was attributable to the special relationship created by Broadlawns’s promise to warn 
her of her husband’s discharge, which was necessitated by her actual knowledge of 
her husband’s propensity for violence.357 Because Broadlawns failed to warn Jillene 
when Gerald was released, the substantial verdict based on this failure was upheld 
on appeal, even though the reviewing court declined the Estate’s argument that 
Tarasoff applied.358 
The Leonard court noted the divergent approaches taken by courts considering 
the issue of liability for patient violence committed upon third persons following 
discharge from civil commitment.359 Some courts had addressed liability based on 
the duty to protect or warn by basically imposing liability on professionals for failure 
to protect or warn the public at large or classes of potential victims.360 Other courts 
                                                          
 
356 Id. at 80. 
357 Id. at 78. 
358 Id. at 80–81. Subsequently, in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Iowa 2009), the court 
retreated from its reliance on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965), in which 
the actor’s conduct is considered a legal cause of liability cause if is it a substantial factor in bringing 
about the result. Instead, it adopted the “risk standard” approach taken by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS to address confusion often created in jurors’ minds by the “proximate cause” test, quoting from 
the comment to the Restatement: 
Properly understood, both the risk standard and a foreseeability test exclude 
liability for harms that were sufficiently unforeseeable at the time of the actor’s 
tortious conduct that they were not among the risks—potential harms—that 
made the actor negligent. . . . [W]hen scope of liability arises in a negligence 
case, the risks that make an actor negligent are limited to foreseeable ones, and 
the factfinder must determine whether the type of harm that occurred is among 
those reasonably foreseeable potential harms that made the actor’s conduct 
negligent. 
774 N.W.2d at 839 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1996)). 
359 Leonard v. Iowa, 431 N.W.2d 508, 511–12 (Iowa 1992). 
360 See, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Colo. 1989) (finding liability based on the negligent 
release of a violent patient who killed a police officer without a specific intended victim because the 
therapist still had a duty to assess a patient’s propensity for violence and protect others by restraining the 
patient for a longer period); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072–73 (Del. 1984); Boulanger v. Pol, 900 
P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995) (limiting Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 82 (Kan. 1983) to finding liability based 
on the release of involuntarily committed mental hospital patients). 
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had limited recovery based on the duty to warn of patient violence that could 
reasonably be anticipated by the treating therapist.361 The Leonard court noted that 
other jurisdictions imposed liability only for injuries sustained by third persons 
specifically identified in patient threats.362 
On the facts presented, specifically the lack of any knowledge that Leonard 
would be victimized by Parrish, the Iowa court in Leonard rejected the argument that 
liability for the patient’s violence should extend to the public generally.363 The court 
reasoned that “the risks to the general public posed by the negligent release of 
dangerous mental patients would be far outweighed by the disservice to the general 
public if treating physicians were subject to civil liability for discharge decisions.”364 
Regardless of the approach taken by any individual jurisdiction with respect to 
the imposition of a duty to warn third persons of potential patient violence, the 
circumstances in which the involuntarily committed patient is released provide a 
compelling factual scenario in which the decision to release without warning may 
give rise to a claim of negligence resting on a breach of the mental health 
professional’s duty to protect third persons from patient violence. Quite apart from 
whether such a duty is imposed in a jurisdiction, civil recovery is likely to be difficult 
because of the operation of statutory immunity protections that are designed to 
facilitate professional use of the involuntary civil commitment process to deal with 
potentially violent, impaired persons.365 
                                                          
 
361 See, e.g., Hamman v. Cty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1127–28 (Ariz. 1995) (applying Tarasoff where 
a therapist could have reasonably identified the violent patient’s family as the most likely potential 
victims, warranting liability even if no specific threat against the identifiable target was disclosed); 
Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1983) (finding liability based on the release of a patient who 
had previously demonstrated dangerousness by driving while intoxicated after being released overnight 
and the danger was known to the patient’s therapist who should have foreseen danger to others). 
362 Leonard, 491 N.W.2d at 511 (citing Furr v. Spring Grove Hospital, 454 A.2d 414, 420–21 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1983)) (following Tarasoff and strictly limiting recovery to situation involving known victim 
disclosed to therapist); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) 
(discussing Tarasoff and finding liability where specific victim identified in patient’s threat disclosed to 
therapist). 
363 Leonard, 431 N.W.2d at 512. 
364 Id. (citing Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo. 1983)). 
365 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-227 (2020) (“No officer, physician, or other person shall be held 
civilly liable for his or her actions pursuant to this subchapter in the absence of proof of bad faith, malice, 
or gross negligence.”). 
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b. Hostility Based on Failed Family or Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Both Tarasoff and Jablonski arose in the context of failed familial or romantic 
relationships in which the patient’s perceived hostility was directed toward obvious 
victims of his anger.366 In both cases, the treating therapists considered the patient 
potentially violent, with the University psychologist in Tarasoff taking affirmative 
steps to have campus police restrain Poddar for purposes of hospitalization,367 while 
the treating professionals in Jablonski did not conclude that hospitalization was 
warranted despite the patient’s “explosive” behavior.368 
Individual acts of patient violence are most likely to arise when there has been 
a history of actual violence toward an identified victim, such as a family member or 
individual who is involved with the patient in an intimate or otherwise extremely 
close interpersonal relationship, or when the relationship itself has collapsed. The 
actualization of violent intent might result either from the continued close proximity 
to the individual or others who are identified by the patient as a cause of their extreme 
anxiety, or from undesired estrangement. The scenarios suggested by this type of 
situation are ubiquitous in popular culture, moreover, and could hardly escape 
exposure to any but the most isolated of patients. 
Mass shootings or other acts of mass violence may arise from these types of 
relationships, occurring in the context of family relationships.369 Sometimes these 
                                                          
 
366 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976); Jablonski v. United States, 712 
F.2d 391, 392–93 (9th Cir. 1983). 
367 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40. 
368 Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 394 (“Although Hazle believed that Jablonski was dangerous and that his case 
was an ‘emergency,’ both doctors concluded that there was no basis for involuntary hospitalization.”). 
369 See, e.g., Sheriff Reconstructs the Murders of 16, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1988/01/01/us/sheriff-reconstructs-the-murders-of-16.html. The story relates the mass murder of his 
family by Ronald Gene Simmons in Russellville, Arkansas: 
Mr. Simmons, 47 years old, is accused of killing 14 relatives and two other 
people in a rampage that the authorities say began at his home in Dover before 
Christmas and ended in a 45-minute shooting spree in downtown Russellville. 
Mr. Simmons was formally charged Wednesday with two counts of capital 
murder and four of attempted murder. 
Id. Simmons accepted the death sentence imposed by the capital jury and successfully waived his right to 
appeal. Simmons v. State, 766 S.W.2d 422, 422–23 (Ark. 1989). The case reached the United States 
Supreme Court when another death row inmate sought to intervene on Simmons’ behalf as next friend to 
force the state supreme court to order appellate review to determine the validity of the death sentence, 
eventually losing. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–52 (1990). 
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will include a patient’s disclosure of a desire to injure, kill, or threaten one or more 
members of their immediate family.370 Therapists may be able to identify potential 
victims more readily in these circumstances, suggesting that warnings to the patient 
or law enforcement would at least be more accurate, if not more effective, because 
of the likelihood of correct identification of a potential victim. But that does not mean 
that subsequent action by the patient, or warned victim, will prevent the tragedy, as 
the facts in Jablonski demonstrate.371 Potential victims who have been involved in 
longer-term or more intense relationships with troubled patients may reject warnings 
altogether or minimize their import based on a failed perception of the seriousness 
of the threat of violence. 
No contact orders issued by courts may, in a very real sense, serve to deter only 
those dangerous patients whose potential for aggression would otherwise be 
controlled; for the out-of-control violent patient, a judge’s signed order may afford 
little protection, and may actually serve to antagonize the individual subject to the 
order further, sometimes contributing to violent retaliation.372 
                                                          
 
370 See, e.g., Hamman v. Cty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1127–28 (Ariz. 1995) (applying Tarasoff where 
a therapist could have reasonably identified the violent patient’s family as the most likely potential 
victims, warranting liability even if no specific threat against the identifiable target was disclosed); 
Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237(Wash. 1983). 
371 Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 393 (“In a private conference following the diagnostic interview, Kimball told 
Kopiloff that she felt insecure around Jablonski and was concerned about his unusual behavior. Kopiloff 
recommended that she leave Jablonski at least while he was being evaluated. When Kimball responded ‘I 
love him,’ Kopiloff did not warn her further because he believed she would not listen to him.”). 
372 See Brian H. Spitzberg, The Tactical Topography of Stalking Victimization and Management, 3 
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 261–88 (2002), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/ 
1524838002237330 (“A summary of 32 studies of restraining orders indicated that they are violated an 
average of 40% of the time and are perceived as followed by worse events almost 21% of the time.”). The 
author is Senate Distinguished Professor of Communication at San Diego State University. Dr. Brian 
Spitzberg, SDSU SCH. OF COMMC’N, https://communication.sdsu.edu/faculty_and_staff/profile/dr.-brian-
h.-spitzberg (last visited June 6, 2021). 
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c. Workplace or Employment-Related Violence 
Mass shootings have occurred373 when disgruntled employees or employees 
who have been terminated later opened fire at their current or former workplace,374 
sometimes referred to as “going postal.”375 Just over a week after a fatal shooting at 
an ex-employee’s workplace in Orlando on June 5, 2017,376 there was another 
workplace shooting at a UPS office in San Francisco.377 These scenarios are perhaps 
most likely to result in identifiable targets for violence in a workplace venue when 
employment issues are causing the patient intense anxiety. For instance, seven 
people were killed, and twenty-five others injured, in a shooting in Odessa and 
Midland, Texas, in 2019; the shooter had been fired from his job hours earlier and 
began the rampage through the cities after being stopped for a routine traffic 
violation.378 
But, other mass shootings may be perpetrated as a result of retaliation by 
mentally unstable individuals who did not have a previous employment connection 
with a specific enterprise. Because of a known history of antagonism toward the 
                                                          
 
373 For a comprehensive list of workplace shootings, see Number of Victims of Workplace Shootings in 
the United States Between 1982 and February 2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
476400/workplace-shootings-in-the-us-by-victim-count/ (last visited June 6, 2021). 
374 See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Ex-Employee Kills 5 Others and Herself at California Postal Plant, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/us/health/exemployee-kills-5-others-
and-herself-at-california-postal-plant.html. The reporter wrote: 
A woman who had left her Postal Service job because of psychological 
problems shot and killed five former colleagues and critically wounded 
another at a sorting plant here Monday night before fatally shooting herself, 
the authorities said Tuesday. . . . The violence provided a flashback to the spate 
of shootings at post offices and related facilities in the 1980’s and 90’s. The 
last such shooting was eight years ago in Dallas, when a letter carrier killed a 
clerk after arguing in a break room. The deadliest was the August 1986 killings 
of 14 people by a co-worker in Edmond, Okla., who then killed himself. 
Id. 
375 The term “going postal” is attributed to Karl Vick who noted the United States Postal Service’s use of 
the phrase in response to mass shootings: 
The symposium was sponsored by the U.S. Postal Service, which has seen so 
many outbursts that in some circles excessive stress is known as “going 
postal.” Thirty-five people have been killed in 11 post office shootings since 
1983. The USPS does not approve of the term “going postal” and has made 
attempts to stop people from using the saying. Some postal workers, however, 
feel it has earned its place. 
Karl Vick, Violence at Work Tied to Loss of Esteem, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 17, 1993). 
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enterprise, it could be that threats of violence would explain the context in which the 
mass shooting occurs. In some instances, expressions of violence by the individual 
could provide some basis for deterrence, although not necessarily by a Tarasoff 
warning because the perpetrator may not have been involved in mental health 
treatment at the time. 
For instance, the shooter’s motivation for killing five employees of the 
Annapolis, Maryland Capital Gazette newspaper was that he claimed the paper 
mistreated him in its stories related to his conviction for harassing a former high 
school classmate.379 The shooter had filed a libel suit against the newspaper, which 
published a chain of papers in the Eastern Shore, and “waged a social media 
campaign” against the Gazette.380 On the morning of the rampage, June 28, 2018, the 
shooter sent a letter to the Gazette’s lawyer, “announcing that he planned to go there 
‘with the objective of killing every person present,’ a copy of the letter shows.”381 
Here, the shooter’s motivation was apparently known—generally and to the 
                                                          
 
376 See Les Neuhaus, Lindsey Bever & Mark Berman, ‘Disgruntled’ Ex-employee Fatally Shot Five at 
Orlando Business, Then Killed Himself, Police Say, WASH. POST (June 5, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/05/multiple-people-killed-in-shooting-at-florida-
business/?utm_term=.e12b4466277b. The perpetrator was a military veteran with a minor criminal record. 
Id. 
377 See Eliott C. McLaughlin & Dan Simon, Officials Identify Gunman, Victims in UPS Shooting, CNN 
(June 15, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/us/san-francisco-shooting/index.html. A gunman 
wearing a UPS uniform shot five UPS employees, killing three, before fatally shooting himself at a UPS 
facility in San Francisco. Id. 
378 Allison Aubrey, Texas Gunman Who Killed 7 Had Been Fired Just Hours Before Shootings, NPR 
(Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/02/756772750/texas-gunman-who-killed-7-had-been-
fired-just-hours-before-shootings-reports. The total number of deaths increased to 25 as other victims died 
later. See Police Raised Concerns About West Texas Gunman 8 Years Before Shooting in Odessa, EL 
PASO TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/texasregion/2019/09/29/police-
raised-concerns-odessa-texas-shooting-gunman-8-years-ago/3815002002/. 
379 See Matt Stevens & Daniel Victor, Annapolis Shooting Suspect Wanted to ‘Kill Every Person’ in 
Newsroom, Letter States, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/us/annapolis-
shooting-woman-harassed.html. 
380 See Sabrina Tavernise, Amy Harmon & Maya Salam, 5 People Dead in Shooting At Maryland’s 
Capital Gazette Newsroom, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/ 
capital-gazette-annapolis-shooting.html (accessed Feb. 2, 2020) (“The article was published in July 2011 
with the headline ‘Jarrod Wants to Be Your Friend,’ and detailed a harassment charge against Mr. Ramos. 
According to the article, Mr. Ramos sent a friend request on Facebook to a former high school classmate 
and over the course of several months, he ‘alternately asked for help, called her vulgar names and told her 
to kill herself.’”). 
381 See Stevens & Victor, supra, note 379. 
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victims—yet it could be that the ultimate act of violence was simply not anticipated 
by the news organization, which likely had been subjected to threats for its treatment 
of other news in the past. Nevertheless, there was a basis for recognizing the potential 
danger: 
Thursday’s shooting prompted law enforcement officials throughout the 
country to protect media organizations. As the day proceeded, however, 
investigators were looking into whether the attack was an isolated grudge. 
“Jarrod Ramos has a long history of being angry and taking action against 
The Capital newspaper,” said Tom Marquardt, a former executive editor and 
publisher at The Capital. “I said at one time to my attorneys that this was a guy 
that was going to come and shoot us. I was concerned on my behalf and on behalf 
of my staff that he was going to take more than legal action.”382 
Even when there is a clear workplace connection between the shooter and 
victims, most evident when the shooting occurs at the workplace, the shooter’s state 
of mind or motivation may not be discernible. For example, the fatal shooting of 
twelve of the shooter’s former co-workers, and the injury of four more, has withstood 
investigation into the motivation of the civil engineer who had recently resigned from 
his position with the city of Virginia Beach, Virginia.383 There was no known 
evidence of mental illness, nor any indication of the reason for his resignation, having 
resigned in good standing.384 With no apparent grievance against the city or fellow 
employees and no known history of mental illness or emotional crisis, the motivation 
                                                          
 
382 Tavernise et al., supra note 380. 
383 See Sara Gregory, Jane Harper & Alissa Skelton, 13 Dead, Including Gunman, in Shooting At Virginia 
Beach Municipal Center, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 31, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://www.pilotonline.com/ 
news/virginia-beach-mass-shooting/article_777b737e-83e3-11e9-b1d0-dff7ad725d5e.html. The shooting 
occurred on May 31, 2019. Id. 
384 See Michael E. Miller, Lynh Bui & Julie Zauzmer, DeWayne Craddock, a Longtime Virginia Beach 
Employee, Identified as Shooter Who Killed 12 in City Building, WASH. POST (June 1, 2019, 8:03 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dewayne-craddock-a-longtime-virginia-beach-
employee-identified-as-shooter-who-killed-12-in-city-building/2019/06/01/0fe20766-840e-11e9-95a9-
e2c830afe24f_story.html; see also Michael E. Miller, Ian Shapira & Julie Zauzmer, Virginia Beach Mass 
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for this shooting remains an unsolved mystery disturbing the community a year 
later.385 
The problem posed by workplace shootings in terms of assessing a perpetrator’s 
motive is that unless the circumstances of their work relationship or termination are 
already disclosed, it may be that an actual motive will never be disclosed if the 
shooter dies in the assault. In some cases, explanations or even ramblings posted on 
social media may, of course, provide a strong basis for drawing inferences from the 
shooter’s words and circumstances of the mass assault that would be accurate. Unless 
disclosed to a mental health professional in the course of mental examination or 
evaluation, or treatment for a diagnosis manifested by threats of violence, Tarasoff 
offers little hope for the prevention of an episode of mass violence by warning or 
other action, such as emergency hospitalization. 
d. School Shootings by Current or Former Students 
Experience with episodes of mass violence may inform mental health 
professionals of a range of potential acts that could logically follow disclosure of 
patient propensity for violence, even when those acts might be viewed as 
unprecedented. The recent history of mass shootings at schools committed by 
juveniles serves to inform therapists of the potential for mass violence committed by 
emotionally disturbed children, particularly when there are firearms accessible to 
them. One early example of this scenario occurred in Jonesboro, Arkansas, in 1998, 
when two boys, aged 13 and 11, opened fire on schoolchildren with weapons taken 
from the younger child’s home, including three semi-automatic rifles and ten other 
loaded weapons.386 The circumstances of the assault, which left four students and 
one teacher dead and ten other children wounded, included this shocking evidence 
of their planning: “both of the boys had been raised around guns. They belonged to 
gun clubs and even participated in practical shooting competitions, which involve 
                                                          
 
385 Although law enforcement had promised a complete report on the shooter’s motivation, The Virginian-
Pilot, the newspaper in Hampton Roads, Virginia, complained editorially a year later that no investigation 
had been fully shared with the community. See Editorial: Public Needs Full Account of Virginia Beach 
Shooting, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 5, 2020), https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/vp-ed-editorial-beach-
shooting-report-0505-20200505-yyzttwqidramhkzsl7ef3o3yya-story.html. 
386 March 24, 1998: A School Shooting in Joneboro, Arkansas Kills Five, HISTORY: THIS DAY IN HISTORY 
(Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-school-shooting-in-jonesboro-arkansas-
kills-five. 
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firing at simulated moving human targets. Golden reportedly shot several dogs in 
preparation for the actual shooting.”387 
An ABC News report from February 12, 2016, included the following 
tabulation recording the history of school shootings from the date of the mass 
shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999: 
The numbers that follow are a part of a larger conversation about school 
violence and children in crisis: 
50—The number of mass murders or attempted mass murders at a school since 
Columbine. (FBI records) 
141—The number of people killed in a mass murder or attempted mass murder at 
a school since Columbine. (FBI records) 
73—The percentage of school shooters with no prior criminal record, not even an 
arrest. (U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education) 
96—The percentage of school shooters who are male. (FBI records) 
17—The number of kids aged 15 or younger who have committed or attempted a 
mass school shooting since Columbine. (FBI records) 
81—The percentage of school shootings where someone had information that the 
attacker was thinking about or planning the shooting. (U.S. Secret Service, U.S. 
Department of Education) 
68—The percentage of school shooters who got their guns from relatives or at 
home. (U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education) 
65—The number of school shooters and thwarted school shooters who have 
referenced Columbine as a motivation. (ABC News investigation, various law 
enforcement agencies) 
                                                          
 
387 Id. Because the two juvenile shooters could not be prosecuted as adults under Arkansas law, they were 
subsequently released from custody after attaining the age of twenty-one; they are reportedly the only 
mass shooters living free at this time. See Meaghan Keneally, The Only Two Living US Mass School 
Shooters Who Are Not Incarcerated, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/living-us-
mass-school-shooters-incarcerated/story?id=36986507. The ABC news follow-up story on the Westside 
school shooting reported: 
Adam Lanza killed himself. So did Seung-Hui Cho at Virginia Tech. And so 
did Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in Columbine. And Christopher Harper-
Mercer in Roseburg. And Elliot Rodger in Isla Vista. 
If you go down the list of mass shootings at U.S. schools, most of the killers 
turned the guns on themselves after killing classmates and teachers. Several 
others were killed by police, and a few were taken into custody alive. 
But only two are now out of prison, one of whom was arrested with a gun after 
his release, while the other has since applied for a concealed carry permit. 
Id. 
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270—The number of shootings of any kind at a school since Columbine. (ABC 
News review of reported cases) 
1—The number of shootings per week, on average, on a school or college campus 
in 2015. (ABC News review of reported cases)388 
School shootings have perhaps been the most troubling scenarios of mass 
violence in the United States because of the perception that schools should afford the 
greatest protection of public venues. This may be, in part, because of the 
vulnerability of children and younger persons, and in part because schools and 
colleges are often viewed as isolated from more common places in which conflict 
would escalate into deadly violence. The reality has been that schools are actually 
rather common forums for random violence or targeted violence that expands to 
include random victims beyond those intended victims who might be identified, at 
least in hindsight, because they have engaged in bullying or been bullied. 
e. Thoughts on Common Circumstances, Venues 
In each of the general circumstances discussed surrounding mass shootings, the 
unique character of the possible relationship between the perpetrator and victims 
suggests a basis for anticipating violence. This assumes that the duty to warn or 
prevent violence for mental health professionals can be predicated on either an actual 
threat by a patient during treatment or individual exhibiting thinking and tendencies 
to commit random acts of violence that could reasonably be evaluated in terms of the 
nature of the threat, intended victim, and likelihood that the individual would have 
sufficient resources, such as access to firearms, to act upon the expressed threat. 
Logically, the circumstances discussed in the preceding paragraphs in Sections 
VI.B.1.a–d of this Article offer the most likely scenarios in which a treating 
professional would have the information supporting a conclusion warranting a 
warning to third persons targeted by the threats or to law enforcement. A patient 
already confined in a mental institution or in treatment who discloses violent 
thoughts toward family members, or individuals previously involved with another 
who displays extreme hostility, would be most likely to have disclosed sufficient 
information and intent to give rise to the treating professional’s duty to warn or take 
steps designed to protect third persons, whether identified specifically or otherwise 
likely to be victims of random violence. 
Workplace and school shootings also suggest the possibility of identifying 
potential violent actors based on a prior relationship between a former, terminated, 
                                                          
 
388 Lauren Pearle, School Shootings by the Numbers since Columbine, ABC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/school-shootings-columbine-numbers/story?id=36833245. 
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or dissatisfied worker or student and the venue for an attack. In some instances, the 
individual expressing hostility to the workplace or school may have been treated by 
a mental health professional and disclosed animosity threatening violence during the 
course of examination or treatment. In those instances, the duty to warn or attempt 
to protect third persons from the patient’s potential for violence may arise as a result 
of the disclosure and professional’s assessment of the patient’s ability to carry out a 
special or general threat. Otherwise, it would seem unlikely that mental health 
professionals would have particularized knowledge that would trigger a duty to warn, 
although mental health professionals may often have significant information aiding 
employers, school officials and teachers, and law enforcement in determining the 
probability that a disaffected individual may pose a threat to others. This kind of 
knowledge may warrant ongoing evaluation of the individual’s continued hostility 
and ability to carry through on a disclosed threat or access to weapons that could be 
used in an attack. 
2. Less Common or Unexpected Scenarios and Warnings 
Although certain scenarios in which acts of mass violence occur are either 
common or seem relatively predictable, they may still remain troubling in terms of 
identifying situations or circumstances regarding specific victims when mass 
shootings occur at schools, theaters, shopping malls, and other public venues where 
the targeting of victims appears random. In these situations, even if the perpetrator 
has engaged in therapeutic sessions with mental health professionals, they may not 
have disclosed specific targets of hostility or plans for attacks. There may well have 
been such insufficient indication of a planned or spontaneous attack that there could 
have been no preventive action taken based on a reasoned assessment of generalized 
threats. 
In contrast to situations in which attacks of mass violence appear to be related 
to a particular activity or circumstance, other considerations minimize any 
expectation that the violence could reasonably be anticipated and prevented by 
warnings by mental health professionals. Venues may suggest commonality in terms 
of predictability, but in fact, contexts still vary in terms of important facts that 
compromise the prospect for prevention. Throughout the recent national history of 
mass shootings, venues in which these attacks occur do not reflect the degree of 
commonality that may characterize the circumstances or motivation of shooters 
permitting generalized conclusions. 
a. Religious Venues 
A prior relationship between the perpetrator of the act of mass shootings and 
prospective victims or the venue in which the violence occurs would logically appear 
to offer the best chances for prevention of shootings or other acts occurring in houses 
of worship. The personal history of the perpetrator and the religious group involved 
would suggest a sound opportunity for application of the mental health professional’s 
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duty to warn prospective victims or act to protect third persons from injury. It does 
not mean, of course, that threats made to a congregation or members of a specific 
religious communities will necessarily be disclosed to professionals positioned to 
evaluate the seriousness of threats or trained to take appropriate action; thus, the 
opportunity for prevention may not arise. Moreover, recent history demonstrates that 
violent assaults against worshippers have not been traced to internal sources, or prior 
relationships, but from external sources; although precise determination of 
motivation is often simply not available for that reason. 
In the mass shooting committed during a service conducted in Milwaukee in 
2005 by the Living Church of God, the shooter, Terry Ratzmann, was a disaffected 
church member.389 He shot and killed four other members including the church’s 
pastor,390 and wounded seven others before turning his weapon on himself, with three 
of the others dying later.391 He had reportedly been suffering from depression prior 
to the shooting, according to another church member.392 
Investigation into the shooter’s motivation focused on the shooter’s 
relationship with the church: 
“We believe that the motive has something to do with the church and the 
church services more so than any other possible motive,” Capt. Phil Horter of the 
Brookfield, Wis., Police Department said at a news conference on Monday. 
“We’re looking at the church totality, whether it’s members of the church, 
members of the hierarchy of the church, the sermons of the church,” he added. 
Investigators are combing through some 1,000 e-mail messages and other 
files, about 70 of them encrypted, on three computers seized from the home where 
                                                          
 
389 See Aamer Madhani & Tom Rybarczyk, Gunman Kills 7 in Rampage, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2005), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2005-03-13-0503130385-story.html. The shooting 
occurred at a service conducted at a suburban Milwaukee Sheraton Hotel, where the congregation had met 
for several years, committed by a long-time member of the fundamentalist, Adventist-like sect adhering 
to Old Testament, retaining Jewish festivals and observing the Sabbath on Saturday. Id. 
390 Church, Police Probe 7 Murders, CBS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2005), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
church-police-probe-7-murders/. 
391 Madhani & Rybarczyk, supra note 389. 
392 Id. 
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Mr. Ratzmann lived with his mother and sister, and one from his office. A message 
left on the Ratzmanns’ answering machine on Monday was not returned.393 
The Living Church of God mass shooting could reasonably have been 
explained as rooted in the shooter’s prior relationship with the church or its 
membership, doctrine, or practice based on information available to law 
enforcement, including the report that he had suffered from depression prior to the 
episode.394 The investigation into this mass shooting also revealed an important 
investigative tool available in other attacks targeted at religion, religious institutions, 
or religious services, apart from witness interviews. It reflects the importance of 
access to information and opinions posted on personal computers and internet sites 
by individuals in advance of carrying out planned acts of mass violence.395 
In contrast to the Living Church of God mass shooting, more recent episodes 
involving venues of religious worship have not commonly involved disaffected 
members of the same religious community as victims. In fact, in many instances of 
mass violence directed at worship or worship places, the probable motive for the 
attack is external. For instance, threats against Islamic mosques are reportedly on the 
rise,396 and groups misidentified with Islam have been targeted, such as the attack on 
a Sikh temple in Wisconsin in 2012, as reported by the New York Times: 
“Everyone here is thinking this is a hate crime for sure,” said Manjit Singh, 
who goes to a different temple in the region. “People think we are Muslims.” 
                                                          
 




395 See, e.g., Church, Police Probe 7 Murders, CBS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2005, 1:44 AM), https://www 
.cbsnews.com/news/church-police-probe-7-murders/ (“The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported Monday 
the Feb. 26 sermon that upset Ratzmann had made the point that people’s problems are of their own 
making. According to the paper, police trying to piece together a motive for the rampage are studying 
encrypted files from Ratzmann’s three computers, seized from the home he shared with his mother and 
sister in New Berlin, Wisconsin.”). 
396 Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/ 
discriminatory-profiling/nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last updated May 2021) (last visited June 6, 
2021) (“In recent years, anti-Muslim sentiment has spiked. Although these sentiments manifest 
themselves in many ways, attacks on mosques directly take aim at religious freedom. Existing and 
proposed mosque sites across the country have been targeted for vandalism and other criminal acts, and 
there have been efforts to block or deny necessary zoning permits for the construction and expansion of 
other facilities.”). 
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Though violence against Sikhs in Wisconsin was unheard of before the 
shooting, many in this community said they had sensed a rise in antipathy since 
the attacks on Sept. 11 and suspected it was because people mistake them for 
Muslims. Followers of Sikhism, or Gurmat, a monotheistic faith founded in the 
15th century in South Asia, typically do not cut their hair, and men often wear 
colorful turbans and refrain from cutting their beards.397 
The link between shootings at mosques and prejudice directed at Islam among 
all ethnic populations adhering to Islamic theology has been clearly confirmed in the 
rampage in which forty-nine were killed and forty injured in mass shootings at two 
mosques in New Zealand in March 2019.398 The shooter’s intent was apparently 
disclosed prior to the action in which three individuals were arrested: 
Before the attacks that took place during Friday prayers at about 1.40pm 
local time, the gunman reportedly published a racist manifesto on Twitter. He then 
live-streamed his rampage, according to an analysis by Agence France-Presse. 
Video footage, widely circulated on social media, showed a gunman 
randomly shooting at people inside a mosque while worshippers, possibly dead or 
wounded, lay huddled on the floor.399 
The New Zealand attack apparently prompted a so-called copy-cat act of mass 
violence. Within a few days of the New Zealand attack, a San Diego college student 
set fire to a mosque in Escondido, California, in which seven worshippers escaped 
injury; then a month later, the student opened fire on a Passover service at a Jewish 
synagogue, killing one and injuring three other worshippers, including the Rabbi.400 
The San Diego perpetrator was apparently motivated by his interest in the live-
streaming of the New Zealand mass shooting, which he reportedly found 
unsatisfying because he was not able to view the episode: “complaining none of the 
                                                          
 
397 Steven Yaccino, Michael Schwirtz & Marc Santora, Gunnman Kills 6 At a Sikh Temple Near 
Milwaukee, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/us/shooting-reported-at-
temple-in-wisconsin.html (emphasis added). 
398 John Power & Gigi Choy, New Zealand Shooting: 49 Killed, More Than 40 Wounded in Mass 
Shootings At Christchurch Mosques, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/ 
news/asia/australasia/article/3001786/schools-shut-down-people-warned-stay-home-after-serious. 
399 Id. 
400 Julie Watson & Elliot Spaga, Warrants Say New Zealand Attack Inspired Synagogue Shooting, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 13, 2019), https://apnews.com/7efa7c16be6d4b82b110e44104f26f80. 
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links to the live-streamed video of the massacre were working and added, ‘I could’ve 
seen it live damnit,’ according to the search warrants.”401 
The combination of religious hatred and improvised visual depiction of 
violence reflected in the San Diego incidents suggests the significant attraction of 
some perpetrators in the representation or publication of their actions, evidence of 
deviance perhaps beyond the scope of published manifestos or rants. Attacks on 
mosques likely reflect a combined source of hostility based on religion and ethnic 
bias directed at those ethnically diverse groups that embrace Islam in significant 
numbers. After the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, anti-Islam 
attacks may reflect coalescing of these various sources of potential animosity with 
national responses to Middle Eastern populations. 
Similarly, there is evidence that the combination of ethnic and religious bias 
common to Anti-Semitism spawned the number of attacks against synagogues, 
including the mass shooting at the Tree of Life Congregation in Pittsburgh on 
October 27, 2018, the deadliest shooting at a Jewish synagogue in U.S. History.402 
During the shooting, eleven worshippers, many elderly, were killed and four of six 
victims wounded were police officers.403 The shooter’s motivation was apparently 
based on the fact that his primary victims were Jewish. “During the shooting, 
‘Bowers made statements regarding genocide, and his desire to kill Jewish people. 
After a standoff with police, Bowers eventually surrendered, and remains in federal 
custody today.’”404 
To the extent that mass violence is directed at Jewish synagogues or 
individuals, the existence of Anti-Semitism as the basis of an attack does not suggest 
that intervention by mental health providers would be a likely means for preventing 
                                                          
 
401 Id. The Associated Press also reported that the perpetrator referenced the manifesto published by the 
New Zealand shooter, noting, “On March 20, investigators in the search documents said he sent another 
text about the writings saying, ‘I think it’s important that everyone should read it.’” Id. 
402 Campbell Robertson, Christopher Mele & Sabrina Tavernise, 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; 
Suspect Charged with 29 Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/ 
us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html. On April 13, 2014, an individual self-identified as 
Fraiser Glenn Cross, Jr. reportedly a former Grand Dragon of the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 
Frasier Glenn Miller, opened fire on a Jewish Community Center in Overland Park, Kansas, a Kansas 
City suburb, killing three persons. Gillian Mohney & Dean Scrabner, Kansas Jewish Center Shooting 
Suspect Identified as Former KKK Leader, ABC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
kansas-jewish-center-shooting-suspect-identified-kkk-leader/story?id=23310932. 
403 Robertson et al., supra note 402. 
404 Shannon Van Sant, Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting Victims Identified, NPR (Oct. 28, 2018), https:// 
www.npr.org/2018/10/28/661530860/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-victims-identified. 
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the assault. Unless the perpetrator has disclosed an intended act of violence or the 
intent to attack an individual, a treating mental health professional could not likely 
make the necessary determination that violence to third persons was intended simply 
from a patient’s general hostility toward Jews or Israel. 
Perhaps in contrast to mass shootings involving Islam and Jewish worship 
centers, or directed at Muslims or Jews individually or personally, the recent history 
of mass shootings involving Christian churches does not suggest so clearly an anti-
Christian motivation. Instead, two episodes reflect that perpetrators may have chosen 
churches as the venue for shootings based on racial animosity. In the Charleston, 
South Carolina murder of nine worshippers at an African Episcopal Methodist 
Church in 2015, for instance, Dylann Roof’s racist motivation was apparent both at 
the time of the shootings and later, during his trial when his confession was read to 
the jury.405 
Another episode followed in Nashville when the shooter, an African American, 
attacked a church, killing one and injuring seven others in apparent retaliation for the 
mass killings at the Charleston church based on a written note.406 The shooter was 
diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness, schizoaffective disorder, and likely 
post-traumatic stress disorder, but an examining psychiatrist concluded that the 
illness did not render him insane under state law.407 The expert, however, concluded 
that there was no evidence of racial animus in the defendant’s history, suggesting 
that the explanation given in the note was seemingly an aberration. Defense counsel 
stressed that the former member of the church had been described as “‘polite, kind, 
and helpful,’ in earlier years.”408 
The most violent church-based shooting in terms of casualties, which occurred 
at the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on November 5, 2017, 
displayed indicators of an episode either triggered by or possibly related to the 
assailant’s history of mental impairment.409 The shooter, Devin Kelly, had a 
                                                          
 
405 Ford & Chandler, supra note 43; see also Keith O’Shea, Darran Simon & Holly Yan, Dylann Roof’s 
Racist Rants Read in Court, CNN (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/13/us/dylann-roof-
murder-trial/index.html. 
406 Travis Loller, Tennessee Church Shooter Sentenced To Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(May 28, 2019), https://apnews.com/f56b445a4e54468caff28c1844c55aa4.S. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. 
409 Fernandez et al., supra note 6; Rosenberg et al., supra note 7. 
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documented history of mental treatment for depression and rage and typically 
threatened violence against superiors when disciplined while failing in his career in 
the Air Force.410 He had escaped from confinement for psychiatric evaluation and 
treatment several years before his attack in Sutherland Springs: 
While Mr. Kelley awaited court-martial, the Air Force sent him to a civilian 
psychiatric hospital in Santa Teresa, N.M., where, according to local emergency 
dispatch records, he was given medication for depression, anxiety and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, and was considered a “high-risk patient.” 
On the night of June 7, 2012, Mr. Kelley escaped, made his way 12 miles 
south in the desert night to the El Paso bus station and bought a ticket home. 
His counselor at the hospital called the police, according to a police report, 
warning that Mr. Kelley had talked about killing his chain of command in the Air 
Force and told other patients he had recently bought guns online.411 
Kelly had a documented history of mental illness, threats of violence against superior 
officers triggered by discipline, hospitalization for mental illness, and access to 
weapons.412 There had even been an appropriate warning to law enforcement 
concerning his threatened violence, but despite those factors likely giving rise to the 
duty to warn or protect potential victims, the actual warning failed to prevent the 
massacre at the First Baptist Church culminating in his suicide some five years after 
his escape from confinement in the mental hospital caused by his aberrant 
behavior.413 What is also part of the scenario is that Kelly was able to obtain guns 
based on a failure by the Air Force to comply with legal requirements for reporting 
that allowed him “to buy firearms after the Air Force failed six times to follow 
procedures that would have alerted the FBI to his criminal record.”414 
                                                          
 
410 Dave Phillips, Richard Oppel, Jr. & Serge F. Kovaleskinov, In Air Force, Colleague Feared Church 







414 Daniel Flatley, Air Force’s Repeated Errors Let Sutherland Springs Shooter Buy Firearms, STARS & 
STRIPES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.stripes.com/news/us/air-force-s-repeated-errors-let-sutherland-
springs-shooter-buy-firearms-report-says-1.559597 (“The Air Force’s failure to submit Kelley’s 
information allowed him to pass federally mandated background checks and to purchase four firearms 
from federally licensed dealers. He used three of the four firearms to kill 26 people and wound 22 others, 
according to the report. He then killed himself by shooting himself in the head.”). 
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Even in circumstances that presented close to an optimal situation for the use 
of a warning designed to protect against violence committed against third persons, 
warnings may well fail due to failures in the system suggested for prevention. 
Moreover, although the attack was committed against a place of worship, there was 
apparently no evidence that the shooting was targeted at the First Baptist Church 
itself or members of its congregation, or that there was an ideological or anti-
Christian motivation for Kelly’s actions. Instead, they might have simply reflected 
his intent to commit a random act of mass violence, which would not have been 
reasonably predicted by mental health professionals, while violence directed at 
military superiors would clearly have been suggested by his prior behavior and 
expressions of threats. 
Only in situations in which a disaffected member of a religious community is 
individually identified, or when threats are directed at a specific religious 
community, could a duty to warn or protect third persons from injury arise. Even 
then, for the mental health professional to make a specific warning or take other 
action, the threat would have to be disclosed by an individual being evaluated or 
treated by the mental health professional. Otherwise, mass violence directed against 
any particular religious group or institution will not be prevented by a mental health 
professional acting as required by Tarasoff, whether the duty to warn has been 
recognized judicially as a matter of duty in terms of negligence or legislative 
definition. 
b. Entertainment Venues, Theaters, and Bars 
The problem posed by expecting mental health professionals to predict 
potential violence jeopardizing third persons targeted at entertainment venues lies in 
two common factors. First, unless the prospective perpetrator is a patient, there is no 
possibility that the mental health professional will have any reason to anticipate 
violence that might be prevented by a warning. Second, there is no necessary 
connection between even a patient threatening violence and any particular 
entertainment venue where an act of mass violence might be perpetrated. For 
instance, the killing of four persons and wounding of thirteen others at the Gilroy 
Garlic Festival in July 2019, in California suggested no particular motive for the 
shooter’s use of a semi-automatic rifle related to the festival or attendees.415 But he 
had posted shortly before on social media a message directing people to read Might 
is Right, a book described as commonly used to “justify racism, slavery and 
                                                          
 
415 See Vives et al., supra note 16. 
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colonialism.”416 There was, apparently, no basis for predicting the eighteen-year-old 
assailant’s specific motivation in attacking this public event that might have 
warranted a warning of potential violence. 
The exception might arise when a mass shooting is related to a specific event, 
such as the Aurora, Colorado theater shooting that occurred when The Dark Knight 
Rises was the feature being shown that night.417 In that discrete situation,418 
disclosure of an intended threat based on a specific aspect of the event could trigger 
the need for a general warning from the mental health professional to law 
enforcement officials or emergency hospitalization.419 
The nation has also seen a number of mass shootings at bars and other 
establishments at which consumption of alcohol is common, such as the shooting at 
the Borderline Bar & Grill in Thousand Oaks, California on November 7, 2018, in 
which thirteen died and ten others were wounded.420 Another instance was the Ned 
Peppers Bar shooting in Dayton, Ohio, that occurred on August 4, 2019, in which 
ten were shot fatally—including the shooter—and twenty-seven others wounded 
with an “AR-15 style” firearm.421 There was apparently no disclosure of any intent 
by either shooter of hostility directed at either establishment or history of an 
employment dispute or other specific cause for the attack. 
                                                          
 
416 Id. 
417 See Sandell et al., supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
418 See Gonzalez, supra note 36 (noting concern that theatrical opening of Joker could be accompanied by 
act of mass violence, similar to the mass shooting during The Dark Knight Rises). 
419 A popular entertainment event or venue could provide a trigger for mass violence, such as the 
Manchester, England, concert bombing, but without specific threat or identification of the target venue, 
the likelihood that any warning of patient hostility would be sufficient to prevent violence, leaving 
emergency hospitalization the most viable option for a mental health professional concerned over 
indications of potential patient violence. The Latest on the Manchester Bombing Investigation, supra note 
59. 
420 Jennifer Medina, Dave Philipps & Serge F. Kovaleski, Dueling Images: A Smiling Young Marine and 
a Killer Dressed in Black, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/ian-
david-long-california-shooter.html. The 28-year-old perpetrator was a Marine Corps veteran thought to 
have suffered from PTSD following deployment to Afghanistan. Id. 
421 Cameron Knight, Dayton Shooter Used a Gun That May Have Exploited an ATF Loophole, CIN. 
ENQUIRER (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/crime/crime-and-courts/2019/08/05/ 
dayton-shooter-used-gun-may-have-exploited-atf-loophole/1920506001/; Hunt, supra note 17. The 
shooter had a history of mental illness, had composed “kill list” and “rape list” while in high school and 
was with his sister at the bar when he opened fire, killing his sister during the episode. Mitchell et al., 
supra note 17. 
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With respect to the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando in June 2016,422 
however, there was reported speculation that the venue might have been targeted 
because it was frequented by gay men.423 Further, there was speculation that the 
Muslim shooter was troubled by his personal sexual orientation, but law enforcement 
authorities ultimately concluded that there was no credible evidence supporting this 
speculation.424 One of the most common problems in the evaluation of perpetrator 
intent in these mass shootings has been the difficulty in differentiating between 
speculation and proof of the actor’s actual intent, rendering conclusions about the 
possibility of frustrating their actions by intervention by law enforcement. This 
problem also complicates the evaluation of potential effectiveness of warnings that 
might have been given by mental health professionals complying with their 
obligations under Tarasoff—an impossibility in any event if the shooter had not been 
treated or evaluated for psychiatric or emotional problems and disclosed the threat 
to commit an act of violence directed at a specific individual or venue. The 
effectiveness of warnings almost certainly cannot generally be accurately 
determined, in any sense. Often, the motives of mass shooters are impossible to 
assess because they are killed in the episode, as Pulse nightclub shooter Omar 
Mateen was.425 
One possibility for protection against mass shootings involving entertainment 
venues for events that does not rest on a specific warning of the target lies in the 
option of enforcing greater screening of attendees as they enter the venue for an 
event. Much as attendees are often screened to prevent entry with prohibited items, 
including food or drink—specifically alcoholic beverage—the sponsor or operator 
                                                          
 
422 Zambelich & Hurt, supra note 45. 
423 Hennessy-Fiske et al., supra note 63. 
424 See Goldman, supra note 62. 
425 Zambelich & Hurt, supra note 45. Mateen was killed by police fire during the shooting, but evidence 
showed that he claimed to be an “Islamic soldier” and during one of several 911 calls made during the 
shooting said: 
“I wanna let you know, I’m in Orlando and I did the shootings,” the gunman 
told the operator during this 50-second call, according to a transcript released 
by the FBI. 
“What’s your name?” the operator asked. 
“My name is I pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic 
State.” 
Id. For an overview of the investigation and litigation history that may follow an act of mass violence, see 
Omar Mateen, ASSOCIATED PRESS, apnews.com/OmarMateen (last visited June 6, 2021). 
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of the event venue might employ screening specifically designed to detect weapons 
to provide protection against shootings. 
Similarly, mass shootings targeting individuals at bars or drinking 
establishments426 may be subject to an additional possibility for prevention 
regardless of whether there has been a threat made that would provide information 
triggering a warning or other action addressing the intended violent act. That would 
involve restricted entry for inspection of weapons, as well as contraband, by security 
personnel—“bouncers”—at the entrance to the establishment. While more 
aggressive searching of individuals entering an event or establishment where entry 
may typically involve some minimal effort at security could be a source of 
complaints, it could also serve to deter individuals, who intend to commit acts of 
mass violence, from entering any venue with restricted admission by ticket or 
otherwise.427 
c. Retail Settings and Malls 
One of the most dramatic recent mass shootings occurred at a retail center and 
involved the killing of twenty-three and wounding of over twenty-four people at a 
Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, on August 6, 2019.428 This shooting was not the 
                                                          
 
426 See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 36 (the Borderline Bar & Grill Shooting in Thousand Oaks, California 
on November 7, 2018, committed by a marine veteran with a semi-automatic pistol before committing 
suicide); Hunt, supra note 17 (the mass shooting at the Ned Peppers Bar in Dayton, Ohio, where the 
gunman used an AR-15 style firearm to kill ten and wound twenty-seven others); Goldman, supra note 
62 (the killing of forty-nine victims at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida). 
427 Moreover, the recognition of a duty for owners or operators to provide minimum levels of screening 
for weapons to protect customers resulting in liability for owners and insurers in the event of injury of 
patrons that could reasonably have been prevented would support adoption of aggressive, or more 
aggressive screening procedures designed to deny admission to potential perpetrators of violent acts 
threatening third persons. See Michael Steinlage, Liability for Mass Shootings: Are We at a Turning Point, 
ABA (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/publications/ 
the_brief/2019-20/winter/liability-mass-shootings-are-we-a-turning-point/. This comprehensive review 
of litigation arising from episodes of mass violence occurring at private enterprises provides an excellent 
insight into the reasoning of appellate courts addressing arguments relating to duty of owners or operators 
to protect against such episodes. The author argues that traditional hesitance to impose duty on enterprises 
to protect against violence that would injure third persons is changing: “As mass shooting incidents 
become more frequent and widely reported, the perception of whether such events are foreseeable has 
begun to shift.” Id. 
428 Manny Fernandez & Sarah Mervosh, Soccer Coach in El Paso Shooting Dies 9 Months Later, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/us/el-paso-shooting-guillermo-memo-
garcia.html. The Times reported on the deceased, 36-year-old Guerillo Garcia: 
Mr. Garcia used his size and his instincts to shield his wife and son, according 
to an account published in The Houston Chronicle. With his back to the 
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first mass shooting having occurred at a mall, an earlier shooting having taken place 
in Clackamas, Oregon, 2012.429 
One of the most difficult problems to address with respect to mass shootings 
involves those that occur in shopping malls.430 In many situations, the difficulty 
posed lies in the fact that these locations are generally open and available for the 
perpetrator interested in engaging in an act of mass violence. Because these locations 
are readily accessible, the prospective perpetrator who has formulated a plan for a 
mass shooting is unlikely to be physically restrained from the venue in which the 
shooting will occur. Even if a treating mental health professional is advised of the 
mentally disturbed patient’s intent to commit a violent act generally—unless a 
specific target, whether individual or location, is also disclosed—the mental health 
professional can only make a general warning as to the patient’s intended act of 
violence. 
However, a warning based upon a patient’s disclosure and the treating 
professional’s evaluation that the patient has the means to commit the threatened act 
of violence could be valuable in terms of emergency hospitalization to avoid further 
action by the patient. Emergency hospitalization offers the opportunity to obtain 
evaluation and treatment, with the potential for neutralizing the patient’s ability to 
move forward in implementing the intended act of violence. In this way, credible 
threats made by patients suggesting likely actualization of hostility or desire to 
engage in public behavior resulting in momentary fame might be successfully 
frustrated by a timely threat related to law enforcement authorities by the reporting 
professional. 
Nevertheless, without disclosure of a threat targeting individuals randomly 
present at a particular venue, such as a shopping mall, those individuals will almost 
always be beyond protection prior to commission of the terroristic act. Generally, 
                                                          
 
gunman, he absorbed many of the bullets. The gunman, who is white, later 
confessed and told the police that he had targeted Mexicans, the authorities 
said. A four-page manifesto attributed to the perpetrator said the attack was 
being carried out in “response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.” He now 
faces federal hate-crime charges. 
Id. 
429 Shoichet & Martinez, supra note 53. 
430 See, e.g., 8-Year-Old Boy Killed, Girl and 2 Adults Injured in Shooting At Alabama Mall, CBS NEWS 
(July 4, 2020, 8:03 A.M.), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alabama-mall-shooting-royta-giles-killed-
riverchase-galleria/. 
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those venues will remain unprotected from acts of mass violence by a perpetrator 
selecting the venue for their action without notice. 
C. Specific Motivation Unique to the Individual Shooter 
Unlike those scenarios that offer the most typically fertile potential for 
identifying probable patient violence, situations in which the patient’s motivation is 
related to undisclosed personal hostility based upon perceived injustice or motivation 
are likely less promising. The former may be attributed to personal attacks, such as 
bullying among younger people431 or adults who have suffered from long-term 
feelings of inadequacy symptomatic of emotional distress or personality disorders 
that may be manifested in desire for revenge or some show of aggression designed 
to respond to those who have belittled, severely criticized, or bullied them.432 In these 
                                                          
 
431 Julia Lurie, Bullying Victims Are Twice as Likely to Bring a Weapon to School, MOTHER JONES (May 5, 
2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/bullying-victims-carry-weapons-guns/. The story 
notes: 
A new study based on a survey of more than 15,000 American high school 
students found that victims of bullying are nearly twice as likely to carry guns 
and other weapons at school. An estimated 200,000 victims of bullying bring 
weapons to school over the course of a month, according to the authors’ 
analysis of data from the Centers for Disease Control’s 2011 Youth Risk 
Surveillance System Survey. That’s a substantial portion of the estimated 
750,000 high school students who bring weapons to school every month. 
Id. 
432 See id. (“For years, anti-bullying groups have drawn a connection between bullying and school 
shootings. . . . However, focusing too much on bullying as a cause of school shootings may distract from 
other important factors, such as mental health and access to weapons.”); see also Jeff Zisner, Bullying in 
School Is a Leading Cause of Active Shooters & School Violence, AEGIS SECURITY & INVESTIGATIONS 
(Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.aegis.com/bullying-in-school-is-a-leading-cause-of-active-shooters-school-
violence/. AEGIS is a private firm providing clients with protective services including active shooter 
training, https://www.aegis.com/survive-active-shooter-training/ (last visited June 6, 2021). The 
contractor advises in explaining its services the relationship between victims of school bullying and later 
violence: 
Furthermore, bullying has been linked to active shooter thoughts and actions. 
Columbine, the most notorious school shooting in modern history that 
prompted extreme responses in schools to take preventative action, has often 
had bullying cited for the shooters’ motives. Most recently, Freeman High 
School in Spokane, WA suffered an active shooter incident where the 
perpetrator openly admitted to the police that his lesson was to “teach them a 
lesson” (e.g. teachers and students there) about bullying, demonstrating this 
very real link. 
Zisner, supra. The author’s reference to the Spokane school shooting involved a fifteen-year-old boy who 
took a gun from his father’s safe and shot four students, killing one, who stated in an affidavit “Instead 
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instances, the therapist may well be aware of the cause of anxiety for the patient but 
lack actual knowledge of how the patient’s propensity for violence might be 
manifested. This is not uncommon, as even law enforcement agencies may be caught 
off-guard by innovations in the infliction of mass violence, perhaps as is evident by 
the failure of security experts to either anticipate or protect against the use of 
commercial airliners in the commission of suicide attacks such as the assault on the 
World Trade Center in 2001.433 
Two episodes of mass shooting illustrate the problem posed by unanticipated, 
or apparently unanticipated, acts of planned violence against unidentified victims. 
First, in July 2016, a lone gunman ambushed law enforcement officers who were 
providing protection during an otherwise non-violent Black Lives Matter protest in 
downtown Dallas, Texas. The gunman killed five officers and wounded seven 
others.434 The shooter, an honorably discharged Army reservist who had been 
deployed in Afghanistan and had no prior criminal record, was reportedly disturbed 
by the killing of Black men by white police officers.435 Second, the mass shooting at 
the Las Vegas open-air concert in October 2017 resulted in the deadliest episode of 
mass violence by a single individual, eclipsing the Orlando nightclub massacre436 
                                                          
 
he’d come to the school to teach everyone a lesson about what happens when you bully others.” Id. See 
Sonya Hamasaki & Nicole Chavez, Suspect in Spokane’s School Shooting Wanted To “Teach Everyone 
a Lesson,” CNN (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/us/washington-spokane-school-
shooting/index.html. 
433 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 7 (2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.pdf (“On 9/11, the 
defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Existing 
protocols on 9/11 were unsuited in every respect for an attack in which hijacked planes were used as 
weapons.”). 
434 Jason Whitely, In Year Since Dallas Police Ambush, What Happened to Movement for Black Lives?, 
USA TODAY (July 7, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/07/dallas-police 
-ambush-anniversary/458218001/. 
435 William Arkin, Tracy Connor & Jim Miklaszewski, Dallas Shooter Micah Johnson Was Army Veteran 
and ‘Loner,’ NBC (July 9, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-
shooter-micah-xavier-johnson-was-rmy-veteran-n606101. The shooter reportedly had a cache of weapons 
and bombing making components in his home and had worked as an “aide for mentally challenged 
children and adults” following his military discharge. Id. 
436 Zambelich & Hurt, supra note 45. 
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and Charles Whitman’s University of Texas Tower shooting rampage437 in terms of 
the number of fatalities and victims randomly wounded. 
The problem posed by the dual concerns—the correct evaluation of the risk 
posed by a mentally imbalanced patient and the need for identification of a 
prospective victim of patient violence—make the imposition of a duty to warn or 
protect potential victims difficult to justify in light of traditional principles of tort 
law in many, perhaps most, cases of patient violence. This is likely particularly true 
when the patient’s hostility is prompted by conceptions or idealized sources of 
oppression bearing on the patient, rather than other individuals. 
Further, those acts of violence that are readily characterized as the product of 
political, religious, or social terrorism may be least likely to be disclosed in the 
context of mental health therapy. This seems likely because the individual’s belief 
system would not appear to be consistent with the need for therapy, although 
individuals may be forced into the evaluation as a result of indications of 
dangerousness. In this respect, the subject may develop extreme political or religious 
views in the progression toward a disordered mental state, which emanates from 
paranoia and ultimately renders the shooter psychotic. 
The suggestion that perpetrators are motivated by mental illness and psychosis 
is probably flawed. Those who argue that acts of mass violence are most likely 
caused by mental illness may reach that conclusion because they do not share the 
belief systems—whether political or religious, for instance—of those who commit 
the acts. The danger in this approach, evidenced by President Trump in his 
explanations that mental illness, not the availability of firearms, is the cause of mass 
                                                          
 
437 On August 1, 1966, Americans were exposed to the reality of televised mass violence as Charles 
Whitman opened fire on random victims from his position atop the twenty-eight story “Tower,” the 
administration building and library at the University of Texas in Austin. See GARY LAVERGNE, A SNIPER 
IN THE TOWER (1997). After earlier killing his mother and wife by stabbing them to death, Whitman 
entered the University’s Tower and took the elevator to the observation deck at the top of the building, 
securing the position to embark on a shooting spree in which he killed sixteen people and wounded thirty-
one over ninety-six minutes. Philip Jankowski, 50 Years Ago, the Unthinkable Became Thinkable, WASH. 
TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/24/50-years-ago-the-
unthinkable -became-thinkable/ (reporting that Neal Spelce, Austin broadcaster, covered the story from 
just outside the sniper’s range). To access the live report, see Fox 7 Austin, KTBC News UT Tower 
Shooting Special Report|Austin, TX 1966, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=bBtrFS-C1ug, to access the live report. For contemporaneous video of the incident, see Whitney Milam, 
Sniper 66—the Charles Whitman Murders Part 1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=MKtP57U0nnM. The video includes actual footage of the incident, interviews and commentary, 
and reconstructions relating to Whitman’s life before the shooting. See id. 
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shootings,438 is that it simplifies causation and seemingly shifts resolution of the 
cause from uncontrolled access to weaponry to treatment for mental disorders. In 
fact, those responsible for mass violence may not suffer from any disorder, but 
instead, are committed to an ideology inconsistent with the norms of thinking in the 
United States. 
Significant episodes of mass shootings may be traced to ideological conflict 
based on ethnic, political, or religious intolerance. For instance, the San Bernardino, 
California, shooting in 2015, in which a heavily-armed couple attacked the social 
services facility and its employees where the husband had worked for a number of 
years as an environmental inspector,439 appeared to law enforcement to have been 
the product of an internet inspired terroristic motivation for the Pakistani couple.440 
Similar to other terrorists, the couple who terrorized San Bernardino did not provide 
any information foreshadowing their intended violence and, in fact, apparently acted 
on short notice.441 Of course, other perpetrators have provided precisely this kind of 
information, foreshadowing their intended acts of violence, often through internet 
conversations or postings. For example, the El Paso Walmart shooter posted a 
manifesto against Mexican-Americans and Latino immigrants on the internet 
                                                          
 
438 See Rogers, supra note 9. 
439 Adam Nagourney, Ian Lovett & Richard Pérez Peña, San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14; Two 
Suspects Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-
shooting.html. 
440 Adam Goldman, Mark Berman & Missy Ryan, San Bernardino Shooter’s Former Neighbor Who 
Bought Rifles Is Cooperating With Authorities, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/12/09/san-bernardino-attackers-talked-about-jihad-and-
martyrdom-in-2013/. The Post reported that former FBI Director James Comey, testifying before the 
United States Senate, told Senators that the couple had been radicalized long before the assault, relating: 
The husband-and-wife duo “were radicalized for quite a long time before their 
attack,” Comey reiterated during an appearance on Capitol Hill in front of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. This follows earlier statements by investigators 
that the couple had been adherents of a radical strain of Islam long before the 
massacre. 
“And online . . . as early as the end of 2013, they were talking to each other 
about jihad and martyrdom before they became engaged and then married and 
lived together in the United States,” Comey said during his testimony. 
Id. 
441 Nagourney et al., supra note 439 (“On Wednesday morning [Farook] attended a holiday party for the 
department at the Inland Regional Center, a sprawling facility that provides services for thousands of 
people with disabilities. He left ‘angry’ after a dispute of some sort, the chief said, and returned with 
Ms. Malik around 11 a.m.—heavily armed.”). 
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explaining the mass shooting he subsequently committed;442 while shooters in the 
New Zealand443 and San Diego444 episodes posted anti-Islamic statements on the 
internet; shooters in Charleston445 and Lafayette, Louisiana,446 posted internet 
statements attacking African-Americans; and the perpetrator of the Tree of Life 
shooting in Pittsburgh posted an anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi rant.447 
To the extent that potential perpetrators of acts of mass violence provide 
information in forums accessible to law enforcement and intelligence officials or the 
public generally, it is possible that those acts will be frustrated or prevented448 in 
                                                          
 
442 Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 15; see also Kevin Rouse, ‘Shut the Site Down,’ Says the Creator of 
8chan, a Megaphone for Gunmen, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/ 
technology/8chan-shooting-manifesto.html. The Times article reports on “8chan,” which it described as 
an “online message board as a free speech utopia.” Id. “But now, 8chan is known as something else: a 
megaphone for mass shooters, and a recruiting platform for violent white nationalists.” Id. The Times 
reporter also relates “8chan” to the El Paso shooting: 
Moments before the El Paso shooting on Saturday, a four-page message whose 
author identified himself as the gunman appeared on 8chan. The person who 
posted the message encouraged his “brothers” on the site to spread the contents 
far and wide. In recent months, 8chan has become a go-to resource for violent 
extremists. At least three mass shootings this year—including the mosque 
killings in Christchurch, New Zealand, and the synagogue shooting in Poway, 
Calif.—have been announced in advance on the site, often accompanied by 
racist writings that seem engineered to go viral on the internet. 
Id. 
443 Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, supra note 396. 
444 Power & Choy, supra note 398. 
445 Ford & Chandler, supra note 43. 
446 See sources cited supra note 41. 
447 Robertson et al., supra note 14. 
448 For example, security officers at the Corpus Christi (Texas) Naval Air Station shot and killed a Syrian-
born individual believed to have subscribed to a jihadist ideology as he attempted to enter the base on 
May 21, 2020, preventing what officials believed to be a terrorist attack on the facility. See Statement 
from Acting Secretary Wolf on Corpus Christi Shooting, US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
(May 22, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/05/22/statement-acting-secretary-wolf-corpus-christi-
shooting; see also Dakin Andone, Barbara Starr, Hollie & Josh Campbell, Texas Naval Base Shooter 
Believed To Have Expressed Support for Terrorist Groups Online, CNN (May 22, 2020), https://www.cnn 
.com/2020/05/21/us/naval-air-station-corpus-christi-lockdown/index.html. Previously, on December 6, 
2019, a member of the Royal Saudi Air Force in training at the Pensacola Naval Air Station, killed three 
and injured eight others, in what the FBI characterized as a terrorist attack. The shooter was identified as 
an Islamic jihadist based on evidence that after visiting the 9/11 memorial in New York on September 11, 
2019, he had posted a message on social media exactly one year later saying “the countdown has started.” 
See Shooting At Naval Air Station Pensacola Called ‘Act of Terrorism’: Deceased Assailant’s Locked 
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some instances. But, the fact that the investigation after the violent act may turn up 
evidence of motivation for the mass assault does not provide law enforcement with 
information in all cases sufficient to prevent the episode. In this sense, law 
enforcement is no more able to predict and prevent mass shootings than mental health 
professionals since it is the disclosure of an intended act directed against a disclosed 
individual or another ascertainable target that is necessary for intervention to prevent 
the violence. However, in the case of Coast Guard officer Christopher Hasson, 
federal officials acted prior to the commission of any act of violence based upon 
concern for his intent and his possession of unlawful weapons.449 His potential 
victims were described by federal prosecutors as “journalists, Democratic 
politicians, professors, Supreme Court justices and those he described as ‘leftists in 
general,’”450 Hasson’s case reflected such significant concern that the usual reticence 
to act against motivation arguably protected under the First Amendment was 
overruled by the potential severity of the threat he posed.451 
                                                          
 
Phones a Hurdle for Investigators, FBI (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/naval-air-
station-pensacola-shooting-called-act-of-terrorism-011320. 
449 Dave Phillips, Christopher Hanson, Coast Guard Officer, Plotted Attacks at his Desk, Filings Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/coast-guard-christopher-hasson-
terrorist-attack.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article (“In court filings, prosecutors 
said he was also a ‘domestic terrorist’ and self-described white nationalist who studied the methods of the 
Unabomber, the Virginia Tech gunman and other extremist killers; stockpiled guns and drugs; drew up a 
target list of prominent cable news journalists and Democratic politicians to be killed; and wrote, 
prosecutors said, of wanting ‘to murder innocent civilians on a scale rarely seen in this country. . . .’ 
Prosecutors say that for at least two years, Lieutenant Hasson visited white supremacist and neo-Nazi 
websites, and studied the 1,500-page manifesto written by Anders Behring Breivik, a far-right Norwegian 
extremist who killed 77 people in 2011. They said that he also took the synthetic opioid Tramadol while 
at work and that he had obtained the drug illegally.”). Much of the material relied upon by prosecutors 
was recovered from Hanson’s computer. Id. 
450 Michael Levenson, Former Coast Guard Officer Accused of Plotting Terrorism Is Sentenced to 13 
Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/christopher-hasson-coast-
guard-terrorism.html. 
451 Id. Federal prosecutors explained: 
Federal prosecutors had asked that Mr. Hasson be sentenced to 25 years 
in prison. In a court filing, they said that Mr. Hasson was inspired by racist 
murderers, stockpiled assault weapons, studied violence and intended to “exact 
retribution on minorities and those he considered traitors.” 
Prosecutors said that Mr. Hasson had identified as a white nationalist 
for more than 30 years and had, in writing, advocated “focused violence” in 
order to establish a white homeland. 
“Christopher Hasson intended to inflict violence on the basis of his 
racist and hateful beliefs,” Robert K. Hur, the United States attorney in 
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With respect to the varieties of ideological motivation causing terroristic acts 
of mass violence, it is possible to categorize these, as one scholar, Dr. Haroro Ingram, 
has. He described the problem of tracing potential violence in three different 
contexts, based on the findings of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism issued 
in 2018:452 
● First, terroristic violence committed by a variety of right-wing and racially-
motivated extremists remains the most common form of ideologically-
motivated violence in the United States. 
● Second, the threat posed by homegrown jihadists, especially those inspired 
by Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, persists as a major domestic security 
concern. 
● Third, the diversity of ideological-motivations driving violent extremist 
activism in the United States represents a significant challenge in itself. 
Indeed, this diversity may be even greater given the motivations of some 
lone shooters. Moreover, this diversity contributes to a volatility within the 
security environment as threats posed by certain groups and actors (e.g. 
extreme right) may contribute to the mobilization of other groups and actors 
(e.g. the extreme left) in a “counter-movement” dynamic.453 
                                                          
 
Maryland, said in a statement Friday. “As long as violent extremists take steps 
to harm innocent people, we will continue to use all of the tools we have to 
prevent and deter them.” 
Id. 
452 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is created by the National Counterterrorism Center and 
published by the White House. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/ 
NSCT.pdf. The National Counterterrorism Center was initially created by President George W. Bush in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center to provide a focal point for 
collection and assessment of information relating to terrorist activity, operating within the Office of 
National Intelligence. History, OFF. DIRECTOR NAT’L INTELLIGENCE: NAT’L COUNTERRORISM CTR., 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-who-we-are/history (last visited June 6, 2021). 
453 See HARORO J. INGRAM, TERRORISM PREVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A POLICY FRAMEWORK 
FOR FILLING THE CVE VOID (2018), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Terrorism% 
20Prevention%20Policy%20Paper.pdf. Dr. Ingram is a researcher with Coral Bell School, Australian 
National University (Canberra), focusing on the use of propaganda by the Islamic State and the Afghan 
Taliban. He served as a research associate with the George Washington University Program on Extremism 
when he published this analysis. Haroro J. Ingram, AUSTRALIAN NAT’L U., http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/ 
experts-publications/experts/haroro-j-ingram (last visited June 6, 2021). 
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His analysis leads him to conclude: “Consequently, there is no typical demographic 
profile of an American violent extremist.”454 
Diversity of terrorists explains much of the problem faced by law enforcement 
and intelligence officers in attempting to anticipate and prevent mass violence. 
Moreover, even if information concerning the intent of terrorists—doctrinal posts or 
rants, included—preventive action only results in frustration of the intended violence 
if the information provides insight into the timing, venue, and nature of the intended 
act. Without foreknowledge of planned violence, the sheer numbers of individuals 
engaging in the dialogue of hate cannot possibly afford counter-terrorism officials a 
reasonable basis for action. In some cases, a violent act may be frustrated, but 
consistent with the common law tradition of responding to criminal acts with 
prosecution and punishment—other than when evidence is sufficient to warrant 
prosecution for conspiracy to commit an act of mass violence455—the available data 
will likely provide only information concerning an episode after it happens, and the 
suspect or suspects have been identified.456 
In addition, Dr. Ingram’s first trend of terrorism, including domestic terrorism 
emanating principally from the far right, identifies a dangerous source of potential 
violence not necessarily ideological in nature, at least in the context of traditional 
political or religious ideologies reflected in acts of mass violence. The diversity 
                                                          
 
454 Id. 
455 Prevention of terrorist acts having their roots in international plots or acts planned by foreign nationals 
does implicate use of prosecution resources to frustrate acts of mass violence. For a thorough analysis of 
counterterrorism and criminal prosecution, see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory 
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007). Investigation 
and prosecution of domestic terrorism or terroristic acts intended by citizens or others lawfully in the 
United States are subject to Constitutional protections, such as the First Amendment. Id. 
456 See, e.g., Barrett et al., supra note 47. The Washington Post article, examining the repercussions from 
the terroristic attack in New York City, referenced the investigation of the Pulse nightclub shooter in 
Orlando noting: 
The FBI has, in the past, scrutinized people who have gone on to commit 
attacks. Perhaps most notably, agents investigated Omar Mateen, who shot and 
killed 49 people last year in an Islamic State-inspired attack in an Orlando 
nightclub, for 10 months in 2013, even putting him under surveillance and 
recording his calls before ultimately closing the case. 
Id. For information on the Pulse nightclub shooting see supra notes 45, 62, 422–25 and accompanying 
text. 
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among domestic terrorists may be even greater, and monitoring those individuals and 
groups may be limited by constitutional safeguards. 
Certainly, there is a significant history of domestic terroristic episodes, 
including the most deadly act—the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, the “worst act of homegrown 
terrorism in the nation’s history.”457 If the Oklahoma City bombing was understood 
as an act of opposition to the United States government, a less readily explained 
source of potential terrorist activity not organized or necessarily politically directed 
has been identified on the internet associated with the “dark web”458 and sites such 
as “4chan.”459 The site, among others, is heavily used by right-wing extremists, 
reflecting an increase in racist attacks over a number of years. Investigative journalist 
Janet Reitman, a contributing editor for Rolling Stone and the New York Times, 
observed: 
Between 2012 and 2016, according to a report by George Washington 
University’s Program on Extremism, there was a 600 percent increase in followers 
of American white-nationalist movements on Twitter alone; white-nationalist 
groups now outperform ISIS in nearly every social metric. Analysts who study 
extremism note that both the far right and groups like ISIS use similar tactics, 
producing high-quality videos and employing memes and jokes to make their 
message more appealing. “The overall goal is to destabilize people so you can 
then fill them with your own views,” says Keegan Hankes, a senior research 
analyst with the Southern Poverty Law Center. “If you make racism or anti-
Semitism funny, you can subvert the cultural taboo. Make people laugh at the 
                                                          
 
457 Oklahoma City Bombing, supra note 64. 
458 See, e.g., Dan Rafter, What Is the Dark Web?, NORTONLIFELOCK, https://us.norton.com/ 
internetsecurity-emerging-threats-what-is-the-deep-dark-web-30sectech.html (last visited June 8, 2021): 
The dark web gets plenty of headlines. That’s because this part of the web is 
made up of hidden sites that you can’t find through a conventional search 
engine. Dark web sites use encryption software to provide anonymity for their 
users and to hide their locations. It’s why the dark web is home to so much 
illegal activity. If you tap into the dark web, you’ll find everything from illegal 
drug and gun sales to pornography and online gambling. 
459 Andrew Thompson, The Measure of Hate on 4Chan, ROLLING STONE (May 10, 2018, 5:13 P.M.), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-measure-of-hate-on-4chan-627922/ (“It’s 
difficult to find a single location—physical or otherwise—so inclusive to the disparate factions of the far-
right as 4chan. Its ‘politically incorrect’ message board—/pol/—has served as a general assembly for all 
manners of right-wing contrarianism—and extremism—a political forum with a bone-deep elusiveness.”). 
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Holocaust—you’ve opened a space in which history and fact become worthless, 
period.”460 
Another bizarre but potentially dangerous presence on the Internet also 
illustrates the problems involved in anticipating acts of mass violence. This involves 
the use of dark web sites to post false claims of violence or impending violence and 
identifying groups with contrary political perspectives in order to confuse 
authorities. For example, individuals identifying with the “boogaloo boys,” an ultra-
right-wing group described as “libertarians,” shot two federal courthouse security 
officers employed to protect the federal courthouse in Oakland, California, on 
May 29, 2020, killing one.461 The shooter was an Air Force sergeant who served as 
the head of the Phoenix Ravens, a unit tasked with defending military installations 
from terrorist assaults. He killed a deputy sheriff who was trying to effect his 
arrest.462 An apparent motive for the assault was to falsely claim that responsibility 
for the shooting belonged to “antifa.”463 “For days, conservative news broadcasters 
pinned the blame on ‘antifa,’ the loosely affiliated group of anti-fascist anarchists 
known to attack property and far-right demonstrators at protests.”464 
                                                          
 
460 See Janet Reitman, All-American Nazis: How a Senseless Double Murder in Florida Exposed the Rise 
of an Organized Fascist Youth Movement in the United States, ROLLING STONE (May 2, 2018, 8:00 A.M.), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/all-american-nazis-628023/. 
461 Dale Beran, The Boogaloo Tipping Point, What Happens When a Meme Becomes a Terrorist 
Movement?, ATLANTIC (July 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/ 
american-boogaloo-meme-or-terrorist-movement/613843/ (“According to prosecutors, [Steven] Carrillo 
and an accomplice, 30-year-old Robert A. Justus Jr., were part of the ‘boogaloo’ movement, a patchwork 
of right-leaning anti-government libertarians, Second Amendment advocates, and gun enthusiasts all 
preparing for another American civil war.”). Beran is also the author of IT CAME FROM SOMETHING 
AWFUL: HOW A TOXIC TROLL ARMY ACCIDENTALLY MEMED DONALD TRUMP INTO OFFICE (2019). 
462 Beran, supra note 461. 
463 Id. The Antifa movement is composed of leftists and anti-racists who have been blamed for violence 
by President Trump. “They believe that law enforcement is complicit in white supremacy, and that 
democracy is in danger.” Antifa Explained, WEEK (June 14, 2020), https://theweek.com/articles/919492/ 
antifa-explained. Antifa operates in opposition to right wing groups such as the Boogaloo Boys and 
claimed involvement in opposing white supremacists in the “Unite the White” rally conducted in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017. Id. The article concludes with this reference to a recent action 
by individuals self-identifying with the Boogaloo Boys: “Last week, three ex-military men who police say 
self-identify as Boogaloo Bois were arrested on the way to a Las Vegas Black Lives Matter protest with 
full gas cans and Molotov cocktails in their car.” Id. 
464 Beran, supra note 461. 
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The use of websites for propaganda or publication of political manifestos 
appears to be fully protected by the First Amendment unless the publishers are 
“inciting acts of violence.”465 The ability to use websites for the dissemination of 
extremist dogma and claims of violence committed or planned by political opponents 
or declaring responsibility for acts of violence almost certainly complicates the 
investigation and monitoring of extremist political views by law enforcement when 
those views include references to violence. Even more attenuated would be the 
likelihood that mental health professionals would have access to threats committed 
by individuals during the course of treatment or evaluation warranting action for the 
protection of third persons, regardless of the ideological perspective of a patient. 
Yet another potential source of mass violence not affiliated with any ideological 
group using internet postings to disseminate radical views, whether reflecting ultra-
right-wing or ultra-left-wing political philosophy, has been identified as originating 
with single men expressing common feelings of rejection by women and extreme 
anti-feminist views. An investigation into mass shootings published in the May/June 
2019 issue of Mother Jones466 offers a stark insight into the motivation of some male 
mass shooters not grounded in political ideology. The author of the article, Mark 
Follman, summarized his findings: 
Nailing down the motive behind a mass shooting is often difficult. Most 
shooters tend to be driven by a poisonous blend of entrenched grievances, personal 
setbacks, depression, rage, suicidal urges, and in some cases, serious behavioral 
disorders or mental illness. Rarely can their actions be explained definitively by a 
single factor. However, Mother Jones’ in-depth database of mass shootings 
reveals a stark pattern of misogyny and domestic violence among many attackers. 
This factor is already relatively well known in cases where men gun down intimate 
partners, children, and other family members in their own or other people’s 
homes. 
                                                          
 
465 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.”). 
466 Mark Follman, Armed and Misogynist: How Toxic Masculinity Fuels Mass Shootings, MOTHER JONES: 
CRIME & JUSTICE (May/June 2019) https://www.motherjones.com/crime-0justice/2019/06/domestic-
violence-misogyny-incels-mass-shootings/ (“In at least 22 public mass shootings, the perpetrators had a 
history of domestic violence, targeted women, or had stalked and harassed women.”). 
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There is also a strong overlap between toxic masculinity and public mass 
shootings, according to our latest investigation.467 
The research found that in a significant number of mass shooting incidents, including 
those involving the Pulse nightclub in Orlando and the Sutherland Springs Baptist 
Church in Texas, the perpetrators had a history of prior violence against women. In 
twenty-two of the episodes occurring since 2011, domestic violence was believed to 
have been a possible contributing factor in the mass shooting and in at least two 
episodes: “The shooters bore the hallmarks of so-called ‘incels’—a subculture of 
virulent misogynists who self-identify as ‘involuntarily celibate’ and voice their rage 
and revenge fantasies against women online.”468 
Regardless of the specific motivation of the perpetrator—whether the shooter 
identified as an “incel,” for instance—there is evidence that significant numbers of 
victims of mass acts of violence are women. A study conducted by a gun-control 
advocacy group, Everytown for Gun Safety,469 concluded that “[i]n more than half 
of all mass shootings in the United States from 2009 to 2017, an intimate partner or 
family member of the perpetrator was among the victims.”470 
This conclusion suggests that, with respect to a significant number of incidents, 
there would be an increased likelihood that a factor of anger or hate arising from 
interpersonal or family relationships would afford a greater likelihood that the 
perpetrator’s anxiety expressed in threatened violence could serve to provide a basis 
                                                          
 
467 Id. 
468 Id. Similarly, Dale Beran expressed concern in a C-SPAN presentation that the anguish of males 
identifying with the “involuntarily celebrate” perspective could reflect thinking underlying fantasies of 
mass violence that would, for some of those involved, result in the commission of such acts. Those 
individuals, he observed, commonly spend inordinate amounts of time on the internet, often lived with 
their parents, watched Japanese anime—animated pornography, and often expressed fascination for acts 
of mass violence, opining that these individuals were prepped to commit violence culminating in suicide 
while filming the experience. It Came From Something Awful, C-SPAN (July 30, 2019), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?463096-1/it-awful. 
469 Everytown for Gun Safety is a gun control lobbying group founded by mayors Michael Bloomberg of 
New York City and Thomas Menino of Boston in April 2006. They co-authored an op-ed piece, Some 
Gun Rules We Can All Agree On, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2008, 12:01 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB121478283640414407. 
470 Julie Bosman, Kate Taylor & Tim Arango, A Common Trait Among Mass Killers: Hatred Toward 
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/us/mass-shootings-
misogyny-dayton.html. 
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for warning or other protective action.471 However, the likelihood that a 
professional’s determination that warning or other action is appropriate—following 
the Tarasoff principle applicable based upon statutory or judicial recognition of a 
duty for the mental health professional to warn—will depend upon whether the threat 
has been disclosed by a potentially violent patient during therapy. Nonetheless, the 
mental health professional might also rest a decision to warn or otherwise act on a 
disclosure made by a prospective victim of fear of violence during their therapy. The 
therapist’s professionally sound decision to take action to initiate involuntary 
commitment proceedings as a response to a threat of violence disclosed by a 
prospective victim would typically be protected from civil liability under statutory 
or judicially recognized immunity.472 
The sources of motivation for mass acts of shooting violence are difficult to 
trace and characterize, particularly when there is no likely connection between the 
shooter’s source of anger and some identifiable circumstance, such as family 
relationships, employment or workplace, schools, or hospitalization. These special 
characteristics may reflect circumstances in which the potential perpetrator discloses 
their specific intent to commit an act of violence. Some of these potential perpetrators 
may disclose violent thinking during the course of mental health treatment, possibly 
giving rise to the duty to warn their potential victims, the duty recognized in Tarasoff 
and post-Tarasoff judicial decisions or legislative enactments. Even when there is 
evidence of potential violence that is not disclosed while the individual is threatening 
violence toward others, the expert assessments of mental health professionals may 
provide understanding for the necessity of intervention to protect third persons from 
injury and assistance in identifying those individuals for whom the intervention is 
appropriate. 
VI. MASS SHOOTINGS AND MENTAL HEALTH: CAUSATION AND 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 
President Trump’s inference that Stephen Paddock, who committed the 
nation’s single worst mass shooting from an upper-story hotel room in the Mandalay 
Bay Hotel in Las Vegas, suffered from a mental illness represents his common 
                                                          
 
471 See supra Section B.1.b. 
472 Action to seek emergency involuntary civil commitment for evaluation and treatment based on the 
threat would typically protect the mental professional from subsequent civil action by the individual 
involuntarily committed by immunity based on an applicable state statute or judicial doctrine. For 
references to immunity for mental health professionals acting to restrain dangerous individuals through 
involuntary hospitalization, see, e.g., supra notes 70, 119, 219, 222–23, 254, 257–58, 266, 298–99 and 
329. 
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response to mass shootings. The mass shooting of so many randomly killed and 
wounded concert-goers, making this the most heinous episode of mass violence 
based on sheer numbers of victims, could seemingly only be the product of a 
malfunctioning brain. But Paddock’s autopsy revealed no organic irregularities, 
unlike the autopsy done on Charles Whitman half a century earlier473 or the scan of 
Herbert Weinstein’s brain, ruled admissible at trial by the New York court on the 
charge of murdering his wife.474 
With respect to the possibility that a mass murderer’s act of violence may be 
attributable to such defects, the medical evidence remains insufficient to draw clear 
conclusions about causation. Actual disclosure of threatened violence is critical to 
the mental health professional’s discharge of a Tarasoff-like duty to warn or 
otherwise protect third persons from injury by their patients. They typically cannot 
prevent dangerous patients from committing mass shootings or other acts of mass 
violence in the absence of the data necessary to draw such predictive conclusions. 
A. Disclosure of a Threat to Commit an Act of Mass Violence 
Even when suspected terrorists, whether international or domestic, have been 
identified by law enforcement prior to their commission of acts of mass violence, the 
information has apparently often not been sufficiently precise in terms of target or 
timing to facilitate prevention in the episodes of mass shooting detailed here. But, 
certainly, other planned acts of mass violence have been frustrated by law 
                                                          
 
473 PRESS CONFERENCE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, MEDICAL ASPECTS, CHARLES J. WHITMAN 
CATASTROPHE (Sept. 8, 1966). 
474 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The New York court held that evidence of apparent brain 
damage suffered by defendant charged with murder of his wife based on a PET scan would be admissible 
at trial: 
Defense counsel intends to call at trial a psychiatrist to testify that at the 
moment Weinstein allegedly killed his wife, he lacked the cognitive ability to 
understand the nature and consequences of his conduct or that his conduct was 
wrong. The psychiatrist is prepared to testify that Weinstein’s cognitive power 
was impaired at that instant, in part, by organic brain damage. 
Id. at 723. For more on admission of PET scans at trial, see Susan Rushing, The Admissibility of Brain 
Scans in Criminal Trials: The Case of Positive Emission Tomography, 50 COURT REV. 62 (2013), https:// 
neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CR50-2Rushing.pdf. The author is a member of the 
University of Pennsylvania faculty and holds both an M.D. (Yale) and J.D. (Stanford). 
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enforcement when discovered through intelligence operations, perhaps most of 
which have never been disclosed to the public.475 
Similarly, even when acts of violence might be anticipated with greater 
certainty, the mental health professional’s duty to warn or protect could be expected 
to prevent a mass shooting or other mass violent act only when the therapist has had 
sufficient experience with the dangerous individual to draw a firm conclusion that 
warning or other protective acts, such as emergency hospitalization, are necessary 
and appropriate. The mischaracterization of motivations of mass shooters as “mental 
illness” is not only simplistic but suggests a deliberate attempt to focus attention on 
factors other than the availability of semi-automatic weapons, principally assault 
rifles, that afford the shooter the tool of choice for random or targeted shootings of 
multiple victims. 
B. Mental Illness v. Access to Firearms: The Politics of Mass 
Shootings 
Public health experts tend to focus on access to weapons as the key factor in 
broader issues of gun violence in the United States; mental health professionals are 
particularly concerned with “scapegoating” the mentally ill as inherently dangerous 
within the population, complicating funding for more treatment.476 From their 
perspective, the emphasis on mental illness rather than control of weapons 
commonly used in the commission of mass shootings is problematic because, while 
there is widespread, but inconsistent, public support for firearms regulation,477 there 
                                                          
 
475 For a history of terrorist attacks known to have been prevented since the attack on the World Trade 
Center in 2001, see List of Unsuccessful Terrorist Plots in the United States Post-9/11, WIKIPEDIA, https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsuccessful_terrorist_plots_in_the_United_States_post-9/11 (last visited 
June 8, 2021). For discussion of the legal ramifications of public policy based on the strategy of preventing 
or intervening to prevent terrorist acts, see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy: Anticipatory 
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (2007) (noting 
problems posed by identification of suspected terrorists not affiliated with “Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations” previously listed by secretary of state). 
476 Jeffrey W. Swanson, E. Elizabeth McGinty, Seena Fazel & Vickie M. Mays, Mental Illness and 
Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research To Policy, 25 ANNALS 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 366 (2015) [hereinafter Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence], https://www.ncbi 
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4211925/pdf/main.pdf. The lead author of this study, Jeffrey W. Swanson, 
Ph.D., is Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science at Duke University School of Medicine. Jeffrey 
Swanson, DUKE PSYCHIATRY & BEHAV. SCI., https://psychiatry.duke.edu/faculty/jeffrey-w-swanson-ma-
phd (last visited June 6, 2021). 
477 Research on public support for gun control demonstrates uneven results with some polls finding 
increasing support, particularly for mandatory background checks for gun buyers, particularly when 
proposed expanded regulation includes restricted access for individuals suffering from mental illness. See, 
e.g., Domenico Montanaro, Americans Largely Support Gun Restrictions To ‘Do Something’ About Gun 
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has been little national action in terms of implementing new regulations. At the same 
time, while mental illness provides the alternative explanation for these acts of mass 
violence, there has not been an increase in funding for mental illness research, 
identification, and treatment that would reflect a national will to address the 
problem.478 
Mental health professionals typically contest the conclusion or suggestion that 
perpetrators of mass shootings act out of mental illness, while public attitudes often 
embrace the notion that acts of mass violence are products of mental illness.479 
                                                          
 
Violence, NPR (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/10/749792493/americans-largely-support-
gun-restrictions-to-do-something-about-gun-violence (“What is clear, from public opinion polling, is that 
Americans believe gun violence is a problem, and they support more restrictions on guns. . . . There is 
public support for universal background checks for gun purchases, extreme risk protection orders (also 
called red flag laws), gun licensing, assault-weapons bans and bans on high-capacity magazines. But many 
of these issues are hotly polarizing. While they mostly enjoy support from Democrats and independents, 
Republicans are not always on board.”). Contra William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, Getting Beyond 
the Myths: What Americans Really Think About Gun Control, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/08/22/what-americans-really-think-about-mass-shootings-
and-gun-legislation/ (“While support for ‘stricter’ gun laws has risen from its low of a decade ago, it 
remains below where it stood in the mid-1990s, the last time the federal government enacted such laws. 
In June of 1995, for example, just 35 percent of Americans were more concerned that the federal 
government would go too far, 10 points below today’s level, while 58 percent were more concerned that 
the government wouldn’t do enough, 8 points above the most recent reading.”). 
478 See, e.g., Position Statement 72: Violence: Community Mental Health Response, MENTAL HEALTH 
AMERICA (Sept. 2018), https://www.mhanational.org/issues/position-statement-72-violence-community-
mental-health-response. This interest group opposing increasing reliance on emergency or involuntary 
hospitalization as a means of preventing violence, noting: 
[M]aking it easier to commit people for involuntary mental health treatment 
will do little or nothing to prevent violent acts. It will only scare people from 
seeking help voluntarily and fail to increase the number who are committed. 
The premise that we can predict or prevent violent acts is unsupported. Even 
in the case of severe mental illnesses, mental health professionals possess no 
special knowledge or ability to predict future dangerous behavior. 
Paradoxically, making it easier to commit people to treatment will not lead to 
more commitments or more people getting care. A chronically underfunded 
mental health system, which experienced $4.6 billion in state budget cuts 
between 2009 and 2014, does not have the capacity to meet those needs. 
Id. 
479 Matthew E. Hirschtritt & Renee Binder, A Reassessment of Blaming Mass Shootings on Mental Illness, 
75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 311, 311 (2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/article-
abstract/2673380. The authors, Professors of Psychiatry at the University of California San Francisco 
Medical School explain in the Abstract: 
Several recent mass shootings in the United States have prompted calls to 
address untreated serious mental illness. This rhetoric—delivered by policy 
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Researchers reviewing the 1990 survey conducted by the National Institute of Mental 
Illness Epidemiological Catchment Area (ECA)480 regarding perceptions of violence 
observed: 
The ECA study thus debunked claims on both extremes of the debate about 
violence and mental illness—from the stigma-busting advocates on the one side 
who insisted that mental illness had no intrinsic significant connection to violence 
at all, and from the fearmongers on the other side who asserted that the mentally 
ill are a dangerous menace and should be locked up; both views were wrong. The 
facts showed that people with serious mental illnesses are, indeed, somewhat more 
likely to commit violent acts than people who are not mentally ill, but the large 
majority are not violent toward others. Moreover, when persons with mental 
illness do behav[e] violently, it is often—although not always—for the same 
reasons that non-mentally ill people engage in violent behavior. In short, violence 
is a complex societal problem that is caused, more often than not, by other things 
besides mental illness.481 
This analysis suggests the political and ideological problems that complicate the 
assessment of the role of mental illness in mass violence. For those who are 
particularly supportive of the right to possess firearms, the concern that mass 
shootings could result in increased regulation of acquisition or ownership of firearms 
is evident, particularly in the increased public response favoring regulation following 
mass shooting events, such as the Sandy Hook school shooting in Newtown, 
                                                          
 
makers, journalists, and the public—focuses the blame for mass shootings on 
individuals with serious mental illness (specifically, schizophrenia and 
psychotic spectrum disorders, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder), 
with less attention paid to other contributory factors, such as access to 
firearms.1 Furthermore, attributing mass shootings to untreated serious mental 
illness stigmatizes an already vulnerable and marginalized population, fails to 
identify individuals at the highest risk for committing violence with firearms, 
and distracts public attention from policy changes that are most likely to reduce 
the risk of gun violence. 
Id. 
480 See, e.g., Karen H. Bourdon, Donald S. Rae, Ben Z. Locke, William E. Narrow & Darrel A. Regier, 
Estimating the Prevalence of Mental Disorders in U.S. Adults from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area 
Survey, 107 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 663, 663 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC1403718/ (“The National Institute of Mental Health Epidemiologic Catchment Area Survey is a 
comprehensive, community-based survey of mental disorders and use of services by adults, ages 18 and 
older.”). 
481 Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence, supra note 476, at 368. 
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Connecticut.482 Opponents of more regulation of firearms have thus far prevailed in 
the legislative arena, however, as Democratic strategists and an editorial writer for 
the Washington Post explained in their 2019 op-ed: 
Like a director yelling “action,” the horrific mass shootings in El Paso and 
Dayton, Ohio, last weekend cued all the same political actors to repeat all the same 
political lines. Conservatives offered their prayers and talked about mental health 
and video games; progressives decried inaction in Washington. Voters could be 
forgiven for assuming they have seen this play before and nothing will ever 
change. But this is wrong. 
America’s relationship with guns is changing, and people, more than ever, 
want someone to “do something.”483 
Despite their reference to polling showing increased support for regulation, the 
authors concede that the major bipartisan effort to require more extensive 
background checks for purchasers of firearms, the Manchin/Toomey bill, was 
defeated by Republicans and red-state Democrats.484 
                                                          
 
482 See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry, Emma E. McGinty, Jon S. Vernick & Daniel W. Webster, After Newtown—
Public Opinion on Gun Policy and Mental Illness, 368 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1077 (2013), https://www 
.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1300512. These researchers conducted two surveys following the 
Sandy Hook mass shooting event focusing on public attitudes toward gun regulation and mental illness. 
They concluded: 
Findings from these surveys indicate high support among Americans—
including gun-owners, in many cases—for a range of policies aimed at 
reducing gun violence. Gun policies with the highest support included those 
related to persons with mental illness. The majority of Americans apparently 
also support increasing government spending on mental health treatment as a 
strategy for reducing gun violence. Given the data on public attitudes about 
persons with mental illness, it is worth thinking carefully about how to 
implement effective gun-violence–prevention measures without exacerbating 
stigma or discouraging people from seeking treatment. 
Id. 
483 Anna Greenberg, David Walker & Alex Nabaum, America Is Turning Against Guns, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/09/how-americans-are-supporting-
gun-control-wake-mass-shootings-like-el-paso/?arc404=true (“Even before the shootings in El Paso and 
Dayton, Gallup recorded the highest level of support for stricter gun laws in 25 years.”). 
484 Aaron Blake, Machin-Toomey Gun Amendment Fails, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2013), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/04/17/manchin-toomey-gun-amendment-fails/. 
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Opponents of more rigorous regulation of firearm access and ownership argue 
that mental illness is the primary factor in addressing mass shootings, opposing more 
firearms regulation, a position endorsed by President Trump.485 It is not, however, a 
position exclusively held by President Trump. In an op-ed published by the L.A. 
Times, authors Grant Duwe and Michael Rocque referred to studies in which a 
significant number of perpetrators of mass shootings were believed to have suffered 
from mental illness. They noted: 
In a story that largely suggested mass murderers are not “insane,” the New 
York Times cited research showing that, in fact, mass murderers are nearly 20 
times more likely to have a “severe” mental illness than the general population. 
According to our research, only one-third of the people who have committed 
mass shootings in the U.S. since 1900 had sought or received mental health care 
prior to their attacks, which suggests that most shooters did not seek or receive 
care they may have needed. 
This treatment gap is underscored by evidence showing that the U.S. has 
higher rates of untreated serious mental illness than most other Western countries. 
Additional research shows that the gap is even larger for males, who have 
committed 99% of the country’s mass public shootings.486 
They sought to rebut the argument that there is no link between mental illness and 
mass shootings: “According to our research, at least 59% of the 185 public mass 
shootings that took place in the United States from 1900 through 2017 were carried 
                                                          
 
485 See supra notes 4, 9, 11, 18 and accompanying text; see also Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun 
Violence, supra note 476, at 367, noting the tendency of public opinion to accept mental illness as a 
primary cause for mass violence: 
The public perception of a strong link between mental illness and violence is 
fueled in part by news coverage of mass shootings and other violent events. 
Two studies have directly linked news media coverage of high-profile acts of 
violence by persons with serious mental illness to negative public attitudes 
toward this group. 
Id. 
486 Grant Duwe & Michael Rocque, Op-Ed: Actually, There Is a Clear Link Between Mass Shootings and 
Mental Illness, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-duwe-rocque-
mass-shootings-mental-illness-20180223-story.html. Grant Duwe is research director for the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections and the author of MASS MURDER IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY (2007). 
Grant Duwe, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY: ISR SCHOLARS, https://www.baylorisr.org/scholars/d/grant-duwe/. 
Michael Rocque is a Professor of Sociology at Bates College. Michael Rocque, BATES: FACULTY 
EXPERTISE, https://www.bates.edu/faculty-expertise/profile/michael-rocque/. 
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out by people who had either been diagnosed with a mental disorder or demonstrated 
signs of serious mental illness prior to the attack.”487 
C. Findings of the National Threat Assessment Center 
The conclusion reached by Duwe and Rocque is consistent with findings of the 
Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center in its published reports on Mass 
Attacks in Public Spaces, surveying attacks occurring in 2017,488 2018,489 and 
2019.490 In its study of twenty-eight mass attacks (twenty-three of which involved 
the use of firearms) occurring from January through December 2017, the Secret 
Service found that the relationship of mental disturbance to violent acts was 
significant: 
MENTAL HEALTH: Nearly two-thirds of the attackers (n = 18, 64%) 
experienced mental health symptoms prior to their attacks. The most common 
symptoms observed were related to psychosis (e.g., paranoia, hallucinations, or 
delusions) and suicidal thoughts. Further, some attackers (n = 7, 25%) had been 
hospitalized for treatment or prescribed psychiatric medications prior to their 
attacks.491 
For calendar year 2018, the threat assessment reported twenty-seven incidents 
concluding: 
Regardless of whether these attacks were acts of workplace violence, 
domestic violence, school-based violence, or inspired by an ideology, similar 
themes were observed in the behaviors and circumstances of the perpetrators, 
including: 
                                                          
 
487 Id. 
488 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: NAT’L THREAT ASSESSMENT CTR., MASS ATTACKS IN PUBLIC 
PLACES—2017 (2018), https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2020-09/USSS_FY2017 
_MAPS.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Threat Assessment]. 
489 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: NAT’L THREAT ASSESSMENT CTR., MASS ATTACKS IN PUBLIC 
PLACES—2018 (2019), https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/USSS_FY2019_MAPS 
.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Threat Assessment] (The Secret Service identified 27 mass attacks occurring during 
2018.). 
490 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: NAT’L THREAT ASSESSMENT CTR., MASS ATTACKS IN PUBLIC 
PLACES—2019 (2020), https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2020-09/MAPS2019.pdf 
[hereinafter 2019 Threat Assessment]. 
491 2017 Threat Assessment, supra note 488. 
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● Most of the attackers utilized firearms, and half departed the site on their 
own or committed suicide. 
● Half were motivated by a grievance related to a domestic situation, 
workplace, or other personal issue. 
● Two-thirds had histories of mental health symptoms, including depressive, 
suicidal, and psychotic symptoms. 
● Nearly all had at least one significant stressor within the last five years, and 
over half had indications of financial instability in that timeframe. 
● Nearly all made threatening or concerning communications and more than 
three-quarters elicited concern from others prior to carrying out their 
attacks. The violence described in this report is not the result of a single 
cause or motive. The findings emphasize, however, that we can identify 
warning signs prior to an act of violence.492 
For 2019, the Secret Service reported on 34 incidents in its most recent Threat 
Assessment: 
The study examines 34 incidents of mass attacks—in which three or more 
people, not including the attacker(s), were harmed—that were carried out by 37 
attackers in public spaces across the United States between January and December 
2019. In total, 108 people were killed and an additional 178 people were injured. 
The findings from this report offer critical information that can aid in preventing 
these types of tragedies, and assist law enforcement, schools, businesses, and 
others in the establishment of appropriate systems to recognize the warning signs 
and intervene appropriately. Key findings from this analysis include: 
● The attacks impacted a variety of locations, including 
businesses/workplaces, schools, houses of worship, military bases, open 
spaces, residential complexes, and a commercial bus service. 
● Most of the attackers used firearms, and many of those firearms were 
possessed illegally at the time of the attack. 
● Many attackers had experienced unemployment, substance use or abuse, 
mental health symptoms, or recent stressful events. 
● Attackers often had a history of prior criminal charges or arrests and 
domestic violence. 
● Most of the attackers had exhibited behavior that elicited concern in family 
members, friends, neighbors, classmates, co-workers, and others, and in 
many cases, those individuals feared for the safety of themselves or others. 
                                                          
 
492 2018 Threat Assessment, supra note 489. 
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These violent attacks impacted a variety of community sectors and were 
perpetrated by individuals from different backgrounds and with varying motives. 
However, similar to previous Secret Service research, common themes were 
observed in the behaviors and situational factors of the perpetrators, including 
access to weapons, criminal history, mental health symptoms, threatening or 
concerning behavior, and stressors in various life domains.493 
In its 2020 report, the National Threat Assessment Center explains that its 
research is designed to address the threat of mass violence by enabling a number of 
actors to recognize potential threats, including mental health professionals and law 
enforcement officers, who play “play a significant role in the multidisciplinary team 
approach that is the foundation of the field of threat assessment.”494 
D. Threat Assessments: Mental “Illness” as a Causation Factor 
While some perpetrators may suffer from recognized mental illnesses, such as 
bipolar I disorder, depression, or schizophrenia, it is difficult to assess whether the 
act of mass violence was actually triggered by illness rather than associated with a 
personality disorder such as paranoia, narcissism,495 and antisocial personality 
disorder, commonly referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy.496 Similarly, the 
substantial presence of mental disorders in American society may serve to question 
whether it is an underlying mental illness or personality disorder that causes an 
individual to commit an act of mass violence or that some individuals suffering from 
mental disturbance may act under the influence of particular stressors. The Secret 
Service survey of acts of mass violence committed in 2017 addressed apparent 
                                                          
 
493 2019 Threat Assessment, supra note 490, at 8–9. The report on 2019 incidents specifically found: 
“Most of the attacks (n = 24, 71%) involved the use of one or more firearms, which included rifles, 
handguns, and a shotgun.” Id. at 9. 
494 Id. at 4. 
495 The report prepared by the Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, reported that 
“Aggressive Narcissism” was a common personality character trait in perpetrators of acts of mass 
violence: “Most of the attackers (n = 23, 82%) exhibited behaviors that were indicative of aggressive 
narcissism, as evidenced by displays of rigidness, hostility, or extreme self-centeredness.” 2017 Threat 
Assessment, supra note 488, at 5. 
496 See, e.g., Marcia Purse, How Sociopaths Are Different from Psychopaths, VERYWELL MIND (June 15, 
2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-sociopath-380184 (“While psychopaths are classified as 
people with little or no conscience, sociopaths do have a limited, albeit weak, ability to feel empathy and 
remorse. Psychopaths can and do follow social conventions when it suits their needs. Sociopaths are more 
likely to fly off the handle and react violently whenever they’re confronted by the consequences of their 
actions.”). 
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evidence of psychological stressors as prevalent in the lives of perpetrators of acts of 
mass violence: 
All of the attackers had at least one significant stressor occur in their lives 
in the five years leading up to the attack. For some, this was in addition to any 
legal consequences they may have been dealing with related to the charges 
described above. These additional stressors most often related to: 
● Family/romantic relationships, such as spousal estrangements, divorces, 
romantic breakups, rejected proposals, physical or emotional abuse, or the 
death of a parent ↔ Personal issues, such as unstable living conditions, 
physical illnesses, or other significant disorders 
● Work or school environments, such as being fired or suspended, filing 
grievances, being bullied at work or at school, feeling disrespected, or being 
the subject of real or perceived gossip 
● Contact with law enforcement that did not result in arrests or charges, such 
as being the subject of domestic disturbance calls or being sought for a crime 
unrelated to their attack. 
Beyond these areas, we found that over half of the attackers (n = 16, 57%) 
experienced stressors related to financial instability in the five-year period prior 
to their attacks. These financial stressors included an inability to maintain 
employment; living in homeless shelters; failed business ventures; and civil court 
filings and proceedings, such as judgments, evictions, tax warrants, and wage 
garnishments. For 10 of the attackers, these stressors occurred within one year of 
the attack.497 
Moreover, the commission of an act of mass violence itself is likely to result in a 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy, rather than mental 
illness, although concurrent diagnoses are likely. However, the public is generally 
responsive to the suggestion that mental illness must be at the heart of what are 
essentially irrational acts of mass violence.498 
The researchers involved in a National Institutes of Health (NIH) study directed 
by Duke Medical School Professor Jeffrey Swanson explained: 
For their part, mental health stakeholders [have] encountered a painful 
dilemma. The goal of keeping guns out of the hands of seriously mentally ill 
                                                          
 
497 2017 Threat Assessment, supra note 488, at 5. 
498 Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence, supra note 476, at 367. The authors of the NIH study 
note: “Negative public attitudes toward persons with serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder are pervasive and persistent in the United States, and the assumption of dangerousness is 
a key element of this negative stereotype.” Id. 
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individuals was emerging as perhaps the only piece of common ground between 
gun rights and gun control proponents; a post-Newtown public opinion poll found 
that a majority of Americans across the political spectrum favored “increasing 
government spending to improve mental health screening and treatment as a 
strategy to prevent gun violence.” But mental health experts and consumer 
advocates strongly rejected what they saw as the scapegoating of people with 
mental illnesses—the vast majority of whom, epidemiologic data shows, will 
never act violently toward others—as if people with mental health disorders were 
somehow responsible for gun violence in general. These stakeholders thus faced 
the difficult prospect of debunking the public perception that “the mentally ill are 
dangerous,” while attempting to leverage that very perception to build support for 
(much-needed) public funding to improve the mental health care system in the 
United States—and to achieve this goal without also spawning crisis-driven laws 
that might overreach in restricting the rights and invading the privacy of people 
with mental illnesses.499 
Another NIH sponsored study offered a similar conclusion in focusing on access to 
weapons as the more appropriate policy concern for prevention of mass shootings, 
rather than resting policy on mental illness as a cause of mass violence: 
It is undeniable that persons who have shown violent tendencies should not 
have access to weapons that could be used to harm themselves or others. However, 
notions that mental illness caused any particular shooting, or that advance 
psychiatric attention might prevent these crimes, are more complicated than they 
often seem.500 
                                                          
 
499 Id. at 366–67. 
500 Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of 
American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 240 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC4318286/pdf/AJPH.2014.302242.pdf. The authors examine changing attitudes toward gun 
control based upon racial attitudes, perhaps oddly, noting that in the 1960s and 70s concern focused in 
public discussion on fear that African Americans would become armed, following Black political leaders: 
Recent history thus suggests that cultural politics underlie anxieties about 
whether guns and mental illness are understood to represent individual or 
communal etiologies. In the 1960s and 1970s, widespread concerns about 
Black social and political violence fomented calls for widespread reforms in 
gun ownership. As this played out, politicians, FBI profilers, and psychiatric 
authors argued for the right to use mental health criteria to limit gun access, 
not just to severely mentally ill persons, but also to “drunkards,” “drug users,” 
and political protesters. Building on these assumptions, the American 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS: TARASOFF AND THE PROBLEM OF 
PREDICTING AND PREVENTING MASS SHOOTINGS 
“I think mental health is the problem here,” Trump said during a news conference 
in Tokyo, saying the shooter in Texas was a “deranged” man who should have 
received treatment. “This isn’t a guns situation.”501 
The unresolved discussion of the link between mental illness and crimes of 
mass violence502 leaves the role of mental health professionals in the prediction and 
prevention of mass shootings and other acts not only unsettled, but overstated. Any 
expectation that expansion of the Tarasoff duty through judicial decisions or 
legislative action will address the problem of mass shootings in public spaces, as 
referenced by the Secret Service in the National Threat Assessment report, will 
almost certainly be frustrating for a number of obvious reasons: 
● First, the most compelling flaw in expecting the mental health system to 
identify those individuals who might be candidates to commit acts of mass violence 
is that there is neither proof nor even consensus that these acts are actually products 
                                                          
 
Psychiatric Association later recommended that “strong controls be placed on 
the availability of all types of firearms to private citizens.” 
Id. at 245. In contrast, current support for gun ownership reflects a different perspective: 
However, in the present day, the actions of lone White male shooters lead to 
calls to expand gun rights, focus on individual brains, or limit gun rights just 
for the severely mentally ill. Indeed it would seem political suicide for a 
legislator or doctor to hint at restricting the gun rights for White Americans, 
private citizens, or men, even though these groups are frequently linked to 
high-profile mass shootings. Meanwhile, members of political groups such as 
the Tea Party who advocate broadening gun rights to guard against government 
tyranny—indeed the same claims made by Black Panther leaders in the 
1960s—take seats in the US Congress rather than being subjected to 
psychiatric surveillance. 
Id. 
501 David Jackson, Trump: ‘Mental Health’ Is the Issue Behind the Texas Shooting, Not Guns, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/06/trump-mental-health-
issue-behind-texas-shooting-not-guns/834879001. 
502 Jessica Duncan, The Facts on Mental Illness and Mass Shootings, FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2019/10/the-facts-on-mental-illness-and-mass-shootings/. Duncan is a science 
writer for FACTCHECK.ORG, and holds a Ph.D in immunology from Yale University. See Our Staff, 
FACTCHECK.ORG, https://www.factcheck.org/our-staff/. 
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of mental illness. While perpetrators may suffer from mental illness, there is no 
evidence to establish that mental illness alone can explain their acts of mass violence. 
● Second, the more likely psychological framework exhibited by perpetrators 
actually demonstrates the existence of serious personality disorders, including 
antisocial personality disorder, reflected in characterizations of the disorder as 
psychopathy or sociopathy.503 
● Third, and perhaps most obvious, is that mental health providers will almost 
always only find it necessary to warn or act to protect potential victims when a patient 
or other person interacts with a mental health professional in a therapeutic 
relationship or under examination for purposes of diagnosis. It is in this kind of 
circumstance in which the potential perpetrator is likely to express a threat to commit 
a particular violent act, identify a target of violence, or at least, disclose tendencies 
to commit an act of violence such as a mass shooting. Many perpetrators of mass 
shootings may well have suffered from mental illnesses and certainly exhibited signs 
of personality disorders. There is little evidence of their contact with mental health 
professionals, however, in situations in which disclosure of threatened violence 
would have been likely, particularly since narcissistic, paranoid, or antisocial 
personality disorders would have probably led to the concealment of specific 
expressions of potential violence that once discovered could have led to confinement 
by involuntary hospitalization for evaluation and treatment. 
● And, finally, there is clearly difficulty imposed by the Tarasoff duty in 
making an assessment of dangerousness warranting warning to third persons or 
acting to prevent injury whether individual targets of the dangerous patient have been 
disclosed or undertaking emergency hospitalization for the patient. Commenting on 
the Sandy Hook shooter,504 who was known to have suffered from Asperger’s 
syndrome,505 Dr. Edward P. Mulvey described the perpetrator as “a withdrawn, 
                                                          
 
503 See notes 33, 501, for references to “psychopathy” and “sociopathy.” 
504 Edward P. Mulvey, Predicting Mass Killings Impossible, CNN (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/12/18/opinion/mulvey-mental-disorder/index.html. Dr. Mulvey is Director of the Law and 
Psychiatry Program at the University of Pittsburgh Medical School. Edward P. Mulvey, PhD, U. PITT., 
http://www.hsalumni.pitt.edu/person/edward-p-mulvey-phd. 
505 Asperger’s syndrome is a developmental disorder included on the autism spectrum typified by 
difficulties in social interaction. In 2013, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 
(DSM-5) folded Asperger’s syndrome under the umbrella of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013). 
The relationship between Asperger’s syndrome and violent behavior is apparently not conclusively 
established. See David S. Im, Template to Perpetuate: An Update on Violence in Autism Spectrum 
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socially awkward young man, reportedly with Asperger’s syndrome, living with his 
mother.”506 Dr. Mulvey then explained: 
We would like to think that if only professionals could identify any shooters 
before they commit any violence, then we could prevent these tragedies. If they 
had been locked up, then they couldn’t have killed anyone. Or if they had been 
forced to take their medicine, then they wouldn’t have gotten to a point of no 
return. If we can find these people, keep guns away from them, restrict their civil 
liberties and monitor them closely enough, then we would have solved the 
problem. 
This approach won’t work. Hindsight is not foresight. The picture is much 
more complex than simply developing “profiles.” Knowing this young man’s 
                                                          
 
Disorder, 24 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 14 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC4710161/pdf/hvp-24-14.pdf. Dr. Im reports: 
For the past two decades, researchers have been using various approaches to 
investigate the relationship, if any, between autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and violence. The need to clarify that relationship was reinforced by the tragic 
mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, 
in December 2012 by an individual diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome. 
Although some case reports have suggested an increased violence risk in 
individuals with ASD compared to the general population, prevalence studies 
have provided no conclusive evidence to support this suggestion. Among 
individuals with ASD, however, generative (e.g., comorbid psychopathology, 
social-cognition deficits, emotion-regulation problems) and associational (e.g., 
younger age, Asperger’s syndrome diagnosis, repetitive behavior) risk factors 
have been identified or proposed for violent behavior. 
While no conclusive evidence indicates that individuals with ASD are more 
violent than those without ASD, specific generative and associational risk 
factors may increase violence risk among individuals with ASD. 
Id. at 14. Dr. Im is Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Michigan Medical 
School. See David S. Im, M.D, MICH. MED.: DEP’T PSYCHIATRY, https://medicine.umich.edu/dept/ 
psychiatry/david-s-im-md. While a direct relationship between Asperger’s syndrome or other autism 
disorders and propensity for violence may never be demonstrated by research, the typical symptom of 
difficulties in social interaction experienced by sufferers might suggest the impact of stressors leading to 
violence noted in the National Threat Assessment Center reports documenting acts of mass violence. See, 
e.g., supra note 488 and accompanying text. Problems associated with the syndrome itself could prove to 
be stressors influencing violent behavior, or symptoms could serve to exacerbate stress that could be 
successfully addressed but for the existence of those symptoms, causing escalation of anxiety to violence. 
506 Mulvey, supra note 504. 
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profile wouldn’t have told us how likely he was going to walk into a classroom 
and open fire.507 
What seems clear from this discussion is that neither mental health 
professionals nor the mental health system itself will afford general effectiveness in 
the prevention of acts of mass violence, even given expansion of the duty to warn or 
protect traced to Tarasoff. Nor will the availability of treatment of perpetrators be an 
answer to future mass violence because, in most episodes, the perpetrator is either 
killed by law enforcement, stopped by armed civilians intervening as occurred in the 
case of Sutherland Springs, or commits suicide. The death of the perpetrator deprives 
law enforcement officers investigating the episode of the opportunity to interview 
the single most important actor involved. It also deprives mental health professionals 
of the opportunity to investigate the perpetrator’s motivation or mental state at the 
time of its commission, forcing review through a psychological autopsy, typically 
leading only to informed speculation. 
However, two additional lines of inquiry might prove important in looking at 
mass shootings for future understanding. First, there was an obvious lull in the 
commission of mass shootings during 2020, the year in which the United States was 
gripped by the coronavirus pandemic.508 It is likely that the reduction in the number 
of mass shootings is attributable, at least in part, to the sheltering policies that have 
resulted in fewer mass gatherings of people in public spaces.509 
Thus, a possible unintended consequence of the national and local responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic might have been thought to portend a decline in firearms 
violence or episodes of mass violence es, including particularly mass shootings. The 
resulting from enforcement of social distancing regulations imposed as emergency 
responses to the dramatic communicability of this coronavirus, and of self-
enforcement through sheltering-in-place and social distancing protocols, reduced the 
occasion, or opportunity for mass public events. Logically, this resulted in some 
obvious reduction in opportunities for disturbed or ideologically inspired individuals 
to actually engage in acts of mass violence, including mass shootings, that could 
successfully target large numbers of individuals. However, to the extent that social 
                                                          
 
507 Id. 
508 Lisa Marie Pane, In a Year of Pain, One Silver Lining: Fewer Mass Shootings, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
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distancing is not only not enforced but attacked politically by those attending mass 
public events, COVID-19 did not necessarily provide any indirect protection against 
episodes of mass violence.510 Nor did the pandemic apparently result in an overall 
reduction in firearms violence during the year and months of lockdown and forced 
isolation.511 
With the recent easing of many limitations on public gatherings by states,512 
mass shootings in Atlanta, Georgia on March 16, 2021513 and Boulder, Colorado, on 
                                                          
 
510 See, e.g., Alta Spells & Eliott C. McLaughlin, At Least 2 Killed in a Shooting At a Greenville, South 
Carolina, Club, Police Say, CNN (July 5, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/greenville-south-
carolina-shooting/index.html.CNN reported: “The nightclub was hosting a ‘very, very, very, large crowd’ 
for a concert when the shooting erupted, Greenville County Sheriff Hobart Lewis said.” CNN further 
reported that there had not yet been any arrests, but that there were two suspected shooters, with no 
speculation about a motive for the shooting. It quoted the sheriff: “‘There’s a lot of shell casings inside,’ 
Lewis said. ‘Everything is turned over. There are a few chairs in there, food on the floor, some bottles 
busted. You can tell somebody left in a hurry. There are some pretty large amounts of blood.’” Id. 
511 See, e.g., Reis Thebault, Joe Fox & Andrew Ba Tran, 2020 Was the Deadliest Gun Violence Year in 
Decades. So Far, 2021 Is Worse, WASH. POST (June 14, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/ 
2021/06/14/2021-gun-violence/. The Post reports: 
Through the first five months of 2021, gunfire killed more than 8,100 people 
in the United States, about 54 lives lost per day, according to a Washington 
Post analysis of data from the Gun Violence Archive, a nonprofit research 
organization. That’s 14 more deaths per day than the average toll during the 
same period of the previous six years. 
This year, the number of casualties, along with the overall number of shootings 
that have killed or injured at least one person, exceeds those of the first five 
months of 2020, which finished as the deadliest year of gun violence in at least 
two decades. 
Id. 
512 See, e.g., Julie Bosman & Lucy Tomkins, Texas Drops Its Virus Restrictions as a Wave of Reopenings 
Takes Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/02/us/coronavirus-reopening 
-texas.html. 
513 8 Dead in Atlanta Spa Shootings, With Fears of Anti-Asian Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https:// 
www.com/live/2021/03/17/us/shooting-atlanta-acworth (updated Mar. 26, 2021). 
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March 26, 2021514 highlighted an uptick in acts of mass violence for that month.515 
These shootings clearly suggest that a conclusion of the pandemic will not result in 
a departure from the pattern of regular episodes of mass shootings resulting in 
significant loss of life and injuries sustained by shooting victims. They have renewed 
concerns over gun violence and control of firearms.516 
Two very important concerns around the return to regular episodes of mass 
shootings are illustrated, moreover, by the attack on employees of the FedEx Ground 
facility in Indianapolis on April 15, 2021. First, the motive of the 19-year-old 
perpetrator, a former short-term employee at the facility, remains in doubt, but the 
suspect had been identified by federal agents in 2020 and placed under a “mental 
                                                          
 
514 Kate Brumback & Angie Wang, Man Charged With Killing 8 People at Georgia Massage Parlors, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/georgia-massage-parlor-shootings-leave-
8-dead-f3841a8e0215d3ab3d1f23d489b7af81. Six women of Atlanta’s Asian-American community were 
among the eight victims killed in the series of assaults committed by the suspect who told police that he 
suffered from a sex addiction apparently causing his rampage. With respect to this explanation, arguably 
explaining that the motivation for the mass shooting was not the result of ethnic hatred, the authors noted: 
The American Psychiatric Association does not recognize sex addiction in its 
main reference guide for mental disorders. While some people struggle to 
control their sexual behaviors, it’s often linked to other recognized disorders 
or moral views about sexuality, said David Ley, clinical psychologist and 
author of “The Myth of Sex Addiction.” 
Id. 
515 See, e.g., Madeline Holcombe & Dakin Andone, The US Has Reported At Least 50 Mass Shootings 
Since the Atlanta Spa Shootings, CNN (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/18/us/mass-
shootings-since-march-16/index.html. This report references the significant number of mass shootings 
reported in the United States following the Atlanta massage parlor shootings on March 16, 2021. 
516 Christal Hayes, ‘Why Does This Keep Happening?’ Mass Shootings in Boulder and Atlanta Expose 
Loopholes, Weaknesses in Gun Laws, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2021/04/01/mass-shootings-georgia-colorado-expose-lax-gun-laws-amid-cries-
reform/7061512002/. The report focused on acquisition of firearms by perpetrators of the Atlanta and 
Colorado mass shootings: 
The suspect who police said opened fire and killed eight at three spas in 
Georgia—an attack that shook the Asian American community—bought a 
handgun hours before the massacre. Georgia has no state law requiring a 
firearm waiting period, a requirement in 10 states and the District of Columbia 
that aims to save lives by delaying a potential killer from acting on impulse. 
Six days after the Georgia assault, police said, a man described by family 
members as mentally ill attacked a Colorado grocery store and killed 10, 
including an officer. Police said that in the days before the attack, the suspect 
purchased a Ruger AR-556 pistol that experts said largely mirrors a short-
barrel rifle. 
 
M A S S  S H O O T I N G S  
 
P A G E  |  8 3 7   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2021.814 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
health temporary hold” by Indianapolis police.517 But, concern was raised within the 
Sikh community because four of the eight victims killed in the assault were members 
of that community.518 Second, although the suspect’s firearm had previously been 
seized but was not forfeited under Indiana’s “red flag” law, it had been returned to 
him. As a result, he had been able to purchase two semi-automatic rifles lawfully in 
July and October 2020, after being temporarily detained.519 While the perpetrator’s 
death may ultimately prove to frustrate any accurate assessment of his motivation, 
the circumstances of the FedEx shooting illustrate the multiple problems posed for 
prevention of mass shootings even when indications of mental impairment 
suggesting potential for violence are known to law enforcement authorities and 
weaknesses inherent in regulation of access to weapons most likely to be used in 
such episodes fail to deter the ultimate act of mass violence. 
Moreover, it is also clear that if the public isolation that has resulted from 
policies limiting public gatherings and activities has resulted in some lessening of 
the most dramatic and consequential episodes of mass violence, there has also been 
an increase in domestic violence.520 The increase in domestic violence is straining 
public resources for assisting victims: 
                                                          
 
517 Steve Almasy, Jason Hanna & Amanda Watts, Police ID Gunman Who Killed 8 People at an 
Indianapolis FedEx Facility as 19-year-old Former Employee, CNN (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.cnn 
.com/2021/04/16/us/indianapolis-shooting-fedex-facility/index.html. 
518 Nora Naughton & Laura Kusisto, FedEx Shooting Probe Centers on Motives, Gun Purchases, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-fedex-shooting-gun-purchases-motives-under-
investigation-11618758394. 
519 Id. 
520 See, e.g., Andrew M. Campbell, An Increasing Risk of Family Violence During the Covid-19 
Pandemic: Strengthening Community Collaborations to Save Lives, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 1 (Apr. 12, 
2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7152912/pdf/main.pdf, observing: 
With shelter in-place measures and widespread organizational closures related 
to Covid-19 likely to continue for an extended period of time, stress and 
associated risk factors for family violence such as unemployment, reduced 
income, limited resources, and limited social support are likely to be further 
compounded. 
. . . 
An increasing risk of domestic violence-related homicide is also a growing 
concern—reports continue to surface around the globe of intimate partner 
homicides with ties to stress or other factors related to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Reports of increasing gun and ammunition sales in the U.S. during the crisis 
are particularly concerning given the clear link between firearm access and 
fatal domestic violence incidents. 
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The coronavirus has created new tensions. Staying at home has worsened 
abusive situations. Shelters worry about the spread of the virus. Americans have 
been cooped up at home for months to slow the spread of the coronavirus, many 
of them living in small spaces, reeling from sudden job losses and financial 
worries. Children are home from school in every state in the country. 
That confinement has led to another spiraling crisis: Doctors and advocates 
for victims are seeing signs of an increase in violence at home. They are hearing 
accounts of people lashing out, particularly at women and children. 
“No one can leave,” Kim Foxx, the chief prosecutor in Chicago, said in an 
interview. “You’re literally mandating that people who probably should not be 
together in the same space stay.” 
The problems have only deepened since stay-at-home orders were first 
imposed.521 
An interesting consequence of the pandemic in this respect may well be 
whether the decline in mass violence would be reversed as the population returns to 
a pre-pandemic state with respect to public life. The increased vigilance in public 
places, including schools, retail establishments, and social entertainment venues such 
as restaurants, bars, theaters, and recreational areas could carry over as circumstances 
for social interaction return to what is often referred to as normal could influence 
public behavior enhancing security that could have frustrated perpetrators of mass 
violence and reduce episodes, but recent evidence does not support this speculation. 
The speculation would have been predicated, at least in part, on the unproved 
suggestion that episodes of mass violence, particularly mass shootings, might be 
attributed to factors in which press coverage and comments influence other 
disaffected individuals to commit similar acts.522 A decline in highly publicized 
episodes of mass shootings could theoretically have resulted in an overall reduction 
in mass violence. Researchers addressing the process of “imitation,”523 have 
                                                          
 
521 Julie Bosman, Domestic Violence Calls Mount as Restrictions Linger: ‘No One Can Leave,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/domestic-violence-coronavirus.html. 
522 James N. Meindl & Jonathan W. Ivy, Mass Shootings: The Role of the Media in Promoting Generalized 
Imitation, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 368 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC5296697/pdf/AJPH.2016.303611.pdf. James N. Meindl is Associate Professor of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, University of Memphis. See ICL Faculty, U. MEMPHIS, https://www.memphis.edu/icl/faculty/. 
Jonathan W. Ivy is Assistant Professor of Psychology, Penn State Harrisburg and Professor-in-Charge, 
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concluded that, with respect to mass shooters, media coverage of mass shootings is 
important in influencing commission of other mass shootings: 
Importantly, the way that the media report an event can play a role in 
increasing the probability of imitation. When a mass shooting event occurs, there 
is generally extensive media coverage. This coverage often repeatedly presents 
the shooter’s image, manifesto, and life story and the details of the event and doing 
so can directly influence imitation.524 
It could ultimately be that the reordering of social interaction during the 
pandemic would result in a reduction in incidents of mass violence even after the 
conclusion of policies designed to enforce social distancing because the lack of press 
coverage of mass shootings will reduce the influence of mass acts in precipitating 
copycat shootings. Or, it could be that the end of the social-distancing policy will 
eventually recreate circumstances ripe for mass violence in public spaces. The 
unresolved questions raised by the social conditions dictated by the pandemic cannot, 
of course, be answered until some point in the future, but recent history suggests that 
the response to the pandemic will not contribute to any reduction in mass shootings 
or firearms violence in the United States. 
However, a second issue that might well bear on the problem of preventing 
mass shootings and other episodes of mass violence warrants consideration. This 
arises from evidence of the significantly greater number of violent acts involving 
firearms that are committed in the United States than in other countries. In an 
editorial op-ed, New York Times reporters Max Fisher and Josh Keller referred to 
data pointing out the high level of violence associated with crime in the United States 
in addressing the problem of mass shootings. They initially noted: “America’s gun 
homicide rate was 33 per million people in 2009, far exceeding the average among 
developed countries. In Canada and Britain, it was 5 per million and 0.7 per million, 
respectively, which also corresponds with differences in gun ownership.”525 The 
authors draw the link between gun ownership and mass shootings by rejecting other 
explanations: 
                                                          
 
524 Id. at 369. 
525 Max Fisher & Josh Keller, What Explains U.S. Mass Shootings? International Comparisons Suggest 
an Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:41 A.M.), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/world/ 
americas/mass-shootings-us-international.html. 
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But there is one quirk that consistently puzzles America’s fans and critics 
alike. Why, they ask, does it experience so many mass shootings? 
Perhaps, some speculate, it is because American society is unusually 
violent. Or its racial divisions have frayed the bonds of society. Or its citizens lack 
proper mental care under a health care system that draws frequent derision 
abroad.526 
They then conclude that mental illness cannot explain the substantially higher 
numbers of mass shootings in the United States, for instance.527 Instead, they focus 
on gun ownership within a population as the key factor: 
These explanations share one thing in common: Though seemingly sensible, 
all have been debunked by research on shootings elsewhere in the world. Instead, 
an ever-growing body of research consistently reaches the same conclusion. 
The only variable that can explain the high rate of mass shootings in 
America is its astronomical number of guns.528 
Whether other explanations than gun ownership have actually been “debunked” is 
debatable, and Fisher and Keller overlook the obvious question in stressing 
ownership as the responsible factor for mass shootings. That is: What explains the 
substantially greater ownership of guns by Americans than other populations? 
Widespread ownership of guns by Americans does not, in itself, explain why 
those weapons are used in the commission of acts of mass violence. Moreover, there 
is absolutely no support for any suggestion that the federal and state governments 
could undertake a program of weapons reduction, whether voluntary buy-backs or 
involuntary seizures, that could successfully result in a significant reduction in the 
aggregate number of weapons. Only the paranoid speculation by elements of the 
population opposing all government regulation of firearms ownership or acquisition 
                                                          
 
526 Id. 
527 Id. (“A 2015 study estimated that only 4 percent of American gun deaths could be attributed to mental 
health issues.”) (Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence, supra note 476). They also relied on 
research by Dr. Adam Lankford, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of 
Alabama and his findings with respect to incidence of mass shootings. See Adam Lankford, U. ALA., 
https://cj.ua.edu/people/adam-lankford/; see, e.g., Adam Lankford, Public Mass Shooters and Firearms: 
A Cross-National Study of 171 Countries, 31 VIOLENCE VICTIMS 187 (2016), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm 
.nih.gov/26822013/#affiliation-1. 
528 Fisher & Keller, supra note 525. 
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would even manufacture such a conspiracy, despite former Texas Democratic 
Representative and candidate for the 2020 Democrat presidential nomination Beto 
O’Rourke’s claim: “Hell yes we’re going to take your AR-15,” made in the wake of 
the El Paso Walmart mass shooting in August, 2019.529 
What cannot be denied is that the history of the United States is one of violence 
and racial discrimination. To dismiss these factors in assessing the country’s 
character ignores that the actualization of its Manifest Destiny in the policies of 
genocide and racial discrimination reflected in the wars against native populations 
and legal slavery. It is possible that there is a flaw in the American character that 
reflects its violent past, a past born out of conflict and conquest dominated by the 
prevalence of firearms. 
Fisher and Keller cite a revealing array of statistical comparisons between the 
United States and other developed nations with respect to gun ownership and gun 
violence that certainly suggest that gun ownership is the determining factor in the 
higher incidence of gun violence. But their position that ownership explains mass 
shootings runs contrary to the evidence they rely on in arguing that the refusal to 
regulate firearms is the cause. For instance: 
In 2013, American gun-related deaths included 21,175 suicides, 11,208 
homicides and 505 deaths caused by an accidental discharge. That same year in 
Japan, a country with one-third America’s population, guns were involved in only 
13 deaths. 
This means an American is about 300 times more likely to die by gun 
homicide or accident than a Japanese person. America’s gun ownership rate is 150 
times as high as Japan’s. That gap between 150 and 300 shows that gun ownership 
statistics alone do not explain what makes America different.530 
If, in this instance, they conclude that “gun ownership statistics alone do not explain 
what makes America different,”531 the logical conclusion is that something in the 
American character, or a value shared by many in the American community, is more 
likely responsible for mass shootings than simply access to firearms. A tiny minority 
                                                          
 
529 Beto O’Rourke on Gun Control: ‘Hell Yes We’re Going To Take Your AR-15,’ NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/video/beto-o-rourke-hell-yes-we-re-going-to-take-your-ar-15-
68832325641. 
530 Fisher & Keller, supra note 525 (emphasis added). 
531 Id. 
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of individuals commit acts of mass violence, yet there is still a hesitance to regulate 
firearms more aggressively.532 That hesitance suggests nothing less than a tolerance 
for violence, as they note in the conclusion of their essay: 
“In retrospect Sandy Hook marked the end of the US gun control debate,” 
Dan Hodges, a British journalist, wrote in a post on Twitter two years ago, 
referring to the 2012 attack that killed 20 young students at an elementary school 
in Connecticut. “Once America decided killing children was bearable, it was 
over.”533 
The end of the pandemic and relative normalization of social interactions, 
particularly in public spaces, will offer additional perspective on the factors that may 
be at the root of mass shootings. Regardless, understanding the motivations of 
perpetrators will likely have little impact on prevention given the likelihood that they 
will continue to die in the conclusion of their acts of mass violence, whether as a 
result of suicide or intervention by law enforcement or civilians, who will also be 
armed with firearms. What does seem clear is that the circumstances in which 
Tarasoff duties to warn or protect, regardless of their precise parameters within any 
given jurisdiction, will not prevent the overwhelming number of mass shootings even 
if prevention occurs in some cases. Even when mass shootings may be linked to 
mental illness or mental disturbance, the likelihood that perpetrators will themselves 
be linked to mental health evaluation or treatment would appear dim, at best. 
EPILOGUE 
The mass shooting at the FedEx distribution center in Indianapolis in April 
2021, following the earlier episodes of mass violence in March in Atlanta, Georgia 
                                                          
 
532 Ironically, the Brookings Institution reports: 
The perceived threat of mass shootings by American citizens now dwarfs the 
threat of attacks by Islamist terrorists. 60 percent fear the former more than the 
latter; only 17 percent disagree. This holds true for Democrats and 
Republicans, liberals and conservatives, men and women, whites with and 
without a college degree, urban, suburban, and rural residents, and (by a 
margin of 53 percent to 23 percent) gun owners. But despite the urgency of 
this threat, only 15 percent of Americans, and fewer than one-third of 
Republicans, believe that the Trump administration has made the country safer 
from mass shootings. 
Galston & Hendrickson, supra note 477. 
533 Fisher & Keller, supra note 525. 
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and Boulder, Colorado, offers dramatic evidence that the relative silence in mass 
public violence during the COVID-19 pandemic will not prove to be a permanent 
cessation of these crimes. Instead, these very high profile episodes, coupled with the 
significant number of total mass shootings documented over the first months of 
2021,534 suggest quite the opposite—that public events of carnage caused by firearms 
will continue, at least in the foreseeable future. The FedEx shooting offered many of 
the most critical factual scenarios discussed in this Article, including: 
● The fact that the perpetrator’s death during the assault has left law 
enforcement without a definitive finding as to the cause for his actions. Recent 
investigation indicates that the shooter had accessed white supremacist political 
websites and was interested in a cultish fascination with “My Little Pony,” 
associated with “Bronies,”535 that suggests online involvement with extremist 
groups, often showing misogynist beliefs or tendencies;536 
● The shootings occurred at the perpetrator’s former workplace, or place of 
employment, a common feature of many mass shootings;537 
● Four of the victims who were killed were members of the Sikh community 
in Indianapolis, raising the possibility that race or ethnic discrimination or 
religious discrimination was the motivation, or a factor, in the mass shooting;538 
● The shooter, Brandon Hole, had previously interacted with local police in 
a dangerous situation in which his mother reported that he was threatening to 
commit suicide, pointing an unloaded shotgun at officers during a confrontation, 
with police seizing the weapon. During their investigation, police had found 
evidence that Hole visited white supremacist internet sites;539 
● Because police had failed to invoke Indiana’s “red flag law” following 
seizure of the shotgun, purportedly based on time constraints for developing 
evidence necessary to warrant seizure, Hole’s shotgun had been returned to him 
                                                          
 
534 See supra note 515. 
535 See Katie Shepherd, FedEx Shooter Visited ‘White Supremacist’ Sites and Surrendered a Shotgun, but 
Didn’t Trigger Red-Flag Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/ 
2021/04/20/indianapolis-shooter-white-supremacist-websites/. The shooter was believed to possibly be 
attracted to the “bronie subculture,” according to sources: “Many ‘Bronies’ put on conventions, collect 
pony figurines, and celebrate the show in online message boards, but some pockets of the online 
community are rife with violent images and white supremacist rhetoric.” Id. 
536 See generally supra notes 467–72 and accompanying text. 
537 See supra Section V.B.1.c. 
538 See supra notes 397, 518 and accompanying text. 
539 Shepherd, supra, note 535. 
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and the law’s provisions that would have prevented him from purchasing weapons 
lawfully permitted his purchase of two semi-automatic weapons months before 
the FedEx shooting;540 
● The incident in which police had encountered Hole following the reported 
suicide threat led to a follow-up investigation by the FBI regarding his potential 
for committing a terrorist act.541 
The FedEx shooting would appear to reflect precisely the set of circumstances 
that might trigger further investigation into the perpetrator’s potential to commit a 
mass shooting. Prevention of the episode, however, would not appear to have 
necessarily impossible, given the large numbers of mentally ill and personality 
disordered individuals in this country, access to weapons, and availability of internet 
sites promoting politically or socially extreme viewpoints. Moreover, thus far, there 
is no evidence or indication that the shooter had been involved in mental health 
treatment or therapy in which he might have disclosed his intent or threat to commit 
an act of violence toward third persons that would have triggered a warning or other 
protective act by a mental health professional.542 
Author’s note: The discussion of mass shootings that have occurred in the 
United States during the writing of this Article essentially concludes with references 
to the Indianapolis FedEx shooting as a matter of necessity. The frequent recurrence 
of these episodes and their relevance to the issues addressed here has certainly 
slowed the writing and editing processes. Even in the final stages of editing, the 
workplace shooting at the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority terminal in 
San Jose, California543 on May 26 occurred, illustrating the difficulty in attempting 
a comprehensive discussion of these episodes in addressing the problems associated 
with mass shootings and expectations that expansion of the Tarasoff duty could 
reasonably be expected to end the recurring violence of mass shootings. 
This Article includes significant use of descriptive language regarding 
aberrant behavior serving to address mental state elements in the definition of crime, 
as well as descriptions of behavior or mental state relating to mental impairment or 




542 Under Indiana law, a mental health professional has a duty to warn an intended victim or appropriate 
law enforcement agencies or take precautionary measures, such as emergency civil commitment, designed 
to prevent patient violence toward a third person. IND. CODE § 34-30-16-2. 
543 See, e.g., Jason Hanna, Josh Campbell & Amir Vera, The San Jose Gunman Appeared To Specifically 
Target His Victims, Sheriff Says, CNN (May 28, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/27/us/san-jose-
shooting-thursday/index.html. 
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disorders, descriptive language that may be questioned as to accuracy by mental 
health professionals. Discussion of mental state is often difficult for the lawyer not 
trained in psychiatry or psychology and imprecision or complication in language 
may even lead to questions in litigation, as evident in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 359 (1997) (“[T]he States have, over the years, developed numerous specialized 
terms to define mental health concepts. Often, those definitions do not fit precisely 
with the definitions employed by the medical community.”). Errors in descriptive 
language in this Article are attributable to the author only. 
